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ABSTRACT 
 The philosophical and empirical study reported here developed from the 
observation that information science has had no comprehensive understanding 
of nonuse of information. Without such an understanding, information workers 
may use the words "nonuse of information" while referring to very different 
phenomena. This lack of understanding makes the job of the information 
professional difficult. For example, the model presented here reduces hundreds 
of theories of information behavior to a conceptually manageable taxonomy of six 
conditions that lead to nonuse of information. The six conditions include: 1) 
intrinsic somatic conditions, 2) socio-environmental barriers, 3) authoritarian 
controls, 4) threshold knowledge shortfall, 5) attention shortfall, and 6) 
 ix
information filtering. This dissertation explains and provides examples of each 
condition. 
 The study of a novel area that had no prior theory or model required a 
novel methodology. Thus, for this study, I adopted the pragmatism formulated by 
Charles Sanders Peirce, a method of evaluating concepts by their practical 
consequences. This pragmatism applied in two ways to the study of nonuse of 
information. First, because nonuse of information is a behavior, pragmatism 
helped me to limit the psychologic implications of the study to behavior, rather 
than to expand the discussion to psychodynamics or cognition, for example. I 
justified this limiting on the basis that behavior reflects the use or nonuse of 
information, and behavior is more observable than other aspects of psychology, 
such as cognition. Second, Peirce's concept of pragmatism supported another of 
his contributions to philosophical inquiry, retroduction, sometimes referred to as 
abduction. To study nonuse of information through retroduction, I created a five-
step "definition heuristic," based on the writings of Spradley and McCurdy. I then 
created a nine-step "retroduction heuristic" based on the system of logic 
identified and termed "retroductive" or "abductive" by Peirce. I used this heuristic 
to identify examples of nonuse of information and applied the examples to a 
second corpus of research reports that contained examples of compelled nonuse 
of information. The taxonomy of this study resulted from this second application 
and represents a descriptive model of compelled nonuse of information. 
 x
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The strongest human instinct is to impart information.  
The second strongest is to resist it.  
--widely attributed to Scottish author Kenneth Grahame (1859-1932) 
The subject of this study 
[T]he aircraft began its takeoff roll, accelerated to a maximum of about 137 
knots, ran off the end of the runway through the airport perimeter fence, and 
impacted trees on an adjacent horse farm. The entire sequence took about 
36 seconds. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash 
fire. (National Transportation Safety Board, 2006) 
[T]he genocide of Jewish people [was not] murder but [w]as “the ‘holiest 
human right and … obligation,’ which is ‘to see to it that the blood is 
preserved pure and, by preserving the best humanity, to create the 
possibility of a nobler development of these beings’.” (Adolf Hitler, 1939, p. 
606; quoted by Lifton, 1986, p. 431; quoted by Tsang, 2002, p. 39) 
[W]omen may be particularly vulnerable to this learning barrier [anxiety 
concerning personal mastery] because of a lifetime of subtle and not-so-
subtle inferences of personal inadequacy in educational settings. (Dunn, 
1987; cited in Dore, 1994, p. 99) 
Forty-nine of the 50 people aboard the aircraft died because the pilots and air 
traffic controller ignored information that the aircraft was on the wrong runway. 
Some six million Jews died because Nazis created nonuse of information among 
tens of millions of German people. Hundreds of millions of women in the U.S. do 
not fulfill their potential because educational systems provide misleading 
information about their capabilities. These three situations appear to occupy 
discrete contexts (aviation safety, political science, sociology), yet the three 
share a thread--the compelled nonuse of information. Perhaps we could 
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recognize and mitigate similar situations if we could unravel that thread and 
follow it to understanding. 
 Teachers, librarians, orators, and members of the helping professions 
such as counselors and psychologists -- in short, information workers -- daily 
confront the use and nonuse of information. They train and practice, and they 
develop concepts about information sufficient to the conduct of their work and 
lives. These concepts, however, are highly individualistic, requiring each 
information worker, in effect, to "reinvent the wheel" with respect to developing 
concepts about the use or nonuse of information. This process of reinvention 
may be a necessary part of vocational maturation -- but what if it is not? What if 
we could create consensus about certain basic concepts in the field of 
information science? For example, could consensus on a concept such as 
compelled nonuse of information (CNI) facilitate training, maturation, and 
communication among information workers? This dissertation begins to explore 
that possibility by reporting the results of a philosophical and empirical study of 
CNI. 
The place of this study in the field of information science 
 Over the last 40 years, the literature of information science has contained 
reviews of information use. In the view of many (e.g., R. S. Taylor, 1978, ch. 3), 
these reviews generally focused on information needs, uses, and users. The 
Annual Review of Information Science and Technology (ARIST) published T. J. 
Allen's review of information needs (1969, p. 3). While prior reviews had focused 
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on information systems, Allen's review centered on the user. In 1986, ARIST 
published a review by Dervin and Nilan (1986) of studies between 1978 and 
1986 that followed this emphasis on the user, an emphasis called by some a 
"user turn." These studies investigated the information needs of the individual 
user, rather than the design of systems or the needs of classes of users. The ISI 
Web of Knowledge database of scholarly articles reported that the Dervin and 
Nilan article was cited 275 times between 1986 and 2008, and a number of 
information scientists (Durrance, 1989; Chang & Rice, 1993, p. 231; T. D. Wilson, 
1997, p. 551; Glammack, 1999, p. 16; Frohmann, 2004, ch. 2) have included the 
Dervin and Nilan article in lists of influential articles. T. D. Wilson (1981, p. 3); 
Dervin and Nilan (1986); Westbrook (1993; 1995); T. D. Wilson (1994; 1997); 
Bates (1999); T. D. Wilson (1999a; 1999b; 2000); Case (2002); and Fisher et al. 
(2005) comprise a very small sample of this "user" literature. 
 Over the last 60 years, however, the literature of information science has 
contained only infrequent reviews of information nonuse, whether from a systems 
or a user viewpoint. Notable reviews of nonuse appear in Zipf (1949), Dervin 
(1973), Wurman (1989; 2001), T. D. Wilson (1997), and Case (2002). Chapter 2 
presents in more detail a review of the literature of information use and nonuse. 
This study extends the list of reviews of nonuse by evaluating a corpus of 
approximately 1,400 articles that mention the concept of nonuse of information. 
This corpus resulted from a search of the texts contained in several academic 
databases for the keywords listed in Appendix 1. The magnitude of this project 
 
 4
dictated the choice of databases: other than the two exceptions noted in 
Appendix 1, the chosen databases provided full-text on-line access to articles, 
with a minimum of database manipulation. Searches of other databases, 
particularly those searched by common Web search engines such as Google, 
returned few full-text articles and far too many coincidental and incorrect matches 
to be of practical value to this study. A pilot project about nonuse of information 
provided the search terms. 
 This study presents a taxonomy and description of a subset of conditions 
leading to of nonuse of information, specifically, conditions leading to compelled 
nonuse of information (CNI). The taxonomy of conditions compelling nonuse of 
information appears in Figure 1.1, which follows. 
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Figure 1.1, Part 1: SOMATIC BARRIERS to information use (excess of "push") 
 
1 Intrinsic somatic conditions 
1.1 Congenital abnormalities and subsequent trauma leading to physical 
impairments 
1.1.1 Toxic influences in pregnancy, such as alcohol 
1.1.2 Maternal psychological disturbance, such as stress 
1.1.3 Perinatal risk factors, such as low birth weight 
1.1.4 Toxic chemicals in the environment, such as lead 
1.1.5 Infectious causes, such as Lyme disease 
1.1.6 Selective deficiencies, such as iodine deficiency 
1.1.7 Head injury 
1.1.8 Neglect and malnutrition 
1.2 Trauma that leads to psychological predispositions 
1.2.1 Dissociation 
1.2.2 Homeostasis 
1.2.3 Neuro-chemical mandates 
1.2.4 Advanced age 
1.3 Intrinsic psychological predispositions 
1.3.1 Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences 
1.3.2 Miller Behavioral Style Scale 
1.3.3 Avoidant coping style 
1.3.4 Sex differences 
(1.3.5 Limits of short-term memory, & eidetic v. symbolic imagery) 
1.4 Intrinsic somatic conditions of uncertain origin, such as those listed in 
the DSM-IV 
2 Socio-environmental barriers  
2.1 Geographical or temporal isolation  
2.2 Inadequate or malfunctioning information systems 
2.3 Lack of capital 
2.3.1 Lack of economic capital 
2.3.2 Lack of cultural capital 
2.3.3 Lack of social capital 
3 Authoritarian controls, listed from greatest to least intentionality 
3.1 Censorship (including restrictive information systems) 
3.2 Disinformation 
3.3 Reward and punishment 
3.4 Explicit approval or disapproval 




(Figure 1.1 concluded on next page) 
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Figure 1.1, Part 2: COGNITIVE BARRIERS to information use (lack of "pull") 
 
4 Threshold knowledge shortfall 
4.1 Illiteracy and other unfamiliar encoding systems 
4.2 Mutually unintelligible languages 
4.3 Special vocabularies 
4.4 Sufficient language 
4.5 Euphemistic language 
4.6 Extra-lexical information 
4.7 Lack of awareness of availability of information 
5 Attention shortfall 
5.1 Engrossment, flow, involvement, presence, rumination 
5.2 Distraction 
5.3 Affect: emotion or mood 
5.3.1 Threat to life 
5.3.2 Threat to health 
5.3.3 Threat to self-image or ego 
5.3.3.1 Threat to self-image, negative face, or positive face 
5.3.3.2 Threat to one's image as held by others 
5.3.3.3 Attribution theory 
5.3.4 Fear of the unknown 
5.3.5 Factors that mitigate affect 
5.3.5.1 Perceived lack of self-efficacy 
5.3.5.2 Pre-existing affective state 
5.3.5.3 Proximity of the threat 
5.4 Priming  
5.4.1 Lexical priming (and semantic priming) 
5.4.2 Priming with respect to the source of the information 
5.4.3 Priming via naïve conceptions 
6 Information filtering 
6.1 Least effort  
6.1.1 Avoidance of cognitive overload 
6.1.2 Resignation 
6.1.3 Avoidance of information where cost exceeds benefit (including 
"optimal foraging" or satisficing) 
6.1.4 Avoidance of activity involving "the life of the mind" 
6.2 Least conflict (seeking "fit," or avoidance of apperception) 
6.2.1 Avoidance of irrelevant or "wrong" information 
6.2.2 Avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
6.2.3 Principle of the best 
6.2.4 Deference to cognitive authority (based on content) 
Figure 1.1: The taxonomy of conditions leading to CNI 
 
 7
This dissertation defines and describes CNI and specifically does not describe 
other facets of information studies, such as volitional nonuse of information (VNI). 
Of the approximately 1,400 articles retrieved by the full-text search, 114 
pertained to the subject of this study, as explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 
presents in more detail the methodology used to derive the taxonomy of 




     Information behavior .  
 
    Information nonuse .          Information use . 
 
  Compelled nonuse of information .         Volitional nonuse of information . 
 
                                                      (this study) 
 
Figure 1.2: The scope of this study within the field of information studies. 
The Definition of Compelled Nonuse of Information (CNI) 
 The definition of CNI used in this study rests on the definitions of three 
fundamental concepts: a definition of information, a definition of information 
behavior, and a definition of "compelled." These concepts occur frequently in 
academic and non-academic speech, and their definitions here apply only to the 
study reported in this dissertation. A definition of CNI follows the explanation of 
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the three fundamental definitions, derived from various literatures as explained in 
Chapter 3. 
A definition of information 
 The definition of CNI rests first on Bateson's definition of "information" as 
"a difference which makes a difference" (1972, p. 453). Although some scholars 
may not accept Bateson's assertion, others do, in the fields of education (e.g., 
Erickson, 2004, p. 492; Mathiasen, 2004, p. 275; Davis & Sumara, 2007, p, 55), 
information science (e.g., Brier, 2004, pp. 643 & 646; Jacob, 2004, p. 515), 
psychology (Cowan & Presbury, 2000), and Marxist scholarship applied to 
education (McClaren, 2006, p. 92). In formulating his definition, Bateson was 
trying to quantify information (cf. Harmon, 1984, 1986), to develop a calculus of 
information, using the mathematical concept of "change," frequently expressed 
as the Greek symbol for delta, ∆ or ∂. He expressed this concept of information 
as "a change that makes a change." Bateson later substituted "difference" for 
"change" to present the definition commonly recognized as his, as diagrammed 
in Figure 1.3: 
 
 "a ∆ that makes a ∆" (e.g., ∆i / ∆t) 
   "a change that makes a change" 
     "a difference that makes a difference" 
Figure 1.3: The evolution of Bateson's definition of information. 
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 The study reported here continues in two respects Bateson's quest for a 
calculus of information. First, conditions leading to CNI appear in Figure 1.1 in an 
ordinal scale, ordered from least to most involvement of conscious cognitive 
processes. This presentation of an ordinal scale is a step toward the 
development of interval and ratio scales, which then might facilitate the 
development of a calculus of information. This is not to say that creating an 
interval or ratio scale for CNI is possible or desirable. The ordinal scale merely 
takes information science one step further toward determining whether CNI can 
be quantified. Second, the elements in the present taxonomy of conditions 
leading to CNI appear to conform to the fundamental laws of modern physics, 
specifically, the conservation laws of classical mechanics: conservation of mass, 
conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, and the like. I summarize 
these fundamental laws very crudely and anthropomorphically by the expression: 
"Things do not like to change." The elements in this taxonomy appear to 
represent, each in its own way, maintenance of status quo and a concordance to 
the classical mechanics of modern physics. Whether the analogy proves to be 
valid or false, it can be tested, which is one step further than Bateson got. The 
study reported here explores the universe of information as defined by Bateson 
and investigates CNI within that universe.  
A definition of information behavior 
 The second fundamental concept important to this study is information 
behavior, and three definitions of information behavior undergird this study. The 
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first, a generalization reminiscent of positivistic communications and information 
theory (e.g., Shannon & Weaver, 1949) defines information behavior as "the 
totality of human behavior in relation to sources and channels of information, 
including both active and passive information seeking, and information use" (T. 
D. Wilson, 2000, p. 49). Wilson's definition parallels closely that of the Library of 
Congress Subject Heading Scope Note for "Information behavior": "Here are 
entered works on the ways human beings interact with various sources and 
channels of information, including both active and passive information-seeking, 
and information use." 
 The second definition of information behavior important to this study, a 
more constructivist definition, defines information behavior as "how people need, 
seek, give, and use information in different contexts, including the workplace and 
everyday living" (Pettigrew et al., 2001, p. 44). As used in this study, these 
definitions do not contradict each other and apply interchangeably. 
 The third definition of information behavior important to this study, a 
definition based in my study of behavioral psychology, defines information 
behavior as a response to a stimulus, where the stimulus is information and the 
response is a use or nonuse of information. In this study, these definitions do not 
contradict each other and apply interchangeably. 
 Based on these three definitions, this study defines information behavior 
through its characteristics, such as the conditions that lead to it and the nature of 
its manifestations, and examines information behaviors reported in the literatures 
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of information science and related fields. These reports frequently result from 
empirical observations of information behavior, such as observations of library 
reference queries (R. S. Taylor, 1962) or observations of lack of library reference 
queries, that is, observations of patrons' reluctance to pose reference queries 
(Durrance, 1989). Thus, for this study, information behaviors consist of those 
behaviors described by studies, largely empirical, of how people interact (or fail 
to interact) with information. 
A definition of "compelled" 
 The third and perhaps most important fundamental concept that is 
necessary to understanding this study is the difference between volitional and 
compelled behavior. In brief, this study defines compelled behavior as behavior 
over which the person performing the behavior has no control. Volitional 
behavior, then, is behavior over which the person has control. In other words, 
when a person has no control over the initiation of a response to a stimulus, that 
response comprises compelled behavior. 
 A more fundamental explanation of the difference between CNI and VNI 
requires a classification of types of cognition. Cognition may occur over a 
continuum of strengths, as in "a dawning awareness" or "a half-remembered 
dream," but, for the purposes of this study, cognition falls into the dichotomy of 
traceable or non-traceable cognition. Figure 1.4 below diagrams this dichotomy 
and presents the relationship of CNI to types of cognition. CNI appears in the top 
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half and VNI appears in the bottom, and this distinction between intuition and 
traceable cognition is vital to a diagnosis of CNI or VNI, as explained below. 
 
 COGNITION      (The taxonomy 
 of Figure 1.1) 
 1 Intuition is "instant cognition" with no traceable reasoning. ↑ CNI 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 2 Traceable cognition has traceable reasoning.  ↓ VNI 
 A) Induction is traceable reasoning from facts to probable theories. 
 B) Deduction is traceable reasoning from theories to predictable facts. 
Figure 1.4: The continuum of cognition with respect to nonuse of information. 
Note that CNI, represented by the taxonomy of Figure 1.1, lies in the top half of 
this diagram, in the portion labeled "Intuition." 
 Intuition has the least traceable cognition, followed in order by induction 
and deduction (Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, 2000, p. 403). 
The line of reasoning leading to intuition remains, by definition, untraceable. 
However, the traceable induction popularized by Sherlock Holmes (mislabeled by 
Conan Doyle as deduction) leads to a probable end, although it also can lead to 
other probable ends. The reasoning of correctly labeled deduction follows 
traceable, logical rules and leads to a relatively certain conclusion. Because 
behavior resulting from traceable cognition is volitional, the CNI that is the 
subject of this study includes only the intuitive elements of nonuse of information, 
elements that involve no traceable cognition and, therefore, no volition.  
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 An important factor in the diagnosing of CNI appears at this point in this 
discussion, the traceability by an observer of a person's cognition. If the cognition 
appears to be illogical or irrational, the person may be experiencing a compulsion 
such as psychological disorder (e.g., Element 1.4 in Figure 1.1, intrinsic somatic 
conditions of uncertain origin, such as those listed in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, DSM-IV). The judgment of 
illogical or irrational, however, can result from a CNI on the part of the observer 
(e.g., prejudice), so that such a judgment must be used cautiously. For example, 
if I have pre-judged all Ruritanians to be sub-human and fit only for slavery, then 
I will think of Ruritanian emancipators as irrational. Thus, if the person performing 
a behavior can trace the cognition leading to the behavior, the behavior, in 
general, should be considered volitional, regardless of what the person observing 
the behavior thinks. 
 A useful separation between VNI and CNI lies at a point where the 
information user/nonuser becomes aware of the cognition that precedes the 
nonuse. In other words, when the person becomes aware of the cognition that 
precedes nonuse of information (e.g., "Hmmm, this appears to be a political 
commercial."), can trace the cognitive paths that led to the nonuse (e.g., "I never 
listen to political commercials."), and maintains the nonuse (e.g., "Therefore, I will 
not listen to this commercial."), the nonuse becomes volitional.  
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 This difference between volitional and compelled behavior applies only to 
the use or nonuse of information and mandates an important modification to 




 Information behavior .  
 
 
     Intuition, or "instant" cognition .   Traceable cognition . 
 
 
 Compelled information behavior .   Volitional information behavior . 
 
 
 Compelled Volitional 
 nonuse of Compelled  nonuse of Volitional 
 information use of information use of 
  information information 
 
 
         (this study) 
 
Figure 1.5: The scope of this study within a revised diagram of the field of 
information studies. 
In this revised diagram of information behavior, the widely accepted bifurcation 
between use and nonuse of information becomes less important than the 
bifurcation between compelled and volitional behavior. With these definitions of 
information, information behavior, and "compelled," we now can define CNI. 
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A definition of CNI 
 Using the definitions of information, information behavior, volitional 
behavior, and compelled behavior, this dissertation defines CNI. 
 
CNI describes behaviors beyond the control of a person,  
behaviors that do not allow a difference to make a difference. 
 
This definition is a dictionary definition, one of five possible types of definitions, 
as explained in Chapter 3. Although it reifies and personifies CNI in a somewhat 
simplistic manner, it describes concisely the manifestations of CNI found in the 
study corpus. The study itself comprises a full definition of CNI. As with 
Bateson's, Wilson's, and Pettigrew et al.'s definitions of information and 
information behavior, this dictionary definition of CNI does not require 
specification of why information is not allowed to make a difference, what 
information is not allowed to make a difference, or by or to whom the information 
is not allowed to make a difference. Why, what, by whom, and to whom comprise 
contexts in which CNI operates. Although extremely important, as such, to the 
study of information, these contexts do not affect the taxonomy of CNI developed 
by this study, because the taxonomy describes information behavior at a higher 
level of abstraction, embracing all contexts simultaneously. In other words, 




 At this point, two further concepts prove useful, the concept of mitigation 
and the concept of resistance to change. For the purposes of this taxonomy, CNI 
can be mitigated by additional information. In this sense, mitigation refers to a 
modification or reduction of CNI. This concept of additional information does not 
mean that CNI will be mitigated or should be mitigated; but that CNI could be 
mitigated with sufficient additional information. 
 As explained above, the second concept, resistance to change, conforms 
to the conservation laws of classical physics and underlies virtually all examples 
of CNI. In other words, each example of CNI resembles the convenient fictional 
concept of a closed system that attempts to maintain an internal status quo. For 
example, the mechanism of habituation attempts to maintain an internal 
homeostasis when a person's body experiences trauma. The additional 
information required to mitigate that CNI is an "unbalanced force" in the sense of 
Newton's First Law of Motion, in which an object in motion will remain in motion 
and an object at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon by an unbalanced 
force. The addition of information also satisfies Newton's Third Law of Motion, 
"For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction," in that the introduction 
of an unbalanced force into a closed system produces a proportionate change in 
the system. Because of its fundamental applicability to all examples of CNI, 
"resistance to change" appears here as a meta-theory, operating at a higher level 
of abstraction than CNI, and this study will not discuss it further. 
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The rationale for a study of CNI 
 The potential contributions of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science are several. Explanations follow this list: 
1. presentation of a methodology for investigating a phenomenon for which 
prior study has not established a theory, models, or data: The 
methodology consists of a novel nine-step retroduction heuristic that 
incorporates a novel five-step definition heuristic; 
2. refinement of the vocabulary of information science through a definition of 
compelled nonuse of information (CNI); 
3. inception of the formulation of a theory of CNI; 
4. presentation of a conceptual or diagnostic tool for information workers; 
5. increased awareness of prejudice against nonuse of information; 
6. theoretical advancement in the design of information systems; 
7. development of nonuse as a Hegelian antithesis to information use; 
8. development of "markers of anti-intellectualism, and 
9. clarification of some of the legal and jurisprudential ramifications of CNI. 
 The first contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a methodology for investigating phenomena for which prior 
study has not established a theory, models, or data. The methodology follows 
from the pragmatism formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce, a method of 
evaluating concepts by what is called his pragmatic maxim: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, you 
conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of 
those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. (1905, p. 481; 
reprinted in 1931-1958, v. 5, p. 438) 
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In other words, Peirce equated objects with their practical consequences. This 
pragmatism applied to both the central conception of this study (CNI) and to the 
methodology employed for this study of CNI, as explained more fully in Chapter 
3. 
 The adoption of pragmatism helped me to grasp the concept of CNI 
through an emphasis on its effect. In this study, the effect of CNI is a behavior, 
nonuse of information. This focus on behavior helped me to limit the study to the 
psychologic metatheory of behavior, rather than to expand the discussion to the 
psychodynamic or cognitive ramifications of nonuse. While psychodynamic and 
cognitive terms appear in the study, the study focuses on behavior, specifically, 
the behavior of nonuse of information. I justified this limiting for the practical 
reason that behavior is more directly observable than psychodynamics or 
cognitivism, which incorporate the less-observable elements of mental states. 
 As applied to the methodology of the study, pragmatism underlies Peirce's 
concept of retroduction / abduction. Pragmatism evaluates a conception by its 
consequences, as if working backward from a result to its cause. Retroduction 
does the same, starting with a phenomenon and working backward to a 
hypothesis. Peirce postulated retroduction as an iterative, somewhat intuitive 
process consisting of formulating, testing, reformulating, and retesting 
retroductive suggestions. 
 For this study, I created two heuristics: a nine-step heuristic for the 
performance of retroduction, and a five-step heuristic for creating a definition of a 
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phenomenon where none previously existed. The retroduction heuristic derived 
from steps described by Peirce (1976b, pp. 319-320) and by his followers such 
as Rennie (1998, p. 111). The definition heuristic evolved from Spradley and 
McCurdy's five-fold classification of definitions (1972, pp. 68-70). 
 The second contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a taxonomy and description of CNI as a tool that might 
facilitate communication between information workers who now use the concept 
nonuse of information without the additional specification of compelled or 
volitional. For example, the term "cognitive avoidance" appeared in hundreds of 
the articles reviewed for this study (e.g., C. Meyer et al., 2005), but fewer than 20 
of these articles (e.g., McDermott, 2007) indicated whether the avoidance was 
volitional or compelled. 
 The third contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is that it provides the inception of a theory of CNI. This study 
has produced a taxonomy of conditions that compel nonuse of information. As a 
visualization or reflection of CNI, that taxonomy is a descriptive or explanatory 
model of CNI. If empirical studies later substantiate this model, it will constitute a 
theory. To paraphrase Katzer et al. (1998, p. 276), a model gives order, while a 
theory gives meaning. In other words, this dissertation presents a model, an 
ordering to the phenomenon of CNI. Empirical substantiation of this model 
subsequently will lead to a theory of CNI. 
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 This use of the word "theory" may confuse those who hold a different 
conception of the word. Dubin, for example, equates theory, theoretical model, 
model, and system. He differentiates, however, the term "empirical system," 
which he defines as "what we apprehend, through human senses, in the 
environment of man" (1978, p. 18). This dissertation describes what Dubin would 
call an empirical system, rather than a theory. 
 The fourth contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a taxonomy of six conditions that compel the nonuse of 
information. I believe that no information workers (librarian, teacher, orator, 
health professional) work from a tabula rasa. Rather, they draw on exposure to 
hundreds of theories and models of information behavior (e.g., Case, 2002; 
Fisher et al., 2005) to identify, diagnose, and mitigate nonuse of information by a 
client. Instead of seeking a closest fit to one of these hundreds of theories and 
models, the information worker might apply more easily the taxonomy's six 
conditions as a short, comprehensive checklist. 
 The fifth contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is an increased awareness of prejudice against nonuse of 
information. Information researchers and workers have tended to view nonuse of 
information in negatively judgmental terms. For example, most of the articles in 
the study corpus that referred to nonuse of information described nonuse 
pejoratively. Similarly, most of the study corpus articles that described use of 
information described use as desirable. C. Harris postulated six reasons that 
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information workers viewed nonuse as undesirable, in a discussion of nonuse of 
information institutions such as libraries: 
1. "being informed is a virtue; 
2. information will make the individual more effective or efficient in any area 
of his or her endeavours; 
3. the use of recorded information reduces the probability of duplication of 
effort; 
4. libraries and information services represent substantial investments 
(public or otherwise) that should be exploited; 
5. individuals have a right to be informed, and should exercise that right; 
6. reading is an improving activity." (1984, p. 69) 
Harris then (p. 70) suggested that examination of nonuse might reveal conditions 
under which attempts to eliminate nonuse would not be the best course of action: 
1. reasons might exist for the nonuse; 
2. nonuse might not be a problem; 
3. nonuse might be an intractable problem.  
As another example of the confounding effect of prejudice on identification and 
mitigation of nonuse of information, most people agree than murder, robbery, 
arson, rape, torture, and similar acts of violence are undesirable, and, as a result, 
most legal codes punish such acts. Tsang postulated psychodynamic 
mechanisms such as "rationalization" (2002, p. 39) and "fragmentation" (p. 43) 
that allowed tens of millions of people in Nazi Germany repeatedly to condone 
and even to commit such acts of violence, and she labeled the acts immoral. 
Devonport and Lane (2006, p. 265) presented nonuse of information via 
avoidance as adaptive or maladaptive for writers of dissertations, allowing the 
writers to apply the label of "mal-" (from the Latin for "bad"). Martin (2000) 
discussed the moral ramifications of self-deception. Judgments such as 
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"immoral" and "maladaptive" add a contextual variable to CNI that does not assist 
and may even hinder the information worker in diagnosing examples of CNI. 
Therefore, this dissertation presents to the information worker a taxonomy of 
conditions that lead to CNI and that avoids such judgments. 
 The sixth contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a theoretical advancement in the design of information 
systems. For example, Cho and Cheon (2004) studied the affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral aspects of what they term Web banner blindness, that is, ignoring 
advertising imbedded in Web sites. Cho and Cheon found that perceived goal 
impediment, perceived ad clutter, and prior negative experience explained 
banner blindness. The condition described in Figure 1.1 (above) as information 
filtering, specifically the condition labeled "perceived cost exceeds perceived 
benefit," explains the findings of Cho and Cheon more parsimoniously. 
 The seventh contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is the development of nonuse as a Hegelian antithesis to the 
thesis of information use. Information science has evolved over the years, but 
always with a focus on information use. This dissertation presents a model of 
nonuse as the antithesis of use and possibly as the next phase of the Hegelian 
dialectic in the development of information science. Karl Popper (e.g., 1962; 
1966) bitterly castigated the concept of dialectic because he thought that it 
"undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual 
responsibility and honesty" (Popper, 1966, p. 395). I have concluded that the 
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dialectic is an important mechanism for the advancement of a discipline through 
a broadening of the scope of discussions in the discipline and through 
presentation and resolution of conflicting views, and this dissertation accordingly 
presents an antithesis in the information science dialectic. 
 The eighth contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a deepening of understanding of the development of anti-
intellectualism in America. Goldstein (2008a) cites Art Winslow as saying: "What 
are the markers of anti-intellectualism? Not even Hofstadter worked that answer 
out fully." Further study and refinement of CNI could lead to a definition of the 
"markers of anti-intellectualism" and facilitate the formation of public policy about 
anti-intellectualism. 
 The ninth contribution of this dissertation to the study and practice of 
information science is a clarification of some of the legal and jurisprudential 
aspects of conditions leading to CNI. Glenn (2008) reviewed a number of studies 
in which priming and prejudice appear to have affected criminals' behavior, 
casting doubt on the intentionality of their actions. In other words, criminal acts 
that result from conditions such as the precognitive priming or prejudice that lead 
to CNI might merit a different legal response than criminal acts that result from 
cognitive deliberation. 
 The potential contributions of this study to information science might also 
benefit other academic disciplines and arenas of human endeavor. Specifically, 
the methodology for investigating novel phenomena could facilitate the study of 
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other disciplines in the humanities (e.g., languages and literature) and the social 
sciences (e.g., anthropology or political science). Conversely, if CNI proves to be 
rare or negligible in impact, this study will mark the beginning of a dead-end path 
that other disciplines need not travel. 
The structure of this study of CNI 
 Chapter 1 has presented an introduction to this study. The introduction 
consisted of a description of the place of the study in the field of information 
science, a definition of CNI, and the rationale of the study. Chapter 2 explores 
the literature of information science and related disciplines for previous writings 
about use of information, nonuse of information, and compelled nonuse of 
information. Chapter 3 presents the evolution and conduct of this philosophical 
and empirical inquiry about CNI. This evolution and conduct included formation of 
the concept of CNI, development of the heuristics and methodology required for 
its study, the theoretical basis of such an inquiry, the conduct of the inquiry, and 
limitations of the methodology. Chapter 4 presents the results of the study--the 
taxonomy and explanation of the six primary conditions leading to CNI. Chapter 4 
also discusses additional conditions, conditions that the study was expected to 
find but did not. Chapter 5 concludes the study with a summary of its findings and 
recommendations for future research about CNI. Appendices and a list of 
references follow Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS STUDIES ABOUT INFORMATION USE AND 
NONUSE 
 The literature reviewed for this study, primarily the literatures of 
information science, psychology, sociology, education, and communication 
studies, includes articles about use of information and articles about nonuse of 
information. Because of this study's genesis in information science, this chapter 
focuses largely on the literature of that discipline, discussing first information use 
and then information nonuse. 
Previous studies about use of information 
 Many authors (e.g., Buckland, 1996; Frohmann, 2000) present the 
documentalists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the originators of 
information science. Speaking broadly, information science research from the 
time of the documentalists through the first half of the 20th century focused on 
information systems. In the second half of the 20th century, this "systems" 
approach expanded to a "user" approach to the study of information. In other 
words, research began to focus on adapting information systems to users rather 
than developing systems to which users had to adapt. Information behavior 
comprised a focus of this user-centered approach, and information science 
borrowed concepts and research methods from the field of psychology (the study 
of behavior and mental processes). 
 Following the expansion of psychology from behaviorism to cognition in 
the 1970s, information science research developed a "cognitive turn" (I. 
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Cornelius, 2002, p. 406), exploring the cognitive processes underlying users' 
behavior (e.g., Bandura & Adams, 1977; de May, 1977). In the 1980s, "cognitive" 
expanded to "socio-cognitive" (e.g., Capurro, 1985; cf. Hjørland, 2002), 
postulating the importance to information behavior of social or environmental 
influences. The proliferation of computers in the 1990s propelled information 
science research about human-computer interaction (e.g., Marchionini, 1991, 
1992), and the further expansion of research about environmental influences led 
to theories of situational influence (e.g., Cool & Williams, 2001). Information 
science research continues to expand, and many researchers continue to study 
the information behavior of users. This study situates itself in those studies of the 
information behavior of users. 
 T. D. Wilson (1981) identified studies occurring as early as 1916 that now 
would be called user studies, however, he named the Royal Society Scientific 
Information Conference (1948) as the earliest user study containing the specific 
terminology of "user." Reviews of user studies began to appear some 20 years 
after that Royal Society Information Conference (e.g., T. J. Allen, 1969), and 
models of information use began to appear a few years later (e.g., Dervin, 1973). 
The following two sections describe first the reviews and then the models. 
Reviews of articles about information use 
 The literature of information science contains a number of reviews of 
theories of information behavior, with the majority of the behaviors pertaining to 
information need, use, and users (cf. Appendix 2). The Annual Review of 
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Information Science and Technology (ARIST) published several landmark 
reviews of user studies, including the Ian Cornelius review mentioned above and 
three of the reviews mentioned here. T. J. Allen compiled an early review of user 
studies and limited it to studies that he termed "good" (1969, p. 3), by which he 
meant that the studies were methodologically rigorous and could be generalized 
to other situations and locales. Allen explored this body of literature through a 
framework centered on the user and related his findings to the information needs 
of scientists and technologists (p. 4). T. D. Wilson (1981, p. 3) used what he 
called an "ecological model" to explain his concept that context motivated 
information-seeking behavior. He listed motivations such as physiological, 
affective, and cognitive needs. Wilson augmented that review (1994) to 
incorporate the information seeking model of D. Ellis (1989), and then added the 
context of uncertainty (1999b). Dervin and Nilan (1986) analyzed the 
conceptualizations underlying user studies published between 1978 and 1986 
and stressed the importance of user-centered research in designing information 
systems. Hewins (1990) updated Dervin and Nilan's 1986 review. Westbrook 
(1993; 1995), in her review of system- and user-centered research, included the 
very practical consideration of the availability to the user of information systems. 
T. D. Wilson (1997) broadened the scope of his prior review articles to integrate 
research about information-seeking behavior conducted in other disciplines, 
specifically, psychology, consumer behavior, innovation research, health 
communication studies, organizational decision-making, information systems 
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design, mass media research, communication studies, and sociology. In the 
same article, Wilson reviewed causes of information nonuse, and I discuss that 
portion of his review in the next section of this chapter. Bates (1999) also noted 
the 1950s shift to user studies in her historical review. She dated the start of user 
studies three years later than I. Cornelius and T. D. Wilson, starting with the 
articles by Conrad (1951) and Mooers (1960). T. D. Wilson (2000) enlarged the 
scope of his review articles, a trend that grew to produce the encyclopedic books 
about information behavior by Case (2002) and Fisher et al. (2005). 
 Some of these studies mentioned nonuse of information indirectly, for 
example, as the implied absence of information use or as barriers to information 
use, and Case devoted a section of his book to aspects of nonuse. No review, 
however, differentiated between volitional and compelled nonuse of information. 
Explanatory models of information use 
 In addition to the reviews of information use mentioned in the previous 
section, information researchers created explanatory models to organize their 
thoughts about information use. Many of these models consisted of simple 
continua or dichotomies, while others analyzed multiple influences or behaviors. 
 Three examples illustrate the search for simple models of information use. 
Maizell (1960) sought the determinants of creativity among chemists, finding that 
creative chemists read more technical literature on the job, were more 
independent of thought, were more inquisitive, and had broader cultural interests 
than less-creative chemists. Chang and Rice (1993) examined the information 
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seeking behavior called browsing. They determined that browsing is an iterative 
behavior dependent on three factors: the motivation of the browser, the sources 
of information, and the results of previous iterations of browsing. Wu (1993) 
formulated a model of "elicitation behavior" to study question-asking behavior. 
 Two examples presented broader models of information use. MacMullin 
and R. S. Taylor (1984) suggested stages of information use: verifying, clarifying, 
decreasing uncertainty, and educating (p. 93, after Dervin, 1973) and functions of 
information (p. 108): to inform, to activate, to instruct, to provide precision, to 
generate ideas, to trigger the imagination, and to give pleasure. Pettigrew et al. 
described the cognitive, social, and multifaceted as three "conceptual 
frameworks in information behavior" (2001, p. 43). Neither study, MacMullin and 
Taylor, or Pettigrew et al., discussed nonuse of information explicitly, except as 
the implied absence of use. 
Previous studies about nonuse of information 
 This same literature of information science contains scant mention of 
NONUSE, the other side of the "information use" coin, as it were. These scant 
mentions have not led to a robust understanding of nonuse of information: some 
of these studies examined closely one situation or topic, and some studied large 
or complex phenomena. I will discuss each type of study in turn, and then 
discuss previous studies that apply specifically to CNI. 
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Narrow but deep studies about nonuse of information 
 Some studies about nonuse of information employed examples and 
theories that were limited to a single situation or topic of study. For example, 
Janis and Feshback (1953) studied the effect of fear on the reception of 
messages about dental hygiene. Strong fear arousal resulted in message 
rejection, resembling elements 5.3 (affect) and 6.1.2 (resignation) of the 
taxonomy of Figure 1.1. Asheim (1953; 1983) discussed the difference that he 
saw between what he described as "authoritarian" censorship and "democratic" 
selection in the library or museum setting. He felt that authoritarian censorship 
prevented the use of information more than selection did, an example of element 
3 (authoritarian control) of Figure 1.1. S. M. Miller described the effect of coping 
style on information behavior (S. M. Miller, 1979b, 1979a; 1987; S. M. Miller et 
al., 1996), suggesting that "monitors" sought out information, and "blunters" 
avoided information. These behaviors resemble element 1.3 (psychological 
predisposition) and element 5.3.4 (fear of the unknown) of Figure 1.1. Swanson 
(1986; 1987) searched for and found examples of bodies of research that did not 
demonstrate awareness of each other but together could have generated new 
knowledge. He called this unrealized new knowledge "undiscovered public 
knowledge," and his undiscovered public knowledge could resemble element 2.1 
(geographical barrier), element 4 (threshold knowledge shortfall), or element 5.4 
(priming) in Figure 1.1. Zipf's principle of least effort (1949) postulated that fruitful 
behaviors are performed more frequently than non-fruitful behaviors. Zipf 
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reasoned that the very frequency of performance then led the performer to 
choose the fruitful behavior, as if by habit, without reflection on the efficiency or 
effectiveness of the behavior. Zipf's principle of least effort resembles element 
6.1 (least effort) of Figure 1.1. 
 These examples of narrow but deep studies about information behavior 
describe particular information behaviors, but they do not draw from, and are not 
applied to, studies about other information behaviors. For example, citations to 
Janis and Feshback (1953) appear primarily in the literature describing the 
advertising technique known as "fear appeal." Asheim (1953; 1983) appears in 
the literature discussing censorship. Medical literature comprises the primary 
venue for the studies citing S. M. Miller (S. M. Miller, 1979b, 1979a; 1987; S. M. 
Miller et al., 1996). Citations to Swanson's undiscovered public knowledge (1986; 
1987) appear primarily in literature seeking ways of discovering undiscovered 
public knowledge. Are these deep but narrow studies an example of avoidance of 
information perceived to be irrelevant (element 6.2 of Figure 1.1), commonly 
expressed as disciplinary tunnel vision? Possibly so, but a discipline must 
specialize in order to increase the depth of its body of knowledge (Bar-Hillel, 
1963). Tunnel vision describes the restricted disciplinary discourse that is 
necessary to all researchers who wish to avoid information overload (element 6.1 
of Figure 1.1), but tunnel vision describes that restricted discourse in an 
unnecessarily pejorative manner. The pejorative nature of the phrase "tunnel 
vision" illustrates the importance of not applying disapproving judgments to 
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nonuse of information, because in the case of restricted disciplinary discourse, 
tunnel vision is vital to the development of the discipline. 
Broad studies about nonuse of information 
 At the other (broader) extreme of applicability lie the studies that apply to 
more than one manifestation of nonuse of information. Five examples illustrate 
that broader extreme.  
 Dervin studied "Information Needs of Urban Residents," as she titled her 
article (Dervin, 1973), and postulated five barriers to information seeking: 
1. Societal barriers, 
2. Institutional barriers, 
3. Physical barriers, 
4. Psychological barriers, and 
5. Intellectual barriers. 
Dervin's list of barriers, while large, did not address other conditions leading to 
nonuse of information, such as engrossment, distraction, priming, and 
information filtering by least effort. Chapter 4 discusses these conditions. 
 Wurman's broad study (1989; 2001) described the phenomenon of 
resignation as it applied to nonuse of information. He described resignation as a 
condition "produced by the ever widening gap between what we understand and 
what we think we should understand" (1989, p. 34). Resignation contributes to 
several conditions leading to nonuse of information and described in Chapter 4, 
such as somatic barriers (elements 1, 2, and 3 of Figure 1.1), affect (element 5.3 
of Figure 1.1), and information filtering by least conflict (element 6.2 of Figure 
1.1). Resignation could result also from conscious cognitive processes, in which 
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case it would be volitional nonuse of information, rather than compelled nonuse 
of information. 
 T. D. Wilson's broad study presented a list of barriers as found in the 
literatures of "personality in psychology; the study of consumer behaviour; 
innovation research; health communication studies; organizational decision-
making; and information requirements in information systems design" (1997, p. 
551), listed in Figure 2.1: 
 
1) Personal characteristics: 
i) Emotional characteristics (nervousness (affect) 
ii) Cognitive (lack of knowledge; verbal limitations) 
iii) Cognitive dissonance 
iv) Selective exposure / cognitive avoidance 
v) Educational level and knowledge base 
vi) Demographic variables: [advanced] age, sex, etc. 
vii) Physiological (hearing) 
2) Social / Interpersonal barriers: 
3) Environmental / Situational barriers: 
i) Economic variables (economic costs and time) 
ii) Time 
iii) Geography (and [advanced] age) 
iv) National cultures 
v) Information source characteristics: 
(a) Access 
(b) Credibility 
(c) Channel of communication. 
Figure 2.1: Wilson's barriers to information seeking (1997). 
Wilson's barriers to information seeking did not address other barriers such as 
authoritarian controls, engrossment, distraction, priming, and information filtering 
through least effort, barriers discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 Case (2002) included both narrow and broad studies in his survey of 
research about information seeking, needs, and behavior. His chapters 5.4 
(Avoiding Information) and 5.5 (Information versus Entertainment) provide in 16 
pages a comprehensive and concise introduction to nonuse of information. 
Case's examples of compelled nonuse of information appear in Figure 2.2, listed 
in the order in which they appear starting on page 92 of Case's book, and quoting 
Case's text. Case's interspersed examples of volitional nonuse of information do 
not appear here, because the pilot study for this dissertation had already 




1) selective exposure and information avoidance 
2) chronically ignorant 
3) affective and emotional states and reactions 
4) there is just too much material 
5) the literature … is redundant and of low quality 
6) lack of time 
7) literacy 
8) access [to computers] 
9) socioeconomic status  
i) attitudes, beliefs, values 
ii) [lack of] knowledge 
iii) family socialization 
iv) community identity and connectedness 
v) socioeconomic status 
vi) ethnic or racial group stratification 
vii) behaviors 
viii) media use, and [lack of] media exposure 
10) information poverty (ignorance) 
i) low level of processing skills 
ii) social isolation in a subculture 
iii) feel fatalistic and helpless 
11) information overload and anxiety 
i) excessive communication inputs / filtering 
ii) too threatening to accept / reduce anxiety 
iii) encounters with new situations 
iv) negative feelings 
v) giving up 
vi) television … may overload the viewer … intentionally 
12) information versus entertainment 
i) sense of their constant unhappiness 
ii) programming that is potentially diverting 
iii) novelty sought, but found threatening 
iv) law of least effort. 
Figure 2.2: Case's barriers to information seeking (2002). 
Case's examples correspond to all six of the primary elements of compelled 
nonuse of information discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 Fisher et al. (2005) covered much of the same material as did Case. 
Appendices 2 and 3 list the information behaviors in Fisher et al. that apply 
specifically to CNI. None of these studies, Dervin, Wurman, Wilson, Case, or 
Fisher et al., limited their discussion to the information behaviors referred to in 
this study as compelled nonuse of information.  
Previous studies about CNI 
 The informal pilot study conducted for this dissertation identified 
approximately 400 articles that mentioned nonuse of information. The preliminary 
taxonomy that emerged from the pilot study already had demonstrated a need to 
focus on compelled nonuse of information (CNI), and this section reports the 
results of that narrowed focus. Among the approximately 400 articles identified in 
the pilot study, three types of literature that pertained to CNI appeared: 
collections of scholarship about CNI (e.g., literature reviews); accounts of 
isolated examples of CNI; and calls for studies about CNI. The collections of 
scholarship and accounts of isolated examples each discussed only a fraction of 
the examples of CNI produced by the informal pilot study. In other words, each of 
the approximately 400 articles in the pilot study focused on one or two or a few of 
the six elements listed in Figure 1.1 and ignored other elements. This dissertation 
discusses in Chapter 4 all six conditions leading to CNI that the study reported 
here has identified, and this study's completeness will permit information 
researchers to identify possible lacunae in this study's model. This study also 
gives information professionals a heuristic for responding to situations involving 
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CNI. The following sections of this chapter demonstrate that no prior study of CNI 
considered all six conditions leading to CNI. Further, the following sections of this 
chapter identify articles that called for research about nonuse of information. The 
existence of these calls for research and the apparent absence of a prior study 
that includes all six elements of the taxonomy indicate the need for this study 
about CNI. 
Collections of scholarship about CNI, such as reviews 
 The literature of nonuse, as I have concluded that it pertains to CNI, 
contains no literature reviews that discuss all of the six conditions leading to CNI 
identified in this study and listed in Figure 1.1. This same literature contains 
reviews limited to specific topics, in other words, reviews that are narrow in scope 
but thorough in treatment. For example, Case et al. (2005, pp. 356-358) reviewed 
two research models of nonuse of medical information: Johnson (1997, pp. 70-
100), and T. D. Wilson (1999b). Both models mentioned concepts resembling 
self-efficacy, which is the perception by a person of the person's ability to act 
effectively, or to have an effect on a situation, when provided with information 
about the situation. Johnson identified what he termed "personal relevance 
factors," in which fear and denial activated nonuse of information and invoked 
beliefs about self-efficacy. Wilson found that anxiety influenced non-seeking of 
information and evoked beliefs about salience (Case et al., 2005, p. 357). Case 
et al.'s review did not discuss many conditions that led to CNI, omitting 
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discussion of conditions such as intrinsic somatic conditions, socio-environmental 
barriers, and authoritarian controls. 
 Previously, Case (2002) had reviewed the literature about "research on 
information seeking, needs, and behavior," as he subtitled his book. He 
organized his review through extensive annotated lists of concepts such as 
users' needs, ignorance, defensive mechanisms, motivation, poverty, and 
overload. The examples of nonuse of information that Case presented appeared 
in the previous section of this dissertation, and Chapter 4 describes them in 
detail. Although comprehensive, Case's review did not present the examples in a 
relational framework. 
 The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 1998, p. 46) reviewed and synopsized 
the literature of nonuse of information related to safety in nuclear power plants 




1) Lack of usable information 
2) Nonuse of available information 
i) Overlooking 
ii) Forgetting 
iii) Ignoring (violation) 
iv) Information reduction (stereotype response without verifying 
check) 
v) Deficiencies in information processing due to time restrictions or 
mental capacities 
3) Incorrect use of available information 
i) Incorrect use in orientation 
ii) Incomplete use in goal formation 
iii) Formation of an incorrect plan to act 
iv) Mismatching recall of a correct plan to act. 
Figure 2.3: The NEA classification of nonuse of information (1998, p. 46). 
These barriers to information use did not address in a recognizable way the 
barriers of authoritarian control, threshold knowledge shortfall, or attention 
shortfall. The NEA report did not specify whether these examples included 
volitional or compelled nonuse of information, that is, whether the nonuse 
resulted from pre-cognitive or cognitive processes. 
 Watson (1998) reviewed studies about nonuse of information among 
social workers. He established that, as early as 1927, social workers needed 
current information in their field, could find that information in the literature of 
social work, and did not read that literature. He presented annotated lists, 
grouped according to the study in which they appeared, of reasons that social 
workers did not use the literature of social work: 
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1) lack of motivation for searching for information, 
2) shortage of time for reading, and 
3) an overwhelming preference for informal communication. 
These reasons did not include other reasons such as intrinsic somatic conditions, 
authoritarian controls, or attention shortfall, reasons that Chapter 4 presents. 
 T. D. Wilson published a description of "intervening variables in 
information-seeking behaviour" (1997, pp. 556-557). In his review, he identified 
these intervening variables as personal, social/interpersonal, and environmental. 
In his article, Wilson also reviewed the literature about "a very general theory 
from psychology … that of stress and coping" (1997, p. 554). His article did not 
address the barriers of authoritarian controls, engrossment, distraction, priming, 
and information filtering through least effort, barriers discussed in Chapter 4.  
 Chatman postulated many theories to explain the information behavior 
performed by the societally disadvantaged. I examined Chatman's theories and 
compared them to the examples of CNI, and this comparison of Chatman's 
theories and the examples of CNI appear in Table 2.1: 
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Study population and situation Publication 
Diffusion theory: opinion leaders did not share job 
information or skills among CETA women 
(Chatman, 1983, 
1987b; Chatman & 
Pendleton, 1998) 
Nonuse of print media among janitors (Chatman, 1987a) 





meaninglessness - no future in jobs " 
isolation - physically, & lack of trust " 
self-estrangement (work has no meaning) " 
normlessness [not found in study] " 
Gratification theory: among janitors, life-events are 




Information from the outside world is irrelevant " 
low expectation of improvement " 
information from outside is not trusted " 
time = immediate past & present " 
mass media = escape " 
Elderly women did not use the library (Chatman, 1991a) 
Knowledge gap theory & the information poor (Chatman & Pendleton, 1995) 
mass media serve only the "media rich" " 
lack of helpful interpersonal channels " 
Impoverished Life-World of Outsiders & self-imposed 
information poverty, among CETA women, janitors, & 
elderly women 
(Chatman, 1996) 
self-reliance from isolation " 
avoiding risk " 
secrecy & deception " 
Life in the round & self-imposed information poverty: 
woman inmates avoid non-critical outside information (Chatman, 1999) 
Table 2.1: Chronological list of examples of nonuse of information apparent in the 
works of Elfreda A. Chatman. 
Chatman's examples correspond to all six of the primary elements of CNI as 
presented in Figure 1.1 and discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 Russ (1983) described the many methods by which society compels itself 
or individuals within itself not to use the information in works authored by women. 
These methods appear in Figure 2.4. 
 
1) Less pay   
i) longer working hours and less "leisure" time 
ii) less economic, cultural, and social capital 
2) Discouragement or denial of education for women  
(cf. Lips & Colwill, 1988; Dore, 1994) 
i) less economic, cultural, and social capital 
ii) less education 
3) Denial of respect via censorship, misinformation, or disinformation 
i) presumption of triviality of women's writing 
ii) denial that a woman wrote the material in question 
iii) accusations that the woman author was more (or less) than a 
woman 
4) "the double standard of content" (Russ, 1983, p. 46), tending to maintain 
a status quo. 
 
Figure 2.4: Russ's methods by which society compels itself or individuals within 
itself not to use the information in works authored by women. 
The methods postulated by Russ did not appear to include intrinsic somatic 
conditions or attention shortfall, which appear in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 These reviews (Chatman, 1983; Russ, 1983; Chatman, 1987a, 1987b, 
1990, 1991b, 1991a; Chatman & Pendleton, 1995; Chatman, 1996; T. D. Wilson, 
1997; Chatman & Pendleton, 1998; Nuclear Energy Agency, 1998; Watson, 
1998; Chatman, 1999; Case et al., 2005) each described several of the elements 




Isolated examples of CNI 
 In addition to the aggregations and reviews of CNI that appeared in the 
preceding sections, the various literatures contained many examples of isolated 
information behaviors that I evaluated to be CNI. These isolated information 
behaviors seldom used the term "nonuse of information" or "information nonuse." 
Instead, other terms appeared. Two examples follow: undiscovered public 
knowledge and dropout. 
 Swanson discovered a manifestation of nonuse of information that he 
called undiscovered public knowledge, that is, "two different sets of problem-
oriented specialized articles, or literatures," that do not cite each other and yet 
are complementary "in that together they suggest new information not apparent 
in either of the sets considered separately" (2001, p. 13). Swanson's derivative 
"new information" might result from conjoining the knowledge produced by the 
groups, and the absence of this new information compels others not to use that 
new information. Swanson did not explain why undiscovered public knowledge 
remained undiscovered, but this study of CNI presents possible reasons. 
Specifically, socio-environmental barriers might apply if barriers such as 
geographical distance prevent the groups of authors from interacting with each 
other, for example, because they attend professional meetings on different 
continents. A temporal environmental barrier, that is, a barrier based on a 
separation in time of one group from another, would appear if one group wrote in 
the 1930s and another wrote in the 1990s without conducting extensive reviews 
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of the literature. Threshold knowledge shortfall might explain an unawareness of 
one group by another if the groups wrote in different languages. Priming might 
result if one group associated the words used to describe the work of a second 
group with topics unrelated to the first group's topic of research. For example, the 
Twilight Zone episode "To Serve Man," from the Damon Knight (1950) short story 
of the same name, featured a fictional book, How to Serve Man, written by a 
helpful and apparently benevolent alien species. Earth authorities, 
misunderstanding the words of the title, regarded the alien species as beneficent 
and ignored the book as a potential threat, until a better translation of the words 
of the title revealed it to be a cookbook. 
 In the field of information science, an April 17, 2005, search of the 
database Academic Search Premier by EBSCO Publishing produced 158 articles 
containing permutations of the term "sensemaking" in conjunction with the work 
of Brenda Dervin or Karl E. Weick. Of these 158 articles, 111 articles (dating from 
1983 to 2004) mentioned Weick but not Dervin (at least, not Dervin's work on 
sense making), and 47 articles (dating from 1993 to 2004) mentioned Dervin but 
not Weick. The same search the next day on Expanded Academic ASAP 
produced 477 citations to Weick, 68 to Dervin, and seven mentioning both Weick 
and Dervin, with only one (Glammack, 1999) of these seven referring to the 
sensemaking studies of both Dervin (Dervin & Nilan, 1986) and Weick (1995). 




Academic Search Premier: 158 citations 
 
 
110 citations 1 citation 47 citations 
 to Weick's sensemaking (not about sensemaking), to Dervin's sensemaking 




Expanded Academic ASAP: 552 citations 
 
1 citation 
477 citations about sensemaking, & 68 citations 
to Weick 6 citations (not about sensemaking), to Dervin 
 to both  
  
 
Figure 2.5: Citations to Karl Weick and Brenda Dervin. 
Dervin focused on the application of sensemaking to the individual, and Weick 
focused on the organizational and social uses of sensemaking (Rice-Lively, 
1996, pp. 11, 54), but commonalities in the two approaches exist, for example, 
the constructivist view inherent in any treatment of sensemaking. The existence 
of the segregation between the literature citing Dervin and the literature citing 
Weick, with only one article of 552 citing both researchers' sensemaking studies, 
represents nonuse of "Weick" information by Dervin citers and nonuse of "Dervin" 
information by Weick citers. Were there no commonalities between the two 
authors, this segregation would be understandable. Commonalities do exist, 
however, have existed since 1995, and have been demonstrated at least since 
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Glammack's article (1999). We probably will never know what knowledge would 
have resulted had the two camps not ignored each other.  
 Other examples of undiscovered public knowledge appear. Swanson 
himself apparently did not discover the parallel public literature of Farradane et 
al. (Farradane et al., 1973; Farradane, 1980), discussing a phenomenon very 
much like undiscovered public knowledge (Kwasnik, 1992). Dryden observed 
non-citation of other schools among schools of eclectic psychotherapy: 
There is little evidence at present that the contributors to this part of the 
volume ... are drawing upon one another's work to a significant degree. ... It 
is important that the pioneers of eclectic psychotherapy demonstrate an 
eclectic attitude (i.e., willingness to draw upon diverse sources) among their 
own ranks. Otherwise they will act as poor role models and increase the 
chances that schools of eclectic therapy will proliferate in the future. (1986, 
p. 374) 
The literature about nonusers of medical information (elements 1.3, 
psychological predisposition, and 5.3.4, fear of the unknown, in Figure 1.1) 
occurs in at least three separate corpora: works following Miller (1987), those 
following Pifalo et al. (1997), and those following Leydon et al. (2000). Beghtol 
(1995) found the example of both Ranganathan and Guttman exploring "facet 
theory" but unaware of each other's work. Beghtol's work, ironically, was 
paralleled by that of Star (1998).  
 The second example of phenomena that resemble CNI comes from the 
literature of education. Of the 21,815 students in grades 9-12 of the Austin 
Independent School District (AISD) for the school year 1999-2000, 721 dropped 
out of school (Texas Education Agency [TEA], 2000). Articles about dropout 
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approach the phenomenon from one or a few standpoints. CNI provides a new 
perspective on the topic of dropout, perhaps allowing administrators, teachers, 
and parents to evaluate the effectiveness, cost, and desirability of various 
interventions. For example, dropout could be an example of resignation (element 
6.1.2 of Figure 1.1), resulting from a desire to withdraw from an unpleasant social 
situation or from education in general. Dropout might result from personality 
disorders (element 1 of Figure 1.1). Dropout might result from a lack of economic 
capital (element 2.3.1 of Figure 1.1), forcing the student to work (leaving no time 
for study), or lack of social capital (element 2.3.3 of Figure 1.1), resulting in a 
hostile school environment. For the purpose of this study, the important point 
here is not the reason for dropout, but rather the need to consider all possible 
reasons. One way to consider all possible reasons is to guide the inquiry with a 
short, comprehensive checklist of reasons, and the taxonomy of CNI provides 
such a checklist. 
Calls for studies about nonuse of information 
 Authors in several fields have noted a need for studies about nonuse of 
information. For example, Villars (1999, p. 1) found that "A national study is 
required on the phenomenon of the non-use of information and of special studies 
on agriculture related to policy issues." Pettigrew et al. stated that "Only through 
focused study can rich insights be obtained regarding such novel concepts as … 
the non-use of information" (2001, p. 68). Case et al. called for a more specific 
study of nonuse of information by communication and information science 
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researchers to explore "avoidance of information from genetic testing for cancer" 
(Case et al., 2005, p. 360). These calls for study of nonuse of information 
indicate an absence of satisfactory analyses of nonuse of information.  
Summary of Chapter 2 
 These collections of scholarship about nonuse of information, such as 
literature reviews; accounts of isolated examples of nonuse; and calls for studies 
about nonuse, demonstrate the state to which the study of nonuse of information 
has advanced. I foresee that the next development in the study of nonuse of 
information must come from a methodical survey and organized presentation of 
nonuse of information. This study reported in this dissertation represents a 
portion of such a methodical survey, dealing with explicit examples of compelled 




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY FOR A STUDY OF CNI 
Yesterday, upon the stair  
I saw a man who wasn’t there  
He wasn’t there again today  
I wish, I wish, he’d go away. 
"Antigonish," by William Hughes Mearns, 1899 
 For several reasons, the study reported in this dissertation was a complex 
study. As noted in Chapter 2, the literatures of information science, psychology, 
sociology, and education do not contain articles about compelled nonuse of 
information. Thus, every stage of this study ventured into unplumbed depths. 
Beyond that reason, CNI itself represents an absence, rather than a presence, 
and studying something that, essentially, is not there, presents conceptual 
problems, as implied in Mearns's poem "Antigonish." Yet, Charles Sanders 
Peirce verbalized a method of philosophical inquiry to study the unknown, a 
method called retroduction. Unfortunately, neither Peirce nor his disciples 
explained the procedure of retroduction. Thus, the need to formulate a 
retroductive procedure compounded the complexity of this study. None of these 
reasons, however, was sufficient to forestall philosophical inquiry, and this 
dissertation reports the results of that inquiry. 
 This chapter presents the procedure developed for studying the unknown, 
a methodology applicable to any topic for which no prior study has established a 
theory, model, or data. The procedure involved iteration, that is, a successive 
examination and reexamination of the topic, with every iteration narrowing the 
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scope of the topic while expanding the data examined for the study (see Figure 
3.1 below). In brief, this study began with a discussion similar to the phenomenon 
called brainstorming. That discussion led to a pilot study, analysis of the results 
of that pilot study, development of a heuristic for defining the topic of the 
research, and development of a second heuristic for investigating the topic. The 
heuristics then enabled a full, formal study, producing and explaining a taxonomy 
of CNI. 
 
Preliminary work:                       brainstorming 
pilot study of nonuse of information 
analysis of pilot study data 
formulation of preliminary taxonomy 
survey of contextual information behaviors 
 narrowing of the study from nonuse to CNI  
development of an appropriate methodology 
Formal study:   search for examples of nonuse of information 
analysis of search results 
formulation of two taxonomies 
selection of best taxonomy 
Re-study:            re-coding of the corpus via the taxonomy 
analysis and adjustment of the final taxonomy 
description of each element of the taxonomy 
 
Figure 3.1: The plan of the study. 
Brainstorming 
 Paraphrasing Charles Sanders Peirce, all the ideas of science begin with 
a surprise (Peirce, 1931-1958, pp. 144-145, from Peirce's "Harvard Lectures on 
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Pragmatism"). In other words, a phenomenon surprises an investigator, and the 
investigator then seeks an explanation for the phenomenon. The surprise that 
inspired the study reported here occurred in the following manner. 
 At the annual review conducted by my doctoral advising committee in 
February, 2004, Dr. David Gracy asked me to identify a topic of particular 
interest. I named the anti-intellectualism described by Hofstadter (1963) and the 
more general topic of nonuse of information. The thought surprised me, because 
I had not verbalized it previously. The other members of the committee, Dr. Philip 
Doty and Dr. Glynn Harmon, encouraged the pursuit of the topic as a dissertation 
study. They suggested additional aspects, such as information avoidance, 
ignorance, intentional irrationality, eidetic imagery versus symbolic imagery, and 
mismatches between information and the multiple intelligences proposed by 
Gardner (1983). The committee recommended that I conduct a pilot study to 
explore the feasibility of the topic as subject for a dissertation, and members of 
the committee suggested search terms that would facilitate the pilot study. 
 Undoubtedly, all such studies begin with a surprise followed by an episode 
of intense mental activity, a "brainstorm." The surprise may come from individual 
inquiry, or it may come from another person. The intense mental activity may 
occur individually, or it may involve several people. The study reported here 
began as a group effort. 
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An informal pilot study of nonuse of information 
 The pilot study involved a search of the literature of information science 
and related disciplines for articles containing examples of nonuse of information. 
The examples displayed properties, one of which was the degree of control over 
the nonuse by the person not using the information. Ordering the list by 
increasing degree of control revealed a dichotomy, rather than a continuum. In 
other words, one example did not display slightly more control than another, but 
displayed either control (volitional nonuse) or no control (compelled nonuse). 
This realization led to narrowing the subject of this study from nonuse of 
information to compelled nonuse of information (CNI). To define the concept of 
CNI, I developed a heuristic for defining novel, previously undefined phenomena. 
The pilot study also involved a survey of theories and examples of information 
behavior and the development of a second heuristic for the application of a 
method of philosophical inquiry for investigating CNI, a method called 
retroduction or abduction. Employment of the heuristic for retroduction then led to 
the full, formal study that began with a comprehensive search of several 
electronic and print databases for examples of CNI, analysis and grouping of 
those examples, and further refinement of the classification scheme. The 
examples of CNI led to the taxonomy illustrated in Figure 1.1 and explained in 
Chapter 4.  
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The search for examples of nonuse of information 
 To determine the feasibility of a study of nonuse of information, I 
conducted an informal pilot study using several large databases of academic and 
popular literature. Search terms included those listed in Figure 3.2: 
 
(information OR knowledge)  
    AND 
    (nonuse OR non-use OR rejection OR avoidance) 
OR 
(nonuse OR non-use OR rejection OR avoidance)  
    AND  
    [(of information) OR (of knowledge)] 
 
Figure 3.2: The pilot study search for examples of nonuse of information via 
keyword searches. 
I also examined the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) for terms that 
might make the database search more comprehensive. LCSH had 26 headings 
that included the term "information," with 11 of these headings pertaining to 
nonuse of information and 15 pertaining to use of information (see Appendix 4). 
None of the search terms used in the informal pilot study appeared in the LCSH, 
indicating a possible gap in the LCSH classification of literature about nonuse of 
information. 
 I chose the specific databases I used because of their large number of 
scholarly articles, a number that represented comprehensive coverage of many 
publishing outlets over a span of many years. I also chose databases because of 
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their ease of access and searching and their inclusion of the literatures of library 
and information science, communication, education, psychology, and sociology. I 
chose these disciplines because, in my experience, their literatures contain a 
higher proportion of scholarship about nonuse of information than the literatures 
of other disciplines. I conducted two searches. The databases used in the first 
search included: 
• Academic Search Premier (1965 to date),  
• Web of Science (ISI Web of Knowledge, 1975 to date),  
• Library and Information Science Abstracts (LISA, 1969 to date),  
• Dissertation Abstracts International (1861 to date),  
• Library Chronicle Index (1970-1989),  
• the Google search engine to search the Web, and 
• the printed annual indexes found in volumes 1 through 40 (1966-2006) of 
the Annual Review of Information Science and Technology (ARIST).  
The first search identified approximately 400 works containing the search terms 
and describing an example of nonuse of information. For comparison, a search 
for "information use" or "use of information" identified approximately 43,000 
works. A second search, this one of the database Expanded Academic ASAP, 
restricted search terms to the database fields "title," "citation," and "abstract." 
Both studies yielded a ratio of studies about nonuse to studies about use of 
approximately 1% (see Table 3.1). 
 I have not found literature discussing the size of the disparity between the 
number of articles mentioning use and the number of articles mentioning nonuse. 
This apparent lack of discussion has many reasons, two of which I will mention 
here: a prejudice against nonuse of information, and concepts such as System 
Justification Theory.  
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Prejudice against nonuse of information 
 As discussed in Chapters 1, 3, and 5, writers in the literature of 
information science (e.g., C. Harris, 1984), education (e.g., Alexander et al., 
1997), and law (e.g., Baarsma, 2002) have tended to portray nonuse of 
information in a negative light. This portrayal, perhaps coupled with a perceived 
threat to a self-image of "siding with the angels" (element 5.3.3 of Figure 1.1), 
may have compelled many writers to study information behavior as use, rather 
than as nonuse. 
System Justification Theory 
 System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, p. 260) states 
that system-justifying ideologies defend and justify the status quo, resulting in 
reduced negative affect and less support for social change and redistribution of 
resources. When applied to the dearth of articles about nonuse of information, 
SJT would manifest itself as: "If I write articles like articles that already have been 
published, in other words, if I do not 'challenge the system', then I will be 
published." 
 Regardless of the reason for the preponderance of articles about 
information use, the development of theory and practice about CNI will increase 
the number of articles about nonuse of information. 
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the first search (7 databases): permutations of  
 
information                                   rejection 
knowledge                 &                avoidance 
message                                      refusal 











Expanded Academic ASAP 
 
information use OR use of information 
 
information nonuse OR nonuse of information 
AND  
information rejection OR rejection of information 
AND  













Table 3.1: Percentage of articles discussing nonuse of information compared to 
articles discussing use of information. 
 I examined the articles about nonuse of information and employed a 
rudimentary form of content analysis to determine the characteristics of nonuse 
of information present in each article. In this content analysis, I did not attempt to 
re-code this corpus or to measure the reliability of my coding (intra-coder 
reliability) because the purpose of this pilot study was to develop concepts rather 
than data. Initially, I limited the coding procedure to the themes of nonuse of 
information developed in that brainstorming discussion with my doctoral advising 
committee. I remained open to new themes, however, and I conceptualized and 
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named new themes when the occurrences of nonuse in the corpus did not 
appear to match previously established themes.  
Development of the concept of CNI and formulation of a taxonomy 
 From the coding and adding activity, I developed a list of several dozen 
themes of nonuse of information. I organized the list of those themes along 
several continua, and finally created a taxonomy that systematically organized 
the themes. In other words, the taxonomy incorporated all of the themes of 
nonuse of information that I had discovered, and the taxonomy presented the 
themes in a manner in which each theme appeared to be contiguous to its 
neighbors by virtue of examples that included the two contiguous themes. I 
ordered the themes along various continua to see if a pattern would occur. Trial 
continua included: 
• "intensity" (the amount of additional information required to overcome the 
nonuse),  
• "obversibility" (the likelihood of an opposing theme appearing),  
• "repeatability" (how many times a theme could affect the same person in 
the same situation),  
• "effect on soma" (how strongly the theme affected the body, rather than 
mental processes),  
• "class" (how the theme might affect people of different socio-economic 
status), 
• "thought" (degree of cognition required), 
• "timing" (the point in the cognitive process at which the theme would 
occur),  
• "source" (degree of originating internally or externally to the person), 
• and other continua now discarded and forgotten. 
 Throughout the process, however, I perceived that the themes in the 
taxonomy fell into two large and somewhat discrete categories: volitional nonuse 
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and compelled nonuse. The terms "volitional" and "compelled" and the distinction 
between them did not appear explicitly in the literature examined for the pilot 
study. However, an ordering along a volitional-compelled continuum quickly 
developed into a dichotomy. Many of the themes had only compelled elements, 
and volitional elements usually had compelled counterparts. This bifurcation 
between volitional and compelled permitted me to visualize the universe of 
nonuse of information clearly enough to identify the portion of particular interest 
to me. Because my academic interest gravitates to the topic of societal injustice 
(e.g., Houston & Erdelez, 2004), and because the "compelled" portion of the 
universe of nonuse of information appeared to be associated with and underlie 
examples of social injustice, I narrowed the scope of research from nonuse in 
general to compelled nonuse of information (CNI). Support and encouragement 
from my dissertation committee, particularly Dr. Diane Schallert, substantiated 
the choice of this new focus of research. 
A survey of theories and examples of information behavior 
 To provide a disciplinary context to this study of CNI, the informal pilot 
study continued with an investigation of use of information, generally referred to 
as "information behavior." This investigation proved to be extremely useful for 
two reasons. First, the results of the investigation provided an overview of the 
current treatment of CNI in the literature of information science and demonstrated 
the need for a more expansive treatment. Second, the information behaviors 
found through the investigation provided insight into the various conditions 
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leading to CNI, as noted in column 3 of Appendices 2 and 3. For example, 
Chatman's Alienation Theory (item 3 in Appendix 2), that most life events are 
meaningless to the alienated, resolved to isolation (element 2.1), resignation 
(element 6.1), and least conflict (element 6.2). 
 To conduct the investigation of information behaviors, I started with the 
book edited by Fisher et al. (2005), in which various authors described 72 
theories and examples of information behavior. Citation tracing and keyword 
searches led to another 52 theories and examples of information behavior. After 
merging six theories with similar theories that appeared under different names, 
118 theories and examples of information behavior remained. Appendices 2 and 
3 list the 103 theories and 15 examples of information behavior identified through 
the informal pilot study, accompanied by citations (column 1) and earliest 
discoverable dates of publication (column 2). The theories and examples of 
information behavior appear in Appendices 2 and 3 because they satisfied my 
informal criteria, primarily, that scholars such as Case (2002) and Fisher et al. 
(2005) recognize them as theories and examples of information behavior. 
Behaviors also appear in Appendices 2 and 3 because their authors labeled 
them with acronyms (e.g., CMC, ELIS, ISIC, ASK, PAIN, CSCW). Although not 
definitive, the presence of an acronym could reflect a somewhat formalized body 
of substantiating thought. It also could reflect a "presence" in the literature of 
information science or in the conversations of information researchers frequent 
enough to justify the acronym as a shorthand label. For whatever reason, an 
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acronym indicated a need to consider including the behavior so named in 
Appendices 2 and 3. 
Comparison of the taxonomy with the theories of information behavior 
 The next phase of the informal pilot study consisted of a merging of the 
preliminary version of Figure 1.1 (the taxonomy of conditions leading to CNI) with 
column 1 of Appendices 2 and 3 (theories and examples of information 
behavior). This merging consisted of noting the explanatory power of each 
element of the taxonomy for each theory or example of information behavior. By 
"explanatory" I mean that the elements of the taxonomy might provide an 
analytical framework that would provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the information behavior. In addition, "explanatory" refers to that facilitating of 
conceptualization in that the relatively few elements of the taxonomy would be 
easier to conceptualize than would be the scores of theories of information 
behavior. For example, Alienation Theory (Chatman, 1990) postulates that 
information and most life-events are meaningless to the alienated due to 
powerlessness, futility of jobs, physical isolation, lack of trust of others, self-
estrangement, and lack of "fit" (normlessness). I compared Chatman's Alienation 
Theory with the elements of Figure 1.1, based on my familiarity with the 
elements. Did isolation (element 2 in Figure 1.1) help to describe Alienation 
Theory? Yes, in this example, work schedules caused social, physical, and 
temporal isolation of night-working janitors that prevented their interaction with 
society and contributed to a concise description of Alienation Theory. Proceeding 
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through the taxonomy in this manner, I determined that I could describe the 
behavior of Alienation Theory through three elements of CNI: element 2, 
environmental (physical, temporal, and social) barriers; element 6.1, resignation; 
and element 6.2, least conflict. In another example, "affect" (element 5.3 in 
Figure 1.1) described Affective Load Theory (Nahl, 2004). When applied to the 
118 theories and examples of information behavior in Appendices 2 and 3, CNI 
described 55 of these 118 behaviors through the six elements of the taxonomy. 
The other 63 theories and examples described information use (e.g., 
berrypicking, by Bates, 1989) rather than nonuse, or information behaviors 
unconnected to use and nonuse (e.g., Cognitive Work Analysis, by Rasmussen 
et al., 1994). Establishing correspondences between the taxonomy and the 
information behaviors in Appendices 2 and 3 revealed overlapping definitions 
among the elements of the taxonomy. Resolving these overlaps led to refining 
the taxonomy by defining the nuances of its elements. 
A heuristic for defining, and a definition of, CNI 
 Spradley and McCurdy (1972, pp. 68-70) postulated a typology of 
definitions as shown in Figure 3.3:  
 
               Definitions 
┌────────┬────────┬────┴─────┬──────────┐ 
nominal        perceptual        taxonomic        componential        dictionary 
 
Figure 3.3: Spradley and McCurdy's typology of definitions. 
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Although Spradley and McCurdy did not discuss it, their typology of definitions, 
when listed in the order of: 
1) nominal,  
2) perceptual,  
3) taxonomic,  
4) componential, and  
5) dictionary,  
creates a methodology for defining a previously undefined "definiendum" (Latin: 
that which is to be defined). In other words, Spradley and McCurdy's sequence of 
definitions creates a plan of action for defining a "definiendum" where the 
"definiendum" and the "definiens" (Latin: that which is doing the defining, or, the 
definition) represent new concepts. The methodology appears graphically in 
Figure 3.4 below. 
nominal  
 definition  
perceptual  
 definition  
taxonomic  
 definition  
componential  
 definition  
dictionary  
 definition 
Figure 3.4: The sequence of definitions for new concepts. 
This study used this sequence of Spradley and McCurdy's types of definitions as 
a methodology to define nonuse of information, as follows. 
1. Nominal definitions 
 Nominal definition, that is, definition of an object by naming it, facilitates 
subsequent discussion but does not define any object other than the object in 
question and does not relate the object to other objects or differentiate the object 
from other objects. For example, I point to an object and say "that is a 'chair'." For 
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that object, then, I have assigned the name "chair." This assigning facilitates 
further discussion of that object, but it does not define similar objects or 
differentiate the "chair" from other objects. 
 For the informal pilot study, I assigned nominal definitions to concepts that 
represented to me examples of nonuse of information. These nominal definitions 
consisted of combinations of each of the three words: information / knowledge / 
message with each of the four words nonuse / avoidance / rejection / refusal, and 
permutations of those combinations. For example, one such combination 
resulted in "information nonuse," and a permutation of that combination resulted 
in "nonuse of information." As noted above, the informal pilot study of various 
popular and scholarly literatures identified approximately 400 works that used 
one or more of these nominal definitions. 
2. Perceptual definitions  
 Perceptual definitions derive from perceptions. For example, "I perceive 
this chair … and I perceive this other chair … and this one …." As with nominal 
definitions, this perceptual definition does not define "chair" in a way that allows 
others to define "chair," but it does begin to constrain the discussion of chairs to 
an agreed upon group of objects. 
 In the approximately 400 works identified in the informal pilot study, I 
perceived several dozen examples of nonuse of information. These several 
dozen examples began to cluster into groups with similar characteristics, each 
group appearing discrete. 
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3. Taxonomic definitions  
 Taxonomic definitions result from arranging perceptual definitions into a 
taxonomy, rather than a listing without order. The arrangement can take the form 
of a hierarchy by utilizing more inclusive and less inclusive characteristics, or it 
can utilize one or more continua. The phenomenon to be defined, then, is any 
item appearing in the taxonomy. To continue the previous example of chairs, a 
hierarchical taxonomy would consider, for example, suspended chairs as 
different from chairs that rest on the floor. Among chairs that rest on the floor, 
some have legs, and some have casters. Among chairs that have legs, some 
have three legs, and some have four. Another taxonomy might organize the 
chairs along continua such as weight or price. All the objects in these 
taxonomies, however, are chairs, and "chair" can be defined as any object in 
these taxonomies. 
 In this study, I created a preliminary taxonomy of nonuse of information. 
Over the course of the study, I refined this preliminary taxonomy into the 
taxonomy of Figure 1.1. Other taxonomies might define CNI as well as that of 
Figure 1.1, and a second example appears in Appendix 5. I chose the taxonomy 
of Figure 1.1 for two reasons. First, the taxonomy of Figure 1.1 appeared to offer 
a view of CNI with more degrees of difference than the taxonomy of Appendix 5, 
a finer-grained and more nuanced picture of CNI. Second, the taxonomy of 
Appendix 5, a taxonomy based on the transmission model of communication, is a 
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focus of controversy among some scholars of information science and related 
disciplines (e.g., MacKay, 1969; Reddy, 1979, 1993; Underwood, 2003). 
4. Componential definitions 
 Componential definitions represent an inductive counterpart to a deductive 
taxonomic definition. In other words, while a taxonomic definition defines an 
object by its presence in a taxonomy (arguing deductively from the general to the 
specific), a componential definition defines an object by its component attributes 
(arguing inductively from the specific to the general). For example, from the 
taxonomy of chairs, we can define a chair by the characteristics common to all 
the chairs in the taxonomy, specifically: a) a piece of furniture that holds your 
weight off the floor, b) has a part that keeps you from falling over when you lean 
back, and c) usually accommodates one person. 
 This study uses a componential definition of CNI derived from the 
elements of the taxonomy (Figure 1.1). In other words, each element of the 
taxonomy has several components. Most of the components of each element are 
unique to that element. Some components, however, are common to all of the 
elements of the taxonomy. The components common to all elements of the 
taxonomy are these: 
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a) The presence of a behavior, for example, eating beef. 
b) The presence of information that might have altered that behavior, for 
example, evidence that BSE ("Mad Cow Disease") might exist in the local 
food supply (McWilliams, 2004). 
c) The presence of a compulsion beyond the control of the person 
committing the behavior. In other words, the nonuse of information is 
compelled nonuse (CNI) rather than volitional nonuse (VNI) because the 
person has no control over the conditions leading to the nonuse. For 
example, the nonuse could be caused by unawareness of the information 
(because it appeared in a small, somewhat local magazine), fear of the 
unknown (if a person already has eaten infected beef, then that person 
may have contracted the incurable BSE), perceiving the information as not 
worth the time needed to obtain it ("I won't bother, because they'll find a 
cure anyway"), or mistrust of the source ("you can't trust that magazine"). 
d) The continuation of the behavior, in this example, continuing to eat beef. 
Componential definitions, then, consist of a statement of the components 
common to all examples of a phenomenon.  
5. Dictionary definitions  
 Dictionary definitions, to be useful, must define a concept in terms of its 
previously defined component concepts. For that reason, dictionary definitions of 
new concepts cannot precede the definition of the component concepts. In the 
example of chairs, we rely on previously accepted definitions of "furniture," 
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"seat," "back," and "person" to define a chair as a piece of furniture that has a 
seat, a back, and usually accommodates one person. Others may improve upon 
this definition, but, in general, we have defined "chair" well enough to discuss 
chairs. 
 The following dictionary definition of CNI employs the common elements 
that make up the componential definition of CNI (listed above). The common 
factors of CNI find expression in this dictionary definition, first given in Chapter 1: 
 
CNI describes behaviors beyond the control of a person,  
behaviors that do not allow a difference to make a difference. 
 
This dictionary definition evolved from expression of the componential definition, 
which derived from analysis of the taxonomic definition, which consisted of 
perceptual definitions based on nominal definitions. 
Pragmatism 
 Although I did not realize it when I formulated them, the definition heuristic 
of the previous section and the retroduction heuristic of the following section both 
rested on the philosophical school known as American pragmatism. Charles 
Sanders Peirce formulated pragmatism in the late 1800s based on his reading of 
Immanuel Kant (Dewey & McDermott, 1981, p. 42). Peirce's extraordinarily 
unconventional patterns of behavior led to the suppression of his writings, 
particularly his autobiographical writings, for up to 80 years after his death in 
 
 68
1914 (Brent, 1996, p. 32). This suppression is important to an understanding of 
pragmatism because Peirce published relatively little during his life. Much of his 
thought emerged only through his autobiographical material. Thus, it fell to 
Peirce's colleagues such as William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to interpret pragmatism and to apply it to other 
fields. More recently, pragmatism grounds the philosophy of Van Fraassen, who 
calls pragmatism "constructive empiricism" (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 184).  
 As noted earlier, Peirce described pragmatism by his "pragmatic maxim": 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, you 
conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of 
those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. (1905, p. 481; 
reprinted in 1931-1958, v. 5, p. 438) 
By this statement, Peirce equated a concept to its practical consequences. 
Elsewhere, he related pragmatism specifically to behavior: 
[T]he maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect 
or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken 
in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably 
modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. (1903, 
reprinted in 1931-1958, v. 5, p. 196) 
I interpret this statement as meaning that conceptions can be judged only by the 
behavioral responses that they stimulate. I applied Peirce's pragmatism to two 
areas of the study reported here: to the concept of nonuse of information and to 
the methodology of this study.  
 First, I looked at the psychologic implications of nonuse of information. 
The discipline of psychology could incorporate explanations of nonuse of 
information via several of its major schools of thought: Freudian 
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psychodynamics, Skinnerian behaviorism, Neisser's cognitive psychology, or 
combinations of the three. I narrowed the psychologic implications of the study to 
behavior, specifically the behavior of nonuse of information, rather than expand 
the discussion to the psychodynamic or cognitive effects of nonuse. I did so 
because the behavioral effects of nonuse of information are more easily 
observable than its psychodynamic or cognitive effects, and pragmatism 
postulates that the effect (which must be observed) is the conception, itself. 
Psychodynamic and cognitive terms appear in the study reported here, but the 
study focuses on behavior, specifically the behavior of not using information. 
 Second, the concept of pragmatism underlies the two heuristics developed 
for this study. The definition heuristic described in the previous section 
exemplifies pragmatism, in that the definition type resulting from each step:  
nominal  perceptual  taxonomic  componential  dictionary (Figure 3.4)  
equals the process required to derive that step. In other words, each of the 
definition types is its effect on the subsequent definition type, as Peirce defined 
an object to be its effect. Thus, pragmatism creates in this definition heuristic 
something of a chain of equivalencies, in which the last definition, a dictionary 
definition, is as trustworthy as the nominal definition that initiated the chain. This 
line of reasoning justifies the definition of CNI as "behaviors beyond the control of 
a person, behaviors that do not allow a difference to make a difference." 
 With respect to the methodology of this study (the retroduction heuristic), 
pragmatism underlies Peirce's concept of retroduction (abduction): 
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If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is 
nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That is, pragmatism 
proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further 
rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to 
say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, 
furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, 
at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not understood as a 
proposition in psychology. For the maxim of pragmatism is that a 
conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that of a 
second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other 
conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical 
conduct differently from that second conception. (Peirce, 1931-1958, v. 5, p. 
196) 
Peirce postulated retroduction as an iterative process consisting of formulating, 
testing, reformulating, and retesting retroductive suggestions. For this study, I 
created a nine-step heuristic for the performance of retroduction, described in the 
next section. The retroduction heuristic derives from steps described by Peirce 
(1976b, pp. 319-320) and by his follower Rennie (1998, p. 111).  
A retroduction / abduction heuristic for investigating CNI 
 To some extent, the entire process of this study (brainstorming, pilot 
study, formal study, and re-study) followed the iterative pattern of retroduction. In 
other words, the retroductive suggestions generated by brainstorming were 
refined and tested in the pilot study, the retroductive suggestions generated in 
the pilot study were refined and tested in the formal study, and the retroductive 
suggestions generated in the formal study were refined and tested in the re-
study. This cyclical, iterative process of generation, testing, reformulating, and 
retesting synopsizes the retroductive method. The following sections explain in 
more detail the process of retroduction and its application to this study of CNI. 
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An introduction to retroductive (or "abductive") reasoning 
 Retroductive reasoning shares many characteristics with grounded theory. 
This study used retroductive reasoning instead of grounded theory for several 
interrelated reasons, many of which Rennie (1998) has expressed. As further 
explained below, retroductive reasoning lends itself to the study of newly 
identified phenomena, while methods such as grounded theory have been used 
effectively in areas with established vocabularies or previous studies. 
Retroductive reasoning "forgives" the lack of a starting point, and that lack of a 
starting point characterizes newly recognized phenomena. Conversely, the 
prescribed procedures of grounded theory apply to studies that build on pre-
existing investigations. CNI has no pre-existing, coherent body of literature, a fact 
that recommends the use of retroductive reasoning to investigate CNI. 
 People develop ideas by inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, and 
retroductive reasoning. As used in this study, induction is "reasoning from 
observations to theories" (Honderich, 1995, p. 405), while deduction is reasoning 
from theories to observations, or, "inference where from a given set of premisses 
[sic] the conclusion must follow" (p. 181). In the initiation of exploratory studies 
such as this study, however, where neither prior systematic observations nor 
theories exist, the researcher will find both inductive and deductive reasoning 
inapplicable. "All the ideas of science come to it by the way of Abduction 
[Retroduction]." (Peirce, 1931-1958, pp. 144-145, from Peirce's "Harvard 
Lectures on Pragmatism"). Peirce, the primary theorizer of retroduction during his 
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long, prolific, and largely unpublished writing career, equated retroduction with 
terms such as "intuition," "hunch," "guess," "presumption," "apagögé," "extremely 
fallible insight," "explanatory hypothesis," "problematic theory," "probational 
adoption of the hypothesis," and "inference to the best explanation leading to a 
scientific hypothesis" (after Bergman & Paavola, 2001). According to Peirce, 
retroductive reasoning might lead to a higher proportion of false starts than would 
reliance on deductive or inductive reasoning, but the exploration of a new idea 
would permit of no other method of reasoning: 
Abduction is no more nor less than guessing, a faculty attributed to 
Yankees. (---) Such validity as this has consists in the generalization that no 
new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus 
reached. (1976b, pp. 319-320, from Peirce's 1902 "Prolegmena"). 
This study, an exploration for Peirce's "new truth," employs Peirce's retroduction. 
 Peirce, a classically trained physical scientist, mathematician, and 
logician, recognized well the pitfalls of performing retroduction, at times calling it 
a process of thought "capable of producing no conclusion more definite than a 
conjecture" (1976b, pp. 319-320, from Peirce's 1902 "Prolegmena"), and at times 
saying: 
Abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless 
is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or 
conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical 




A nine-step heuristic for the performance of retroductive / abductive reasoning 
 Peirce and his followers postulated nine steps that would ensure the rigor 
of the retroductive method. I have termed the nine steps a heuristic because they 
comprise a somewhat flexible method of providing a reasonably close 
approximation of an answer to a question. This heuristic suits the retroductive 
method because retroduction seldom leads to a conclusion. Instead, retroduction 
leads to a suggestion that forms the basis for further investigation. Neither Peirce 
nor his followers ever presented a complete heuristic, but Rennie (1998, p. 111) 
articulated steps 3-5, Peirce (1976b, pp. 319-320) suggested others in his 
various writings, and Bergman and Paavola (2001) added nuances that clarified 
the process. I have constructed from their work the following nine-step heuristic 
to investigate CNI in the study reported here. 
1. Perceive a phenomenon leading to surprise: the breaking up of a belief or 
conception 
2. Perform the fundamental and primary retroduction: that CNI can be 
studied, even without prior systematic observations or theorizations 
3. Synthesize the new phenomenon into a judgment, hypothesis, or 
retroductive suggestion 
4. Bracket intuitive prejudices 
5. Immerse in the data 
6. Conceptualize 
7. Hypothesize 
8. Select the hypothesis most efficient to entertain, interrogate, or test 




Fuller explanations of the nine steps follow. 
1. Perceive a phenomenon, leading to surprise.  
 Peirce defined surprise as "some belief, active or passive, formulated or 
unformulated, [which] has just been broken up" (1998, p. 287, from Peirce's 1903 
"A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic"). The surprised performer of retroduction 
must have formed the belief prior to being surprised, but the retroductive method 
begins with the surprise rather than the prior formation of the belief. 
 The phenomenon of nonuse of information surprised me. I had studied 
information use for 12 years, and I had never thought about nonuse, except to 
deplore isolated examples such as censorship, propaganda, anti-intellectualism, 
and prejudice. I began to search for examples, and I was surprised to find in the 
literature very few treatments of nonuse, as such, while I could think of so many 
examples. I began to see connections and similarities among the examples, and 
I began to search for larger treatments of nonuse of information. Searches of 
databases of scholarly literature revealed a few dozen examples in a few 
hundred articles, but no comprehensive treatments. With encouragement from 
my doctoral advising committee, I began to see the study of nonuse as a 
worthwhile addition to information science, in part because it seemed such a 




2. Perform a fundamental and primary retroduction. 
 Perform a fundamental and primary retroduction, for example, "that the 
facts in hand admit of rationalization, and of rationalization by us" (Peirce, 1931-
1958, p. 219, from Peirce's 1901 "On the Logic of drawing History from Ancient 
Documents"). 
 The database searches produced examples of nonuse that appeared to 
be well defined but extremely limited in application and interpretation. I observed 
that the examples bore relationships, one to another, although no such 
relationships appeared explicitly in the works discussing the examples. For 
example, Chatman found that the poor demonstrated "a heavy use of television 
for escape and for surveillance" of their environments (1985, p. 277). Yet, no one 
appeared to have linked her work with "avoidance of stimuli that inform rather 
than entertain" (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967; Graber, 1989) or the scholarship of 
propaganda (e.g., Lasswell, 1927, 1949). I retroduced that this study could 
identify, define, and connect such examples and that this study would be 
feasible, understandable, and worth the effort to conduct. 
3. Synthesize the new phenomenon into a judgment, hypothesis, or retroductive 
suggestion, based on fallible insight.  
 In this step, the researcher synthesizes the new phenomenon into a new 
conception or general hypothesis (Peirce, 1931-1958, p. 181, from Peirce's 1903 
"Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism"). 
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 The more I looked at examples of nonuse, the more I began to see 
concise explanations of information behavior when viewed as nonuse rather than 
use. I had not counted theories of information use at that time, but I knew that 
scores existed. Thus, I could envision the creation of a classification scheme 
based on a few elements of nonuse of information rather than on scores of 
theories of information use. Further, the classification based on nonuse appeared 
to have internal consistency, that is, each element bore a relationship to the 
elements next to it, while the scores of theories of information use stood largely 
in isolation. The classification of nonuse appeared to have great potential as an 
explanatory model of conditions that could lead to CNI, a model for employment 
by information professionals, so I formed the retroductive suggestion that an 
explanatory model of nonuse could organize and facilitate the study of 
information behavior, a field currently laboring under its current emphasis on 
information use. 
4. Bracket intuitive prejudices about the phenomenon.  
 Peirce discussed intuitive prejudices only indirectly, in step 8 below. In 
step 4, Rennie (1998, section following the introduction) refers to: 
attempting to set biases aside (i.e., to put them in 'brackets', as 
phenomenologists describe the tactic); and by being as explicit as possible 
about them when writing up the returns from their studies. 
I had intuitive prejudices about nonuse of information, that it somehow was 
morally "bad," ubiquitous, virtually invincible, invisible to most, and seductive, 
rather like a Christian devil or Arabian genie. I observed the prevalence of that 
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intuitive prejudice in the literature of information science (e.g., C. Harris, 1984), 
education (e.g., Alexander et al., 1997), and law (e.g., Baarsma, 2002). I kept 
this intuitive prejudice before me when I began to collect examples of nonuse of 
information. Among those examples, I found nonuse of information that could 
benefit the nonuser. For example, psychodynamic defense mechanisms permit a 
person to survive, to remain sane, or to function in the presence of unpleasant 
information (e.g., Freyd, 2006). In other words, nonuse, as such, seems neither 
helpful nor harmful to the potential nonuser, and the nonuser is neither morally 
good nor bad by not using information. What did appear in the examples, 
however, was an indication of the difference between volitional nonuse of 
information and compelled nonuse of information. This realization allowed me to 
identify many compelled rather than volitional examples of nonuse of information 
and to narrow this study to an investigation of compelled nonuse of information 
(CNI). 
 I had another intuitive prejudice about nonuse of information, this one 
involving the nature of authoritarianism and its employment of CNI to control 
others. I viewed authoritarianism with suspicion and its mechanisms of control as 
alarming because such control lends itself to abuse as controllers seek self-
aggrandizement or perpetuation of their control at the expense of the controlled. 
However, some amount of authoritarian control and manipulation of information 
can benefit the controlled. For example, against the threat of species extinction 
by means of an environmental "tragedy of the commons" (Schmuck & Vlek, 
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2003), many (e.g., Hardin, 1968) assert that only a measure of authoritarian 
control can regulate the use of the commons in a far-sighted manner. The 
regulation may be by physical force or by manipulation of information, tactics 
identified by Servan (1767, p. 35, quoted by Foucault, 1977, p. 102):  
A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true 
politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas; it 
is at the stable point of reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link 
is all the stronger in that we do not know of what it is made and we believe 
it to be our own work. 
The sources of the most powerful of "their own ideas" are, almost by definition, 
hidden: "The very efficacy of inviolate rules depends on their being abstracted 
from any social context or set of conventions--they just are." (Burbules, 
1986/2002, p. 342) Any act of selection involves omission of the phenomena not 
selected. For example, the selection of ideas involves the omission of the ideas 
not selected. For this reason, the control of slaves (to use Servan's word) by 
"their own ideas" comprises a form of CNI in which "their own ideas" (ideas 
fostered by an authority) preclude other ideas (ideas that might weaken the 
authoritarian control). These other ideas constitute nonused information. 
5. Immerse in the data.  
 Peirce did not discuss immersion in the data, and Rennie merely 
mentioned it and implied the necessity of comprehensive immersion: "the 
adherence to a conceptualization thus conceived [step 6, following] is contingent 
on its being supported by the data as a whole [emphasis added]" (1998, p. 111). 
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This step presents the question of what constitutes data in the study reported 
here. 
 In this study of examples of CNI that appear in the published literature, I 
treat each example of CNI as a datum, following the precedent set by the science 
of bibliometrics. In 1922, bibliometrics (then called bibliographical statistics and, 
before that, bibliography) added quantitative methods to its formerly used set of 
qualitative methods (cf. Hulme, 1923; Krzys, 2005, p. 292) to permit the 
description of the evolution of various sciences through metrics applied to their 
literatures. Analysts first used books as data, then other works such as journal 
articles, and then the books' and articles' references and citations. In this 
expansion of subject matter, particularly in the analysis of references and 
citations, the methodology of bibliometrics regained the qualitative component 
(how a bibliographic datum was mentioned, rather than just the fact of its being 
mentioned) that the shift from bibliography to bibliographical statistics to 
bibliometrics had de-emphasized: 
At first, there were citation counts which were used to indicate importance 
of journals; these counts being statistical did not consider the quality of a 
work. Ultimately, the citations themselves were closely examined as 
indicated in many research papers. (Krzys, 2005, p. 317) 
 For his dissertation about the obsolescence of books in college libraries, 
Gosnell (1943) used three collections of books as populations (Krzys, 2005, p. 
292), implying the legitimacy of the use of a book as a datum. His dissertation 
used books, book chapters in edited volumes, and journal and conference 
articles as sources for the study. In 1978, Nicholas and Ritchie identified 
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descriptive ("describing the characteristics or features of a literature") and 
evaluative ("examining the relationships formed between components of a 
literature") components of bibliometrics. Krzys paraphrased Nicholas and Ritchie:  
Although all the descriptive studies are not evaluations, all the evaluative 
analyses are first descriptive with the evaluative taking the data one step 
further, providing 'data on the condition or character of the literature as a 
whole.' (Nicholas & Ritchie, 1978, quoted in; Krzys, 2005, p. 296)  
In the study reported here, I searched for and evaluated published examples of 
CNI and treated those examples as data, using a technique similar to evaluative 
bibliometrics. To evaluate the examples, I determined the manner of usage of the 
examples in the published works and the relationship of the examples to CNI. 
 As described earlier, I conducted an informal pilot study that examined 
various literatures for occurrences of nonuse of information (see Figure 3.2). I 
performed similar searches in other databases such as Google Scholar, 
Altavista, and meta-search engines such as Dogpile, Clusty, and Ez2find. 
Concluding the searches, I compiled a comprehensive list of examples of nonuse 
of information as presented in the literatures indexed by the mentioned 
databases. 
 A discussion of the limitations on such immersion appears in the next 
section, limitations such as examples that eluded the searches because of 
different vocabulary, examples that never were published or that appear so 
seldom as to avoid even an apparently exhaustive search, examples that predate 




6. Form new conceptions bearing some degree of ordering.  
 With this step, the performer of retroduction / abduction forms conceptions 
contingent on support by "the data as a whole" (Rennie, 1998, p. 111). 
 With the manifestations of nonuse of information produced during the 
informal pilot study, I began to compile lists of conditions that might cause 
nonuse. I ordered these lists of conditions along the ordinal continua of: 
• apparent strength with respect to somatic and cognitive thresholds,  
• source of the condition (external or internal to the nonuser),  
• susceptibility of the condition to mitigation,  
• nature of initiation (somatic or cognitive), and  
• status as either compelled or volitional.  
These lists of conditions illustrated the nature of the conditions as either 
compelled or volitional, and I decided to narrow the scope of this study to 
compelled nonuse of information (CNI). I developed an ordinal taxonomy of 
conditions that lead to CNI (see Figure 1.1). As noted above, I also created a 
taxonomy of conditions based on the transmission model of communication, 
sometimes known as the Shannon-Weaver model (see Appendix 5). I chose the 
ordinal taxonomy for two reasons, as explained earlier in this chapter. The 
ordinal taxonomy has a more nuanced picture of CNI, and the Shannon-Weaver 
model arouses controversy about the suitability of information theory as a model 
for communication other than that studied by telephone engineering. 
7. Hypothesize for the surprising phenomenon.  
 This step merges into the previous step because conceptualizations about 
the whole body of data lead to conceptualizations accounting for the novel data 
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that caused the initial surprise. Peirce interchangeably used other phrases to 
label this step, for example, "invention of the hypothesis" (1985, from an 
unpublished Peirce manuscript, 1901). 
 As the examples of CNI accumulated, I created hypotheses about the 
structure of an explanatory model of CNI. The taxonomy of Figure 1.1 represents 
the hypothesis selected, as the next section explains. 
8. Select the most efficient hypothesis.  
 Select the hypothesis most economical to follow (Peirce, 1976a, pp. 37-
38, from Peirce's 1902 "Carnegie Application"). Peirce defined economy in terms 
of money, time, thought, and energy (1931-1958, p. 600, from Peirce's 1903 
"Lowell Lectures"). Peirce also advised the researcher to select a hypothesis "so 
long as this preference is not based upon any previous knowledge bearing upon 
the truth of the hypotheses, nor on any testing of any of the hypotheses, after 
having admitted them on probation" (1931-1958, pp. 524-525, from Peirce's 1901 
"Hume on Miracles"). I conclude from this statement that Peirce was warning in 
the first case ("previous knowledge") against using intuitive prejudices that had 
not been bracketed, and in the second case ("testing") against using what the 
business world calls "sunk costs," that is, the resources already expended, 
unrecoverable, and not affecting the cost-benefit ratio (the efficiency) of future 
expenditures. 
 Peirce's admonition to select the most efficient and economical hypothesis 
bears a superficial resemblance to the concept known as parsimony or Occam's 
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Razor. However, while parsimony/Occam's Razor prefers the hypothesis that 
introduces the fewest assumptions and postulates the fewest hypothetical 
entities, Peirce's efficiency and economy derive from the money, time, thought, 
and energy required to test the hypothesis. As such, Peirce's efficiency and 
economy resemble strongly his pragmaticism (William James's pragmatism), 
because his pragmaticism emphasizes the effects of a concept. In other words, 
Peirce admonished us to select a hypothesis based on its effect. With 
retroduction, testing the hypothesis should have a minimal effect on the 
resources required to do the testing. 
 I hypothesized that an explanatory model of CNI could exist, that I could 
develop it, and that it would prove useful in understanding the empirical 
examples of information behavior that occur in the literature of information 
science and related fields and in the practice of information professionals. 
9. Inductively verify the hypothesis against the data as a whole.  
 Peirce referred to this step also as entertainment of the hypothesis (1985, 
p. 895, from Peirce's 1901 "The Proper Treatment of Hypotheses"), or 
interrogation, or testing by experiment of the hypothesis (pp. 898-899). I 
conclude that this step in the performance of retroduction justifies the use of the 
term "retroduction" rather than "abduction," although I have not found this 
justification stated so explicitly in Peirce's works. He says only: "I have on 
reflexion [sic] decided to give this kind of reasoning the name of retroduction to 
imply that it turns back and leads from the consequent of an admitted 
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consequence, to its antecedent." (quoted in Bergman & Paavola, 2001; n.d., pp. 
4-5) I agree with Peirce's renaming of the method, because "abduction" implies 
to me a drawing away from the consequence with the direction being 
unspecified, whereas "retroduction" implies a drawing away from the 
consequence to its antecedent, as Peirce stated. "Retroduction" also implies to 
me a returning, and in this sense, I treated the hypothesis of step 8 as both the 
outcome of retroduction and as the font of new retroductions, returning or looking 
back to a prior step in the retroductive process. Specifically, I looked back to the 
last point at which I had perceived a phenomenon leading to a surprise. That 
point followed the pilot study, with the realization that nonuse of information 
consisted of CNI and VNI, and that this study should focus on CNI. I re-entered 
the retroduction cycle at Step 3, synthesizing the new phenomenon into a 
hypothesis. That hypothesis took the form of the taxonomy depicted in Figure 
1.1. Re-entering the retroduction cycle, I reminded myself of Step 4, bracketing 
intuitive prejudices, and began Step 5, immersion in the data, with the "Formal 
Study," reported in the next section. 
A search for examples of CNI and formulation of a final taxonomy 
 A central component of the study reported here was the search of the 13 
print and electronic databases in Appendix 1 for the search terms listed in Figure 
3.5. These search terms included the terms used during the pilot study and terms 
thought of later or suggested by members of the dissertation advising committee, 






 cogniti(ve or ition) blunt(ing or er) 
 information refus(ing or al) 
 knowledge reject(ion) 




Figure 3.5: The formal study search for examples of nonuse of information via 
keyword searches. 
The results of this search generated no completely new conditions leading to 
CNI, but they did suggest sharper definitions of the existing conditions and a 
reorganization of parts of the taxonomy. 
 The search resulted in approximately 1,400 articles that contained some 
form of the search terms. Many of these articles contained chance juxtapositions 
of the search terms; many contained examples of information use, rather than 
nonuse; and many did not contain sufficient information to determine whether the 
described nonuse was compelled or volitional. From the approximately 1,400 
articles, 114 presented examples of CNI, and these 114 appear here in Table 
3.2: 
Author and date Sources of articles 
1. Agrawal et al. (2007) Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 44(1), 100-113. 
2. Aldoory & van Dyke 
(2006) 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 
83(2), 346-361. 
3. Arsenault & Castells 
(2006) 




Author and date Sources of articles 
4. Azaiza & Cohen (2006) Journal of Women's Health, 15(5), 520-530. 
5. Baarsma (2002) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 93(1), 23. 
6. Baker (1980) Journal of Business Communication, 17(3), 33-43. 
7. Ball-Rokeach et al. 
(1981) Public Opinion Quarterly, 45(1), 58. 
8. Bergen Jr. (2001) Education, 122(1), 154. 
9. Birch (1990) Developmental Psychology, 26(4), 515-519. 
10. Black & Fung (1983) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 18, 307-354. 
11. Brandon (2006) Educational Studies, 40(2), 196-208. 
12. Broderick (2005) Cognitive Therapy & Research, 29(5), 501-510. 
13. Brooks et al. (2003) Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 904-914.
14. Brunel & Pichon (2004) Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 3(4), 360-374.
15. Burden (1991) Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 4(4), 331. 
16. Cheah (2006) Asian Journal of Communication, 16(3), 293-314. 
17. Cho & Cheon (2004) Journal of Advertising, 33(4), 89-97. 
18. Chute & Wiener (1996) International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 6(3), 211-231. 
19. Clerk (2007) American Annals of the Deaf, 152(1), 5-19. 
20. S.W. Cornelius & Caspi 
(1987) Psychology and Aging, 2(2), 144-153. 
21. Crawford (1978) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 13, 61-81. 
22. Cronin (2005) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 39, 395-432. 
23. Deveney & Deldin 
(2004) Emotion, 4(3), 295-304. 
24. Dimaggio et al. (2006) Psychology & Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 79(4), 495-516. 
25. Dimaggio et al. (2002) Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 12(4), 421-451. 
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Author and date Sources of articles 
26. Dore (1994) Journal of Social Work Education, 30(1), 97-106. 
27. Downing (2006) Intervention in School & Clinic, 42(2), 67-77. 
28. Eisen et al. (2007) Developmental Psychology, 43(6), 1275-1294.
29. Eisenstadt et al. (2002) Self & Identity, 1(4), 289-311. 
30. Everill & Waller (1995) European Eating Disorders Review, 3(3), 129-147. 
31. Faris & Smeltzer (1997) Journal of Business Communication, 34(1), 7-26. 
32. File, et al. (1993) Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical & Experimental, 8(3), 195-202. 
33. Floyd & Clements 
(2005) International Journal of Listening, 19, 39-50. 
34. Foa & Kozak (1986) Psychological Bulletin, 99(1), 20-35. 
35. Freyd (2006) Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 29(5), 518-519. 
36. Fry & Prentice-Dunn 
(2005) Health Communication, 17(2), 133-147. 
37. Garmon (2005) Educational Studies, 38(3), 275-286. 
38. Gernsbacher (1993) Psychological Science, 4(5), 294-298. 
39. Gernsbacher & Faust 
(1991) 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 17(2), 245-262. 
40. Gernsbacher & 
Robertson (1995) Psychological Science, 6(3), 165-169. 
41. Giacalone et al. (2007) Psycho-Oncology, 16(4), 365-370. 
42. Godlee et al. (2004) Lancet, 364(9430), 295-300. 
43. Goldsmith (1999) Research on Language & Social Interaction, 32(4), 303. 
44. Granfield (2002) Journal of Alcohol & Drug Education, 47(2), 18.
45. Greenwood (1997) Lancet, 349(9058), 1041. 
46. Hamblin et al. (1984) Journal of Clinical Psychology, 40(6), 1510-1516. 
47. Haynes (1988) Quarterly Journal of Speech, 74(1), 71-99. 
48. Hemsley-Brown & 
Sharp (2003) Oxford Review of Education, 29(4), 449-471. 
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Author and date Sources of articles 
49. Hoffmann (2004) ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 61(1), 75-79. 
50. Hofmann et al. (2005) Emotion, 5(4), 464-475. 
51. Ikpeze & Boyd (2007) Reading Teacher, 60(7), 644-654. 
52. Jacobson (2001) CyberPsychology & Behavior, 4(6), 653-673. 
53. Jones & Leary (1994) Health Psychology, 13(1), 86-90. 
54. Kalichman et al. (2006) Health Psychology, 25(2), 205-210. 
55. Keller et al (2003) Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 40(1), 54-64. 
56. Klaczynski et al. (1997) Journal of Educational Psychology, 89(3), 470-485. 
57. Kreling et al. (2006) Psycho-Oncology, 15(12), 1065-1076. 
58. Kupermintz & Salomon 
(2005) Theory Into Practice, 44(4), 293-302. 
59. Kuyken et al. (2006) Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(3), 387-396. 
60. Laney & Loftus (2005) Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 50(13), 823-828. 
61. R. J. Lewis et al. (1986) Journal of Personality, 54(4), 676. 
62. Lips & Colwill (1988) Canadian Psychology Psychologie Canadienne, 29(1), 57-68. 
63. McKnight (2006) Journal of the Medical Library Association, 94(2), 145-151. 
64. L. M. Meyer (2000) Theory Into Practice, 39(4), 228. 
65. Meyers (2002) Journal of Educational & Psychological Consultation, 13(3), 151-183. 
66. Mickiewicz (2005) Political Communication, 22(3), 355-380. 
67. Mikulincer et al. (2003) Personality & Social Psychology Review, 7(1), 20-40. 
68. R. F. Miller & Tighe 
(1974) 
Annual Review of Information Science and 
Technology, 9. 
69. Mills (1965) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2(4), 589-593. 
70. Mills & Jellison (1968) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(1), 59-62. 
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Author and date Sources of articles 
71. Moradi et al. (2006) Journal of Counseling Psychology, 53(1), 57-66. 
72. Morgan & J. K. Miller 
(2002) 
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 
30(2), 163. 
73. Muha & K. S. Smith 
(1998) Journal of Health Communication, 3, 109. 
74. Nickerson (1998) Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175-220. 
75. Olson (1995) Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28(1), 45-68. 
76. Owens (2006) AAC: Augmentative & Alternative Communication, 22(3), 196-208. 
77. Palmer & Carter (2006) Communication Law & Policy, 11(1), 1-34. 
78. Parks & Toth (2006) Aging, Neuropsychology & Cognition, 13(2), 225-253. 
79. Paulson (2002) Reading Psychology, 23(1), 45-66. 
80. Perse & Ferguson 
(1993) Journalism Quarterly, 70(4), 843-853. 
81. Pinquart (2002) Experimental Aging Research, 28(3), 317-336.
82. Pratkanis & Gliner 
(2004) Current Psychology, 23(4), 279-304. 
83. Radeborg et al. (1999) Ergonomics, 42(5), 767-777. 
84. Ray (2003) Journal of Applied Communication Research, 31(3), 185. 
85. Rhodes & Wood (1992) Psychological Bulletin, 111(1), 156-171. 
86. Richards (1997) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 16(1), 156-162. 
87. Riskind et al. (2006) Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 25(7), 779-801. 
88. T. Rogers (1998) Communication Review, 2(4), 497. 
89. Rose & Rudolph (2006) Psychological Bulletin, 132(1), 98-131. 
90. Rousseau et al. (1998) Psychology & Marketing, 15(7), 643-662. 
91. Rubin (1988) Journalism Quarterly, 65, 368-375. 
92. Scott & Stradling (1997) Journal of Traumatic Stress, 10(3), 523-526. 
93. Sedikides & Green 
(2000) 




Author and date Sources of articles 
94. Seife (2001) Science, 291(5508), 1472. 
95. Shehryar & Hunt (2005) Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(4), 275-287. 
96. Sherman et al. (2000) Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1046-1058. 
97. Shermer (2004) Scientific American, 290(5), 46. 
98. Simon-Arndt et al. 
(2006) Health Communication, 20(1), 13-22. 
99. Soliah et al. (2006) College Student Journal, 40(4), 729-739. 
100. Sprinkle et al. (2006) Communication Education, 55(4), 389-402. 
101. Stovall-McClough & 
Cloitre (2006) 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
74(2), 219-228. 
102. E. Taylor & J. W. 
Rogers (2005) 
Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 
46(5), 451-467. 
103. Tsang (2002) Review of General Psychology, 6(1), 25-50. 
104. Turk (2004) Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1), 271-286. 
105. M. M. Turner et al. 
(2006) 
Human Communication Research, 32(2), 130-
156. 
106. Tyree & T. A. Fiore 
(1994) Remedial & Special Education, 15(6), 363. 
107. Volk (2007) Journal of the Medical Library Association, 95(2), 203-207. 
108. Weaver (1959) Speech Monographs, 26(4), 273. 
109. Weisgerber (2004) Information, Communication & Society, 7(4), 554-574. 
110. Williams et al. (2007) Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 122-148. 
111. Witte (1992) Communication Monographs, 59(4), 329-349. 
112. Wolfson (2006) Death Studies, 30(2), 113-120. 
113. Xie (2007) Educational Gerontology, 33(5), 429-450. 
114. Zulu (2003) AILA Review, 16(1), 52-61. 
Table 3.2: Authors, dates, and sources of articles containing examples of CNI.  
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A summary of the retroductive procedure employed in this study 
 In any investigation involving retroduction, the outcome of the retroductive 
process determines the next step in the investigation. If the retroduction has 
produced a hypothesis testable by inductive or deductive methods, the 
investigation progresses to those methods. If the retroduction has produced a 
completely unexpected hypothesis, the investigation returns to Step 1 of the 
retroduction heuristic and again proceeds through Step 9. If the investigation 
produces neither a surprise nor a testable hypothesis, the investigation returns to 
Step 5 and again proceeds through Step 9. This third possibility occurred twice 
during the study reported here, as diagrammed in Figure 3.6 below. In the first 
iteration of retroduction, the pilot study consisted of a database search for terms 
derived from brainstorming and led to the preliminary taxonomy (steps 1-9). The 
results of the first iteration did not produce a hypothesis testable by inductive or 
deductive methods, and it did not produce a surprise that would justify starting 
again at Step 1. Therefore, the study returned to Step 5, the formal study. The 
formal study consisted of a database search for terms derived from interrogation 
of preliminary taxonomy, and the results of this second iteration consisted of two 
taxonomies, depicted in Figure 1.1 and Appendix 5. The third iteration of 
retroduction consisted of a repeat of the formal study, but this time using the 




step: Iteration 1: Iteration 2: Iteration 3: 
1. Surprise Brainstorming   
2. Retroduce "nonuse exists"   
3. Synthisize "nonuse explains"   
4. Bracket "not bad; not good"   
5. Immerse pilot study of nonuse and IBs 




6. Conceptualize first taxonomy second taxonomy 
tweaking the 
taxonomy 
7. Hypothesize nonuse  CNI third  taxonomy 
tweaking the 
taxonomy 
8. Select first taxonomy second taxonomy 
tweaking the 
taxonomy 
9. Interrogate "almost, but  not quite" 
"almost, but  
not quite" 
"on to induction 
or deduction" 
Figure 3.6: A summary of the retroductive procedure employed in this study. 
Methodological limitations of this study 
 Several factors inherent in the methodology of this study potentially limit 
its quality:  
1) the context of the study,  
2) the applicability of applying reductionism to information behavior,  
3) a lack of trustworthiness of the data,  
4) a lack of rigor in the retroductive reasoning process, and  
5) a lack of prior theory underpinning CNI.  
The next five sections describe each limitation more fully and indicate why the 
methodology of this study is sufficient for its purposes and does not suffer unduly 
from these limitations.  
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1. Limitations imposed by the context of the study 
 Step 4 of the retroduction heuristic, bracketing intuitive prejudices, forces 
the practitioner of retroduction to consider some of the factors that influence the 
outcome of the retroductive process. But, just as the fish cannot see the water, a 
practitioner cannot identify fully (to say nothing of neutralizing) the effects of a 
study's context. With respect to this study, I am certain that my life experience, 
the need to satisfy my school (under its own constraints), and the life 
experiences of each of my faculty advisors have influenced the conduct and 
outcome of this study. Contextual limitations, however, apply to virtually all 
behavior. I rely, therefore, on Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim and claim that this study 
will be judged by its effect on disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences, 
and not on its contextual limitations. 
2. Limitations imposed by application of reductionism to CNI 
 The method of philosophical inquiry known as reductionism rests on the 
assumption that a phenomenon can be explained by analysis of its components, 
while holism asserts that unique properties emerge from considering the 
phenomenon as a whole, a view popularly summarized as "the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts." Reductionism occurs in several permutations: 
scientific, philosophical, theoretical, methodological, ontological, hierarchical, 
mathematical, linguistic, and legal. In virtually all permutations, the propriety of 
applying reductionism rests on the question: "Is this phenomenon explained more 
completely and understandably by holism or by reductionism?" The hierarchical 
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reductionism proposed by Dawkins (1986, p. 13) provides a clue to the 
explanatory power of reduction, describing complex systems as a level in a 
hierarchy of organizations. CNI, for example, occupies one level of the hierarchy 
depicted in Figure 3.7 below. Describing CNI in terms of information behavior 
(which is one level above CNI in the hierarchy of Figure 3.7) requires 
consideration of hundreds of information behaviors that compel nonuse of 
information (examples appear in Appendices 2 and 3). Similarly, studying CNI as 
a collection of sociological, political, economic, and psychologic principles (which 
are two levels below CNI in the hierarchy of Figure 3.7) requires a large number 
of those principles. Studying CNI by reducing it to the somatic and cognitive 
barriers one level below it, however, reduces CNI to the parsimonious six 
elements of the taxonomy of Figure 1.1 above. Conversely, viewing CNI 
holistically does not reveal emergent phenomena or causality from higher levels 
of the taxonomy to CNI. In other words, the sum of its parts is not greater than 
the whole. This parsimony of reduction and the ineffectiveness of holism justify 





        information use (& VNI)                                  CNI 
                                                 somatic barriers                  cognitive barriers 
                            sociology, political science, economics 
                                                              psychology 
                                                              physiology 
                                                              biology 
                                                              chemistry 
                                                              physics 
Figure 3.7: Hierarchical reductionism as applied to CNI. 
3. Limitations imposed by the trustworthiness of data 
 The analysis of CNI reported here may not be comprehensive because of 
two reasons, lack of inter- and intra-coder reliability testing, and limitations of the 
vocabulary used for searching the literatures. I did not attempt to re-code the 
corpus of the pilot study or to measure the reliability of my coding (intra-coder 
reliability) because the purpose of the pilot study was to develop concepts rather 
than data. I did re-code the corpus of the formal study, as will be explained. I did 
not attempt inter-coder reliability testing of the formal study because of the 
exploratory nature of this study. The vocabulary used to search the various 
literatures, that is, the set of search terms, was limited by its sources: my 
dissertation committee, the pilot study, and subsequent analysis of the pilot study 
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data. Other examples of nonuse of information might exist under different 
terminology. The literature search, however, proceeded beyond the point at 
which new elements of the taxonomy emerged, similar to the concept of data 
saturation. In other words, new elements ceased to appear, but this study may 
have overlooked extremely infrequent elements.  
 The taxonomic elements reported in this dissertation, however, provide a 
sufficiently firm foundation for further research. This sufficiency has two bases: 
the concept of data saturation mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the 
nature of the explanatory model of CNI. The explanatory model presents an 
ordering of types of elements, similar to the Periodic Table's ordering of 
elements. When Mendeleev formulated his early versions of the Periodic Table of 
the Elements, he noted gaps and predicted that chemists would fill the gaps with 
newly discovered elements. In fact, his predictions came true (Thall, 2006). 
Elements of CNI may not possess an integer interrelationship similar to the 
periodicity of the elements (based on the integers one through eight). Rather, 
they may possess an ordinal and hierarchical interrelationship similar to the 
Systema Naturae of Carl Linnaeus (1735; Quammen, 2007). Just as 
Mendeleev's Periodic Table based on atomic weight led to the modern Periodic 
Table based on atomic number, and as Linnaeus's taxonomy based on 
morphology led to modern taxonomy based on genetics, the CNI taxonomy of 
this study might lead to further such study of information behavior. Thus, the 
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value of this study rests primarily on its existence and methodological rigor and 
only secondarily on its comprehensiveness. 
4. Limitations imposed by a lack of rigor in the performance of retroductive 
reasoning 
 According to Walton (2004, p. 4),  
Logicians have tended to be not very welcoming to the idea of allowing 
abductive inference as part of logic, because logic is supposed to be an 
exact science, and abductive inference appears to be inexact. 
This claim to inexactness stems less from the method (retroduction / abductive 
inference) and more from the novelty of the topic undergoing retroduction, 
whatever that topic may be. With deduction and induction, the researcher works 
from the known to the unknown. With retroduction, the researcher works from the 
unknown to the possible. Stated another way, when embarking on an exploration 
of the unknown, the researcher MUST start with retroduction. As noted earlier, 
Peirce asserted that "no new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new 
truths are thus reached" (1976b, pp. 319-320, from Peirce's 1906 "Prolegmena"). 
Therefore, according to Peirce, while retroduction may lead to false starts, no 
research has started otherwise, that is, without Peirce's "surprise." To mitigate 
the inexactness inherent in the retroductive method, an inexactness stemming 
from a lack of prior systematic observations and theories and leading to only 
probable conjectures, I formulated and followed the retroduction heuristic, the 
nine-step methodology suggested by Peirce and his followers. 
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5. Limitations imposed by the lack of prior theory underpinning CNI 
 Although CNI has scant theoretical underpinning at this time, its 
explanatory model still can facilitate the study of information behavior. Further 
study will provide that underpinning and modify or substantiate the taxonomy. 
 The use of a model without theoretical underpinning finds precedent in 
bibliometrics. For example, Brookes (1969) said:  
The Bradford law [that a few journals carry most of the important articles] 
remains empirical until it is better understood. But if it can be demonstrated 
to be widely applicable, reliable and useful in practical operations, there is 
no need to wait until the underlying theory is completely established. 
Wilkinson (1972) added:  
Despite the limitations of our understanding of such laws, then, Bradford 
promises useful application in the design of more rational and economic 
information systems. 
In fact, others did refine and expand Bradford's Law, as stated by Hertzel (2003, 
p. 317), justifying its early use and continued study.  
 The lack of theory in this presentation of the CNI taxonomy may 
disappoint those who have a different concept of the word "theory" and require 
empirical support and predictability. According to Kaplan (1964, pp. 294-302), 
however, classifications function very much like theories, making sense of 
disturbing situations. Classifications identify and name the phenomena of 
interest, cluster them, and create a structure of their relationships (after Kwasnik, 
1992, p. 63). The taxonomy does just that, identifying, naming, clustering, and 
structuring conditions leading to CNI and, thereby, creating something of a theory 
in Kaplan's view. 
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Summary of Chapter 3 
 The methodology presented in this chapter: 
• pilot study,  
• formulation of heuristics,  
• creation of the taxonomy / explanatory model / classification scheme, and  
• comprehensive literature search 
resulted in the taxonomy of CNI presented in the next chapter, Chapter 4. As 
Chapter 2 demonstrated, scant prior discussion now exists about CNI. The 
taxonomy of Chapter 4 may have limitations, but it should be sufficient to 
facilitate discussion about CNI. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE TAXONOMY OF CONDITIONS LEADING TO CNI 
 This chapter explains Figure 1.1 above, the taxonomy of conditions 
compelling nonuse of information, starting with a discussion of the criteria used in 
ordering the taxonomy. Other orderings might be possible, and this section 
explains the ordering chosen for this dissertation. A discussion of the 
dichotomous nature of CNI-VNI follows, and then the chapter presents an 
explanation of the elements of the taxonomy. When considered together, the 
examples of CNI represented by the elements of Figure 1.1 comprise a 
taxonomic definition of CNI, one of the five types of definitions identified by 
Spradley and McCurdy (1972), as explained in Chapter 3 above. 
Criteria used in ordering the taxonomy 
 The taxonomy in Figure 1.1 (above) presents conditions that compel the 
nonuse of information. Several criteria determined the order of the elements of 
the taxonomy in Figure 1.1:  
1) the magnitude of the condition,  
2) cognitive involvement, and  
3) the direction of the condition. 
Magnitude 
 The conditions appear in the taxonomy in order of my estimation of their 
"magnitude," the amount of additional information needed to create a use of 
information from the nonuse. In other words, conditions at the top of the 
taxonomy, such as element 1 (intrinsic somatic conditions), would require a 
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smaller intervention of additional information to overcome the condition than 
would conditions further down the list, such as element 6 (information filtering). 
Note that placement in the taxonomy does not suggest whether a condition 
should be mitigated, only how it could be mitigated. 
Cognitive involvement 
 The conditions also appear according to my estimation of the amount of 
cognition involved in the nonuse, from least cognitive (most somatic) to most 
cognitive (least somatic). In other words, mitigation of a condition toward the top 
of the taxonomy would invoke less cognition than a condition lower on the page. 
Two important concepts modify the concept of cognitive involvement: timing and 
the traceability of cognition. 
 Timing refers to the duration of the nonuse of information. From a practical 
standpoint, nonuse exists only when it affects behavior. In other words, when a 
person must react to information before consciously thinking about the 
information, the person has not used the information. The game "Simon Says" 
provides an example. When a person responds correctly in the game, that 
person's response usually follows a traceable process of cognition: "The caller 
said 'Simon says.' I should move." Or, "The caller did not say 'Simon says.' I must 
not move." If the person responds incorrectly, the incorrect response usually 
comes just before the thought: "Oh no! I did that incorrectly!" Most people can 
play Simon Says at slow speeds. A rapid game, however, reduces the 
opportunity for cognition and increases the opportunity for CNI. 
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 Traceability of cognition, the second concept, refers to Figure 1.4 above 
(the continuum of cognition with respect to nonuse of information), in which 
cognition appears as an interrupted continuum from intuition to induction to 
deduction (Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, 2000, p. 403). As 
explained in that section of this dissertation, traceable cognition generally implies 
VNI, while intuition implies CNI. To convert that cognition continuum into a 
dichotomy requires the establishment on that continuum of a point that demarks 
volitional cognition from compelled cognition, and the position of that point 
depends on the concept that I have called "timing." As implied in the paragraph 
above, if a person does not react to information without consciously thinking 
about the information, the person has engaged in CNI. If, however, the person 
can trace the thoughts that led to the nonuse of information and still does not 
react to the information, the person has engaged in VNI. The source of the 
information does not affect this determination, so 
whether the information comes from the person's 
memory or from another source, the same 
criteria apply. 
The direction of the condition 
 The taxonomy also describes the 
"direction" of the condition, as either a "push" or 
a "lack of pull." The analogy of the bell jar 
Figure 4.1: The analogy 
of the bell jar. 
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(Figure 4.1) illustrates this concept. The bell jar is an early form of the vacuum 
chamber, a rigid container from which a pump removes air. The bell jar is unique 
among vacuum containers, however, because it is made of glass, permitting 
observation of events inside the jar. For the bell jar analogy to work, I assume 
that humans normally use information (allow information to make a difference). 
When humans do not use information, some part of their information-using 
system has performed abnormally. Similarly, the bell jar system, when sitting 
unused, would allow air to enter the jar. When in operation, however, the bell jar 
system keeps air out of the jar. When air enters an operating bell jar system, 
some part of the system has failed. Failure (air flowing into the jar) will occur 
when the jar is not strong enough to push against the outside air or when the 
pump does not pull air out of the jar strongly enough. If the bell jar system 
represents a person, then air leaks represent use of information. The jar itself 
represents the somatic barriers listed in Figure 1.1 above, pushing to keep the air 
out, and pump weakness represents a "lack of pull" resulting from the cognitive 
barriers listed in Figure 1.1. Leaks (use of information) will increase when the 
somatic barriers do not "push" strongly enough, or when "lack of pull" from 
cognitive barriers increases. For example, nonuse of information will increase as 
the somatic barrier "censorship" (element 3 in Figure 1.1) increases or as the 
cognitive barrier "engrossment" decreases the "pull" for information. See Table 
4.1, following, for a more graphic representation of the push/pull dichotomy. Note 
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that "push" and "pull" here are, by definition, precognitive or intuitive and beyond 
the control of the person.  
SOMATIC BARRIERS: 
Conditions that "push" against 
information: 
COGNITIVE BARRIERS: 
Conditions causing a "lack of 
pull": 
trauma lack of threshold knowledge 
psychological predispositional mismatch engrossment / distraction 
social barriers affect 
physical / temporal barriers priming 
censorship least effort 
mis- / disinformation least conflict 
Table 4.1: The directions in which CNI barriers act. 
Other methods of ordering the elements of the taxonomy 
 Instead of the taxonomy of Figure 1.1 or the taxonomy based on the 
transmission model of communication (Appendix 5), the elements of CNI could 
appear along other continua such as "internal to external causation" or in other 
dichotomies such as "awareness-unawareness." These two orderings appear 
below. I considered these taxonomies but preferred the taxonomy of Figure 1.1 
because it followed three orderings: magnitude, cognition, and direction, while 
the taxonomies described below each followed only one ordering: internal to 
external in the first example, and awareness to unawareness in the second. 
Internal to external causation 
 In a continuum of internal to external causation, the taxonomy would 
change as shown in Table 4.2: 
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The taxonomy of Figure 1.1, 
magnitude, cognition, & direction: 
The taxonomy of Table 4.2,  
internal to external causation: 
Intrinsic somatic conditions Intrinsic somatic conditions 
Socio-environmental barriers Threshold knowledge shortfall 
Authoritarian controls Attention shortfall 
Threshold knowledge shortfall Information filtering 
Attention shortfall Socio-environmental barriers 
Information filtering Authoritarian controls 
Table 4.2: An alternative ordering of the elements of the taxonomy, based on an 
internal-to-external continuum. 
The ordering of Table 4.2 would require re-evaluation of the role of the external 
"others" in several elements. For example, illiteracy (element 4.1) would appear 
toward the "internal" end of the continuum, while mutually unintelligible 
languages (element 4.2) would appear toward the "external" end of the 
continuum. In the taxonomy of Figure 1.1, these elements occur contiguously. In 
other words, the two taxonomies are not compatible. 
Awareness-unawareness 
 A dichotomy of awareness-unawareness would re-organize the taxonomy 
at the level of the sub-sub-elements. For example, lexical priming (element 5.4.1) 
and priming via naïve conceptions (element 5.4.3) would appear on the 
"unaware" side of the dichotomy, while priming with respect to the source 
(element 5.4.2) would appear on the other side. In the taxonomy of Figure 1.1, 
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these elements occur contiguously. In other words, the two taxonomies are not 
compatible. I chose the taxonomy of Figure 1.1 over the "internal-to-external" 
ordering and the "awareness-unawareness" ordering because it followed three 
orderings: magnitude, cognition, and direction. In other words, the taxonomy of 
Figure 1.1 explains more about CNI than do the other orderings. 
Length of explanations of the elements of the taxonomy 
 The descriptions of the six primary elements of the taxonomy require 
markedly different numbers of pages in the dissertation. Two possible reasons 
appear for this difference. First, some elements might be more complex than 
others and necessitate longer explanations. Second, the descriptions use 
examples from two specific corpora of literature. Selection of different or 
additional corpora might result in a different distribution of page lengths. 
Explanations of the elements of the taxonomy 
 Conditions leading to CNI appear in the taxonomy as independent, 
discrete elements. In the 114 articles that comprise the corpus of the formal part 
of this study, CNI frequently resulted from two or more elements or as one 
element leading to another. For the purposes of forming the taxonomy, however, 
I describe the elements as independent, with occasional interrelationships noted. 
The six primary conditions leading to CNI appear here in the order of the 
taxonomy: the three somatic barriers; then the three cognitive barriers. 
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Somatic barriers to use of information 
 Somatic barriers involve a person's body, as with externally induced 
trauma or as the result of intrinsic somatic barriers such as psychological 
predispositions. Examples of somatic barriers to use of information appear 
below. CNI induced by somatic barriers may exceed a threshold of physical 
perception, and the person may be aware of the condition, for example, deafness 
or social disadvantage. In other situations, the person may be unaware of 
barriers such as authoritarian censorship, which may keep even the act of 
censorship hidden from the person. Somatic barriers to use of information fall 
into three broad categories, outlined in Figure 4.2 and described below. 
 
Somatic barriers to use of information 
 
1 Intrinsic somatic conditions: physical barriers on which changes in 
socio-environmental or authoritarian controls will have little effect 
 
2 Socio-environmental barriers: physical barriers on which changes in 
somatic abilities or authoritarian controls will have little effect 
 
3 Authoritarian controls: physical barriers on which changes in somatic 
abilities or socio-environmental conditions will have little effect 
 
Figure 4.2: Somatic barriers that cause CNI. 
1. Intrinsic somatic conditions 
 Intrinsic somatic conditions describe conditions due to causes within the 
body that contribute to CNI and on which changes in socio-environmental or 
authoritarian conditions will have little effect. For example, government 
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censorship of a newspaper has little effect on the nonuse of information from that 
newspaper by a person who cannot read. Intrinsic somatic conditions can be 
congenital (present at birth) or induced by subsequent trauma. For the purposes 
of creating a taxonomy of CNI, the time of onset of the condition (congenital or 
subsequent) is more a matter of curiosity than a guide to diagnosis or mitigation. 
For example, neither the person born blind nor the person subsequently blinded 
will be able to read a newspaper. 
 Intrinsic somatic conditions occur in many forms and can provoke the 
compelled nonuse of information through several mechanisms. The following 
sections present intrinsic somatic conditions that appeared in the study corpus. 
The intrinsic somatic conditions appear in the following order, an order explained 
in the introduction to this chapter. 
1) congenital abnormalities and subsequent trauma leading to physical 
impairments,  
2) trauma leading to psychological predispositions, 
3) intrinsic psychological predispositions, and  
4) intrinsic somatic conditions of uncertain origin.  
These four groupings overlap, in that they occasionally contain examples that 
would appear to fit in more than one group. When an example could be placed in 
more than one group, I placed it in the group that, in my opinion, reflected the 
chronologically earliest cause of CNI. For instance, if an article discussed a 
psychological predisposition and the trauma that led to the predisposition, I 
placed the example in the section about trauma. Within the four groups, the 
barriers appear in an approximate chronological order, that is, in the order in 
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which they might occur in a person's lifetime. Many of these barriers could 
appear at almost any time during a lifespan, so the order of examples within the 
groups is a matter of convenience for the author and does not affect the 
taxonomy. 
1.1) Congenital abnormalities or trauma leading to intrinsic somatic conditions, 
such as blindness, deafness, or abnormal brain size and configuration 
 Intrinsic somatic conditions frequently result from trauma before birth or 
during early childhood. E. Taylor and J. W. Rogers (2005, pp. 452-460) 
cataloged a number, including: 
• toxic influences in pregnancy such as alcohol, 
• maternal psychological disturbance such as stress, 
• perinatal risk factors such as low birth weight, 
• toxic chemicals in the environment, such as lead, 
• infective causes such as Lyme disease, 
• selective deficiencies such as iodine deficiency, 
• head injury, and 
• neglect and malnutrition. 
In addition to this list of potential adversities for the perinatal and young, Taylor 
and Rogers (p. 463) also found that: 
Adversities do not come singly. Much of the research reviewed has been 
ingenious in trying to isolate the effects of one stressor in the presence of 
others, with experimental correction of the problem, or quasi-experimental 
studies of defined influences such as episodes of heavy metal pollution, or 
with multivariate statistical correction for possible confounders. In practice, 
many problems often coexist and need several kinds of intervention.  
In other words, genetic predispositions, environmental stressors, and the 
presence of other adversities could intensify each of the adversities and its 
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impact on developmental disorders, leading to intrinsic somatic conditions and 
CNI. 
 Trauma occurring later in life also results in intrinsic somatic conditions. 
Greenwood (1997, p. 1041) described the traumatic amnesia that accompanies 
closed-head injury and suggested that the duration of the amnesia correlated 
positively with the severity of the trauma: 
The best predictors of outcome after closed head injury remain behavioural 
measures rather than neuroimaging or electrophysiological or biochemical 
findings, as is also the case after stroke. Of the behavioural measures 
studied, the duration of post-traumatic amnesia has been shown repeatedly 
to be one of the best single predictors of residual problems with cognitive 
function or functional independence--better, in many studies, than the depth 
or duration of coma. 
The Greenwood article thus implied that closed head injury caused amnesia, a 
compelled nonuse of the information that the person with the head injury might 
otherwise have recalled. 
 Physical impairments present a barrier to information use. Owens (2006, 
on visual impairment) and Downing (2006, on mild to moderate learning and 
behavior problems) described the nonuse of information caused by several 
impairments and suggested guidelines that government, educators, and 
businesses might adopt to mitigate this CNI. Owens suggested adaptations for 
the visually impaired, such as simplified language, Braille and large-print formats, 
and graphic modifications such as wide spacing of text and the use of contrasting 
colors. Downing proposed school media centers with special equipment for the 
disabled. T. Rogers (1998, p. 503), citing Stubbins (1988, p. 25), however, 
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described power relationships between the impaired and the non-impaired that 
would forestall any such adaptations: 
For Stubbins a disability may be viewed as a particular type of relationship 
between impaired persons and the social and physical environment. The 
impaired person is part of a relationship that is built into the structure of our 
institutions and society. It is a relationship in which the able-bodied have 
power over those with impairments. This power is played out in the ability of 
the able-bodied to define a disability from their perspective. 
Where Stubbins is correct and the able-bodied world intentionally does not 
accommodate the impaired, two elements of the taxonomy would combine to 
prevent the use of information. First, the impairment prevents the use of 
information (e.g., deafness blocking sound from a movie). Second, authoritarian 
control (described further in Section 3 below) denies access to the impaired (e.g., 
producers of movies do not caption most movies). 
1.2) Trauma leading to psychological predispositions, such as dissociation, 
amnesia, false memories, and selective attention (habituation) through 
homeostasis 
 A number of examples from the corpus discussed the effect of trauma 
(described above) on psychological predispositions (described below). Specific 
examples described here are dissociation, homeostasis and habituation, neuro-
chemical mandates, and natural aging. 
 Dissociation frequently results from trauma and manifests as a "disruption 
in the usually integrative functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or 
perception of the environment," according to Everill and Waller (1995, p. 129), 
quoting earlier editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders: DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). According to 
Everill and Waller, this disruption affects the individual through selective attention 
and selective memory, both of which compel nonuse of information (CNI). Eisen 
et al. (2007, p. 1292) described the dissociation that accompanied childhood 
abuse: 
Trauma-related psychopathology and poor cognitive functioning were 
significant predictors of memory inaccuracy. For example, regarding trauma 
related psychopathology, being highly dissociative and mounting a greater 
stress response as well as self-reporting more trauma symptoms were 
associated with increased memory error for stressful medical procedures. 
In addition to accompanying trauma, dissociation also accompanies 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Some people view aspects of PTSD as 
volitional, rather than compelled, however, as when General Patton famously 
slapped the soldier with PTSD. Stovall-McClough and Cloitre (2006, p. 226) 
labeled avoidance of reminders of the trauma that led to PTSD as volitional and 
labeled dissociation resulting from PTSD as non-volitional: 
PTSD avoidance is primarily volitional and does not interfere with an 
individual’s orientation to the present (time, space, and place). Dissociation, 
on the other hand, is an involuntary process that has the effect of removing 
one from a present orientation (i.e., losing time, feeling like two people, 
feeling outside one’s own body). 
Dissociation, whether from trauma or from PTSD, results in compelled nonuse of 
the information that the person with the head injury or PTSD might otherwise 
have recalled from memory. 
 Homeostasis, the maintenance of the body's internal environment 
(Cannon, 1932) through habituation ("a reduced response to repeated 
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presentation of the stimulus," Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 624) can result in 
CNI. For example, a person living beside a highway becomes desensitized to the 
sounds of traffic. Habituation can prevent harm in some cases and cause harm in 
others, demonstrating the importance of evaluating CNI without the prejudice that 
nonuse of information is bad. For this reason, the statements of causing and 
preventing harm that appear in the study corpus do not affect the taxonomy. 
Flood (1975, p. 45) presented an example of homeostasis preventing harm: 
Continued increases exceed the threshold of discrimination, leading to 
sensory decreased discrimination and finally to shock. Continuation in 
duration rather than intensity results in a chronic stress reaction à la Selye. 
... [T]he filtering mechanism actually serves as a physiologic and 
psychologic homeostatic mechanism. 
Flood's example presents homeostasis as more of a physiologic than a 
psychologic manifestation of habituation. Section 6.1 below discusses 
psychologic manifestations, specifically, information overload. Foa and Kozak 
(1986, p. 27) postulated a mechanism to explain habituation as helpful in the 
therapeutic treatment of some forms of pathological anxiety: 
[H]abituation constitutes information that changes a fear structure. When 
physiological responses decrease during confrontation with feared 
situations, interoceptive information about the absence of physiological 
arousal is generated. … The resultant less “unitized” configuration of 
elements is less readily evoked by information that matches only some of 
the elements in the structure. 
In this example, the habituation altered a physiological predisposition (the 
inherent memory structure for a particular fear), reducing the response to 
negative affect (element 5.3 of Figure 1.1). Such therapeutic habituation, 
however, does not always reduce responses. M. J. Scott and Stradling (1997) 
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indicated that attempts at habituation produced less effect in some cases of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and that the more severe the PTSD, the 
less successful the habituation: 
Clients seen in clinical practice seem likely to benefit from exposure 
treatments if they find them acceptable, but many do not. Data from both 
studies here suggest those with more severe symptoms and those with 
higher levels of co-morbid depression may be the clients least likely to 
tolerate exposure treatments. (p. 526) 
Whether preventing or causing harm, homeostasis and habituation compel the 
nonuse of information. 
 Neuro-chemical mandates, for example, drugs or alcohol, can compel 
nonuse of information. In the use of sedatives during dental treatment, File et al. 
(1993, p. 201) reported:  
During actual dental treatment with sedation two possible coping strategies 
emerged. In some patients the drug treatment induced complete amnesia 
for items presented after drug administration, and in this respect midazolam 
was the more effective drug. Alternatively, patients showed relative 
cognitive avoidance of dentally-related words, but for superficially coded 
words this avoidance strategy was prevented by midazolam.  
Some might consider chemical-induced amnesia to be desirable in the case of 
dental treatment. Yet, some might feel that the preferential destruction of the 
right-brain caused by ingestion of alcohol (Hamblin et al., 1984, p. 1514) is not 
desirable: 
This study showed that older, chronic alcoholics do substantially worse than 
younger alcoholics on right hemisphere tasks. As noted, further analyses 
also revealed that alcohol appears to assert a more pressing influence on 
decline than age on complex nonverbal abstract tasks, but that age seems 
to assert a prepotent influence on more visualspatial tasks. This study … 
does revalidate alcoholic aging decline in a chronic alcohol population and 
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suggests, further, that alcohol and aging do interact with each other to 
assert a strong influence. 
Dental sedation and alcohol ingestion result in CNI, and again the question of 
whether the CNI prevents or causes harm does not affect the taxonomy. 
 Advanced age, as mentioned above, interacts with alcohol to influence 
strongly "complex nonverbal abstract tasks." Advanced age alone also affects 
the ability of a person to use information: 
Because of changes in acuity and sensitivity, older adults may have a 
reduced likelihood of noticing and encoding warnings; because of changes 
in working memory capacity, older adults may have a reduced likelihood of 
comprehending warning information and complying with it. (Rousseau et al., 
1998, p. 657) 
Giacalone et al. (2007, p. 365) found that "Elderly patients may also be affected 
by sensory deficits, cognitive impairment and functional deficits that might require 
more kindness." In this example, the socio-environmental factor of prejudice 
against those of advanced age (described in Section 2 below) can enhance or 
reduce the effects of advanced age on CNI. S. W. Cornelius and Caspi (1987, p. 
152) found that, in adults, advanced age increased some aspects of intelligence 
(which I define for the purposes of this study as the measure of the ability of a 
person to be changed by information) while it decreased others: 
Intelligence is a multifaceted construct encompassing diverse abilities and 
skills. Notwithstanding methodological issues inherent in developmental 
research, conclusions about changes in intelligence in adulthood and old 
age are problematic because different facets of intellectual behavior and 




Specifically, Cornelius and Caspi referred to "sound judgments and effective 
decisions" (1987, p. 151) in solving everyday problems at an advanced age. The 
foregoing examples presented the effects of trauma and the body's reaction to 
trauma (dissociation and habituation), neuro-chemical mandates, and natural 
aging on psychological predispositions, which appear next.  
1.3) Intrinsic psychological predispositions, inborn or subsequently acquired 
 Many definitions of intelligence exist. For the purposes of this study of 
CNI, I define intelligence in a very limited way that conforms to Bateson's "a 
difference that makes a difference": intelligence is the measure of a person's 
susceptibility to change by information. This definition fits with Gardner's theory 
of multiple intelligences (MI). Gardner (1983; 1999) postulated a group of 
potential somatic barriers in his theory of multiple intrinsic intelligences that might 
facilitate or hinder performance of specific tasks. The intelligences currently 
include: 
1) Verbal-linguistic - words, spoken or written; 
2) Logical-mathematical - logic, abstractions, inductive and deductive 
reasoning, and numbers; 
3) Spatial - vision and spatial judgment; 
4) Bodily-kinesthetic - movement and doing; 
5) Musical - rhythm, music, and hearing; 
6) Interpersonal - interaction with others; 
7) Intrapersonal - introspective and self-reflective capacities; and 
8) Naturalistic - relating information to one's natural surroundings. 
 Some people have contested Gardner's theory. For example, Waterhouse 
cited a number of review articles that found "no validating studies for multiple 
intelligences" (2006b, p. 208) and other reviews stating that "MI theory lacks a 
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rationale for the phylogenetic emergence of the intelligences" (2006a, p. 213). 
However, Gardner's theory of MI has a very practical application in identifying 
conditions that lead to CNI. For example, a person born with a predisposition to 
exceptional balance (Gardner's body-kinesthetic intelligence) might not be able to 
use information presented in terms of mathematical concepts as readily as might 
the person born with a predisposition to understanding mathematical concepts 
(Gardner's logical-mathematical intelligence). The intelligences rarely act 
independently of each other, and one predisposition does not preclude another, 
so this example is a broad generalization for illustrative purposes only. In cases 
of extreme lack of predisposition toward one type of intelligence, for example, an 
extreme lack of logical-mathematical intelligence, a person with that lack would 
not be susceptible to change by information related to that lack, for instance, the 
numbers representing amount, price, and unit cost of various supermarket items. 
 In addition to those identified in Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences, 
other intrinsic psychological predispositions affect the use of information. S. M. 
Miller (1979b; 1979a) proposed the Miller Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS) to rank 
blunters (those who avoid threatening information) and monitors (those who scan 
the environment for threats). In 1987, she named additional points on the scale 
and introduced curiosity as a possible motive for high monitors' scanning the 
environment. If curiosity implies volitional use of information, the line that 
separates CNI from VNI occurs on the MBSS between low monitors and high 




 THE MBSS,    COMPARED TO:  NONUSE OF INFORMATION 
high blunters (distractors),  
low blunters (nondistractors), 
low monitors (avoiders), and ↑ CNI 
high monitors (seekers), impelled by curiosity. ↓ VNI 
 
Figure 4.3: The MBSS (S. M. Miller, 1987, p. 346), as applied to this study. 
 Foa and Kozak (1986, referred to above, in the discussion of habituation) 
postulated an inherent psychological predisposition that they called a "memory 
structure":  
[F]ear is represented in memory structures that serve as blueprints for fear 
behavior, and therapy is a process by which these structures are modified. 
We argue that two conditions are required to reduce pathological fear: First, 
the fear structure must be activated, and next, information incompatible with 
its pathological elements must be incorporated. (p. 21) 
These memory structures portray affect as a psychological predisposition, which 
is a somewhat more somatic orientation of affect than the cognitive orientation 
presented in Section 5.3 (Affect) below. Following Foa and Kozak's model, I 
postulate that CNI results from an activation of these memory structures. 
 Many researchers have studied the psychological predisposition labeled 
"avoidant coping style." Virtually none of these researchers has specified 
whether the avoidance was volitional or compelled. For example, Kalichman et 
al. said that: 
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[P]eople who avoid health information and are generally avoidant in how 
they deal with stressful situations are also more vulnerable to unfounded 
claims and misinformation. Evaluating health information requires active 
deliberation that is not characteristic of people who cope through 
avoidance. Avoidant coping may therefore not only be unassociated with 
health benefits, it appears that avoidant coping may be related to a 
vulnerability to potentially harmful information, products, and even 
treatments. (2006, p. 209) 
However, Kalichman et al. did not indicate the magnitude of "active deliberation" 
or whether avoidance of "active deliberation" would be volitional or compelled. 
 In addition to physical impairment and intrinsic psychological 
predispositions, a person's sex appears as an intrinsic somatic condition that 
affects CNI. For example: 
(B)oys are often assumed to be more likely than girls to engage in 
behavioral avoidance and withdrawal (i.e., to avoid problems by physically 
removing themselves from the situation) and in cognitive avoidance and 
denial (i.e., to not think about the problem). … However, these effects tend 
to be small, and it is more common to find no sex difference for both 
general stress … and for peer stress …. In some cases, the sex difference 
even favors girls. (Rose & Rudolph, 2006) 
These intrinsic somatic conditions: physical impairment, psychological 
predispositions, and sex differences, receive extensive study, as indicated by 
numerous citations in the very small sample of examples in this section. These 
examples have documented the origins of many of these conditions leading to 
CNI. Other intrinsic somatic conditions that affect CNI do not have known origins, 
and they appear in the following section. 
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1.4) Intrinsic somatic conditions of unknown origin (physical or psychological), 
inborn or subsequently acquired, leading to amnesia and false memories 
 In addition to pathologies identifiable as either physical impairment or 
intrinsic psychological predispositions, other pathologies that cause CNI lack an 
identifiable cause. They include false memories and some illnesses such as 
those described in the DSM-IV. For example, an article about false memories 
stated: 
If there is one lesson from this research, it is probably this: Just because a 
memory seems detailed, just because the person seems confident in it, and 
just because emotion is expressed when the memory is contemplated, does 
not mean it really happened. (Laney & Loftus, 2005, p. 827) 
Selection of a phenomenon implies rejection of the other phenomena not 
selected. Similarly, a person's non-volitional acceptance of information in the 
form of personal false memories implies the equally non-volitional (compelled) 
rejection of information from memories that would have been true, had the 
person not experienced the false memories. For example, Laney and Loftus 
(2005, p. 826) reported an experiment in which people who liked to eat pickles 
stopped eating pickles after they were convinced that pickles had made them 
sick in childhood (the "memory" was completely false). In other words, the people 
who formerly liked pickles were compelled not to use the information that pickles 
had never made them sick. 
 Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), as defined in the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), provides another example of an 
intrinsic somatic condition for which an origin, physical or psychologic, remains 
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unknown. Many researchers have documented the symptoms of NPD, however. 
For example: 
[N]arcissists swing between two states of mind: one of them, overt, 
involving disdainful grandiosity, fantasies of wealth, power, physical 
attractiveness, and invulnerability, and the other, covert and composed of 
an out-of-place sensitiveness, a sense of inferiority, insignificance and 
fragility, and a search for glory. Horowitz and colleagues … noted that 
behind their grandiosity narcissists conceal a profound feeling of shame 
and a proneness to feeling themselves criticized and humiliated, as a result 
of which they tend to reject any information that could hurt them. He also 
noted the presence of mixed states of mind, with a simultaneous activation 
of shame, anxiety, and anger, as defenses against degraded selfschemas. 
(Dimaggio et al., 2002, p. 423). 
Mental health workers may disagree about the origins, motivations, and 
mechanisms of NPD, such as grandiosity, sense of inferiority, and shame. 
Regardless of such disagreement, NPD compels nonuse of information in two 
ways: NPD tends to compel a person not to empathize (not to use information 
about the needs of others) and not to use information that conflicts with self-
image. As such, NPD qualifies as an intrinsic somatic condition that compels 
nonuse of information. 
Summary of Section 1: Intrinsic somatic conditions 
 These somatic conditions (physical impairments, psychological 
predispositions, and conditions of unknown origin) describe intrinsic somatic 
barriers that contribute to CNI and on which changes in socio-environmental 
barriers or authoritarian controls will have little effect. For example, no amount of 
turning up the volume (changing an environmental barrier) will enable a deaf 
person to hear the radio (deafness being an intrinsic somatic barrier).  
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 Intrinsic somatic barriers prevent use of information only in the presence 
of related socio-environmental barriers. For example, deafness does not compel 
nonuse of a newspaper, and blindness does not compel nonuse of a radio. 
Rather than describe each of the specific socio-environmental barriers that relate 
to each type of intrinsic somatic condition, I group and describe socio-
environmental conditions leading to CNI separately, in the next section.  
2. Socio-environmental barriers to use of information 
 This section describes the second of the three groups of somatic barriers 
to use of information (intrinsic somatic conditions, socio-environmental barriers, 
and authoritarian controls). This group, socio-environmental barriers, describes 
social and environmental conditions that compel nonuse of information. 
Examples of socio-environmental barriers include geographical or temporal 
isolation, inadequate or malfunctioning information systems, and lack of 
applicable economic, cultural, or social capital (resulting in prejudice based on 
race, physical appearance, advanced age, or gender). Socio-environmental 
barriers appear in the taxonomy in a category discrete from intrinsic somatic 
conditions and authoritarian control, because changes in socio-environmental 
barriers will have little effect on barriers imposed by intrinsic somatic conditions 
and authoritarian control, and vice versa. For example, no amount of physical 
proximity to newspapers or radios will enable a person to use these media to get 
information that an authority has banned from being communicated using these 
media. Similarly, if a person's television does not work, no number of televised 
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public service announcements will enable that person to use the information from 
those announcements. 
2.1 & 2.2) Geographical or temporal isolation and inadequate or 
malfunctioning information systems  
 These elements appear as socio-environmental barriers in the study 
corpus. These barriers frequently work in concert to compel nonuse of 
information. For example, R. F. Miller and Tighe (1974) postulated both 
geographical remoteness and differences between the impaired and non-
impaired communities as socio-environmental barriers to use of information by 
the "information poor." To overcome these two barriers, they suggested that: 
[I]f needs of the information-poor are to be adequately met, information 
channels must shift to nonprint media, service locations must move close to 
the people, and new staff competencies must be learned. (1974, p. 202)  
Similarly, Owens (2006) described barriers to the use of information by members 
of the visually impaired community: 
Barriers include language that is too complex, text that is not accessible, 
lack of availability of alternative languages and formats (e.g., Braille, large 
print, audio and electronic formats), and use of disabling language, and the 
physical inaccessibility of various hard-copy formats. (p. 197) 
Owens suggested that these barriers compounded the somatic barrier of visual 
impairment (mentioned above in Section 1.2). Nurses practicing in critical (i.e., 
life-threatening) situations suggested to McKnight (2006) that two environmental 
barriers compelled their nonuse of information--malfunctioning information 
systems and the unavailability of doctors: 
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They [the nurses] encountered barriers to information acquisition in both 
paper and online systems. Equipment failure, unavailable people, social 
protocols, and mistakes caused by simultaneously using multiple complex 
systems hampered their information-seeking efforts. (p. 150) 
These socio-environmental barriers (geographical isolation and inadequate or 
malfunctioning information systems), frequently are associated with lack of socio-
economic status, as noted by R. F. Miller and Tighe (1974) above. Examples of 
barriers more specific to socio-economic status appear in the next section. 
2.3) Lack of capital.  
 Lack of capital, as a socio-environmental barrier, includes lack of 
economic, cultural, or social capital. This study uses Bourdieu's (1986) concept 
and classification of "capital": 
Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its "incorporated," 
embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, 
basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social 
energy in the form of reified or living labor. (p. 241) 
 
[E]conomic capital ... may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; 
cultural capital .. may be institutionalized in the form of educational 
qualifications; and ... social capital ... may be institutionalized in the form of 
a title of nobility. (p. 243) 
In Bourdieu's view, capital refers to a "command over resources." Those 
resources may be economic (based on wealth), cultural (based on knowledge of 
a culture), or social (based on networks of mutual acquaintance and recognition). 
The following examples of CNI each may involve more than one type of capital. 
The specific type of capital, however, does not limit the creation of a model of 
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CNI, because the type of capital does not differentiate any element of the 
taxonomy from any other element. 
 Nonuse of information under the circumstances of "lack of capital" can 
result when a source (of information) harbors prejudice about a person and 
withholds information because of the prejudice. Race, sex, physical appearance, 
advanced age, and perceptions about wealth and membership in particular 
communities are common bases for such prejudice.  
 Before continuing with a discussion of prejudice, a clarification will be 
useful here. Prejudice can resemble three other mechanisms: authoritarian 
control (described in Section 3 below), priming (described in Section 5.4 below), 
and avoidance of conflicting information (described in Section 6.2 below). These 
four mechanisms differ from each other by their sources and by the nature of the 
factors that might mitigate them: 
• Prejudice (discussed in this section): Mirroring the viewpoint of Stubbins 
(mentioned above) of disability as "a particular type of relationship between 
impaired persons and the social and physical environment" (1988, p. 25), 
efforts to mitigate prejudice as a socio-economic barrier would focus on 
changing the relationship, that is, the perceived difference between the victim 
and the source of the prejudice.  
• Authoritarian control (discussed further in Section 3, following): Efforts to 
mitigate authoritarian control (e.g., censorship) as a manifestation of prejudice 
(lack of capital, socio-economic barrier) would focus on changing the nature 
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or magnitude of the control, rather than the perceived difference between the 
victim and the source of the control. Both prejudice and authoritarian control, 
however, are somatic barriers to use of information, while the following two 
mechanisms are cognitive barriers. 
• Priming (discussed further in Section 5.4 below) and trust / distrust of a 
cognitive authority (discussed further in Section 6.2 below): Priming and trust 
/ distrust of a cognitive authority differ from prejudice and authoritarian control 
in that they are cognitive barriers to use of information, while prejudice and 
authoritarian control are somatic barriers. Efforts to mitigate these barriers 
(authoritarian control, priming, and trust/distrust of a cognitive authority) would 
require different foci and tactics. Further distinctions between priming and 
trust / distrust of a cognitive authority appear in Sections 5.4 and 6.2 below. 
 F. H. Ellis provided an example that presents the problems of 
discriminating among prejudice, authoritarian control, priming, and least conflict. 
He quotes Jonathan Swift: 
Falsehood flies, and Truth comes limping after; so that when Men come to 
be undeceiv'd, it is too late, the Jest is over, and the Tale has had its Effect. 
(1985, p. 24) 
• If we define prejudice as "pre-judging," then Swift's "falsehood" or "jest" 
would compel a person to formulate a judgment before considering Swift's 
"truth." Mitigation of prejudice in this example would require the person to 
judge the "tale" again, taking Swift's "truth" into consideration. 
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• If Swift's "falsehood," came from a person or organization possessing 
authority, then this example would indicate element 3 of the taxonomy, 
authoritarian control. Mitigation of this authoritarian control would require 
the authority to provide less "falsehood," or more "truth." 
• If the "falsehood" has become a naïve conception through lack of previous 
information that Swift would call "true," and if that naïve conception prevents 
consideration of subsequent information, then Swift's example demonstrates 
element 5.4 of the taxonomy, priming. Mitigation of this nonuse of information 
would require the use of "bridging analogies" (Reiner et al., 2000, p. 29) that 
would allow the person holding the naïve conceptions to merge "truths" with 
the "falsehoods" gradually, until "truths" predominated. 
• If a person discredits Swift's "truth" because the "truth" conflicts with a 
"falsehood" based on trust of a cognitive authority, then this example 
qualifies as element 6.2 of the taxonomy, least conflict. Mitigation would 
require truths from stronger cognitive authorities. 
Thus, Swift's statement may apply to many situations, but the determination of 
specific conditions leading to CNI would require knowledge of specific 
circumstances, such as sources and the nature of mitigating information. This 
concludes the clarification of the differences among prejudice, authoritarian 




 Reports of lack of capital appeared in the study corpus. For example, 
Chute and Wiener (1996) described situations in which pilots failed to use 
information from flight attendants because of a difference in the cultures of the 
cockpit and the passenger sections of a commercial airliner.  
We described the problem as primarily arising from the fact that the two 
crews are drawn from two disparate cultures, one dedicated to and highly 
proficient in technical matters, particularly the operation of complex 
machinery, the other well-versed in sociability and public service. Needless 
to say, there is a gender difference as well: Although the number of female 
pilots is increasing, flying remains a male-dominated profession. The same, 
but opposite, can be said of the flight attendant, although male flight 
attendants account for a far more significant fraction of their profession than 
female pilots do of theirs. (p. 213) 
In some examples, flight attendants were afraid to impinge on the elite "culture of 
the cockpit" because of a lack of social and cultural capital (the flight attendants 
were not conversant with the culture of the technology of flight). The resultant 
nonuse of information by the pilots caused accidents and near-accidents. For 
example,  
On March 10, 1989, 24 people were killed when an Air Ontario F-28 
crashed on take-off from Dryden, Canada due to an accumulation of ice on 
the wings. Before the aircraft was airborne, a flight attendant, Sonia 
Hartwick, saw wet snow building up on the wings but thought that she 
should not call the cockpit because she had the feeling that pilots did not 
welcome operational information from cabin crew members. (Chute & 
Wiener, 1996, pp. 211-212) 
A passenger informed me that a piece of the wing was separating . . . . I 
made four visits to the pilots and was not taken seriously. Upon landing 
(about 20 min. later) the pilots checked it out and made a joke about not 
believing me. The plane was grounded and the next flight was canceled. 
(Chute & Wiener, 1996, pp. 216) 
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 Similarly, McKnight (2006, p. 150, quoted above) found that social barriers 
(e.g., some doctors are unavailable at night to nurses) compounded the 
environmental barriers mentioned above to prevent nurses from acquiring 
information. 
 Xie (2007, p. 429) described prejudice against the aged as a barrier to 
older people's learning about computers and telecommunications from younger 
people: "lack of technical support is a major barrier to information technology (IT) 
learning, yet it is difficult to get support from younger people." Giacalone et al. 
(2007) noticed ageism in the prejudice of Italian doctors against older adult 
cancer patients: 
The communication between physicians and older patients is often thwarted 
by the doctors’ ageist attitudes. Physicians tend to spend less time with 
older patients than with younger ones, paying less attention to their 
unexpressed needs and value preferences. (p. 365) 
Menou (1983, p. 123) described societal aspects of sexism:  
[M]any traditional societies confine the woman to 'her traditional role of 
mother and spouse', to quote a recent pontifical statement, which left out 
the third basic attribute of household slave, probably because of its obvious 
lack of metaphysical brightness. 
Other societies, perhaps less "traditional" than those described by Menou, 
denied various educational opportunities to women, thereby placing women in 
positions of less social and cultural capital. For example, Lips and Colwill (1988) 
described the Canadian practice of prescribing different curricula for girls and 




One factor that helps to stream women into traditional jobs is the existence 
of high school commercial courses that separate male and female students, 
reinforce traditional gender roles and stereotypes, and channel girls into 
low-paying "female" jobs. (p. 62) 
These examples of lack of capital resulted in CNI through prejudice, priming, and 
trust / distrust of a cognitive authority. 
Summary of Section 2: Socio-environmental barriers to use of information 
 The socio-environmental barriers described in this section consisted of 
geographical or temporal isolation, inadequate or malfunctioning information 
systems, and lack of applicable economic, cultural, or social capital. Unlike the 
intrinsic somatic conditions described in Section 1, socio-environmental barriers 
described a person's surroundings, rather than the person. 
 The next section, Section 3, describes another type of socio-
environmental barrier unrelated to personal abilities, authoritarian control. 
Authoritarian control differs from socio-environmental barriers because 
manifestations of authoritarian control contain a degree of intentionality, as will 
be explained. 
3. Authoritarian controls 
 Authoritarian controls are barriers to use of information, and changes in 
somatic abilities or socio-environmental conditions will have little effect in the 
presence of authoritarian controls. As noted above, no amount of visual acuity 
will enable a person to read a book burned by a censor. The Holocaust, referred 
to on page 1 of this dissertation, resulted from a number of manifestations of 
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authoritarian control of the German people by the Nazis (Lifton, 1986; Tsang, 
2002). 
 This study derives the term "authoritarian control" from the definition of 
authoritarianism in the literature of sociology, usually discussed with reference to 
authoritarian regimes. For example: 
The major characteristics of authoritarian regimes include a limited political 
pluralism with restrictions on the activities of interest groups and parties, a 
low level of social mobilization and popular political participation, a 
dominantly “subject” or “parochial” political culture, and usually a 
personalized form of leadership. (Berg-Schlosser, 2005, p. 172) 
This study, however, uses the term "authoritarian control" to refer to any situation 
in which one actor (governments, societies, media, religions, and individuals) 
denies information to another. In the study corpus, examples of authoritarian 
control that create CNI appear to vary in intentionality ("the mind’s capacity to 
direct itself on things," from the Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, 
2000, p. 399). Figure 4.4 diagrams authoritarian control. 




  Reward and punishment 
   Explicit approval or disapproval 
    Tacit approval or disapproval 
     Misinformation 
      Organizational inertia 
       Mistakes 
 
Least intentionality 
Figure 4.4: Mechanisms of authoritarian control, arranged by intentionality. 
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Figure 4.4 also represents the subdivisions of "authoritarian control" used in this 
study and the order in which they appear below. 
3.1) Censorship  
 Censorship appeared in the study corpus in Palmer and Carter (2006) in 
the form of legislation known as the "United States Information and Educational 
Exchange Act," familiarly known as the "Smith-Mundt Act of 1948," amended in 
1970, 1985, and 1999. Under this act, broadcasting or distributing to people in 
the U.S. the international propaganda broadcasts of the U.S. government (e.g., 
Voice of America and Radio Sawa) violated Federal law. In other words, the U.S. 
government prevented the inhabitants of the United States from hearing the 
information that the U.S. government provided to inhabitants of the Soviet Bloc 
and the Middle East. Palmer and Carter concluded that: 
It seems that an unstated reason for court decisions upholding Smith-
Mundt's domestic dissemination ban against challenges based on the First 
Amendment and on the Freedom of Information Act may be that U.S. courts 
are reluctant to narrowly define the federal government's right to speak and 
its right not to speak. Thus, the government speech doctrine appears to be 
on a collision course with the right [of citizens] to send and receive 
information freely. (p. 32) 
Such authoritarian control leading to CNI appeared in another example, smaller 
in geographical scope but more obviously lethal, in which South Carolina 
continually refused to give jurors information that would assist them in returning 
murder trial verdicts. According to Baarsma (2002): 
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In Shafer v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court once again confronted 
South Carolina's practice of refusing to inform capital juries choosing 
between a sentence of life imprisonment or death that the defendant would 
be statutorily ineligible for parole if sentenced to a life term. (p. 23) 
As a result, some South Carolina juries sentenced convicted criminals to death, 
thinking that death was the only sentence that would keep those criminals 
permanently away from society. In both of these instances, the Smith-Mundt Act 
and Shafer v. South Carolina, governments used authoritarian control to compel 
the nonuse of information by citizens. 
 Clerk (2007, p. 10) presented a less direct form of authoritarian control 
when she described "how oralism [a communication scheme for the hearing-
impaired, taught primarily in the educational system] controlled the information 
provided to the deaf community in both deaf schools and deaf clubs." As 
mentioned above, T. Rogers (1998) suggested that a motive for this type of 
authoritarian control could be a desire by those in power to control or even to 
suppress the disabled by "defin[ing] a disability from their [the able-bodied] 
perspective" as a way to "have power over those with impairments." (p. 503) 
3.2) Disinformation  
 Disinformation, the deliberate provision of incorrect information, and 
misinformation, the accidental provision of incorrect information (Rowe, 2003, p. 
45, sidebar) frequently occur through manipulation of language. George Orwell 
(1949) coined "newspeak" for his novel 1984 to describe a fictional example of 
governmental disinformation through manipulation of language. Turk (2004) 
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described a non-fictional example, noting that the U.S. government once called 
some behaviors "crimes" but now calls those behaviors "terrorism": 
The United States has a long history of violence associated with political, 
labor, racial, religious, and other social and cultural conflicts. 
Assassinations, bombings, massacres, and other secretive deadly attacks 
have caused many thousands of casualties. Yet, few incidents have been 
defined as terrorism or the perpetrators as terrorists. Instead, authorities 
have typically ignored or downplayed the political significance of such 
violence, opting to portray and treat the violence as apolitical criminal acts 
by deranged or evil individuals, outlaws or gangsters, or “imported” 
agitators such as the radical Molly Maguires of Pennsylvania’s coal miners’ 
struggles. (p. 272) 
Turk stated that the U.S. government then used the threat of terrorism to justify 
the killing of citizens and foreigners suspected of these behaviors: 
Among the departures from previously assumed legal norms are … (d) 
creation of military tribunals with the authority to try and sentence (including 
to capital punishment) both foreign nationals and American citizens defined 
as enemy combatants; (e) relaxing the prohibition of assassination to permit 
the extralegal killing of suspected terrorists, whether foreigners or citizens 
... . The decision to launch an essentially unilateral invasion of Iraq was a 
huge departure from generally and increasingly accepted (outside the 
United States) international norms for reviewing interstate grievances and 
providing for a collective (Security Council) decision authorizing military 
action against a sovereign government. (p. 281) 
Floyd and Clements (2005) analyzed six speeches in which George W. Bush 
used associational juxtaposition, "pairing images in order to bring about an 
unconscious association between them" (K. Smith et al., 2005, p. 499), 
incorrectly to link 9/11 to Saddam Hussein in an effort to justify the Iraq War. 
Fetzer (2004) described five levels of governmental misinformation and 
disinformation that he encountered in his investigation of the assassination of 
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President Kennedy. Quoted in the order presented in the article, the five levels 
are: 
The fifth level of disinformation occurs when a source presents information 
that has been deliberately selected to misrepresent, distort, or abuse the 
target with the intention to mislead. Citing only evidence that is favorable to 
one side, as though no contrary evidence exists, is known as special 
pleading. (p. 233) 
The fourth level of disinformation, for example, occurs, not when a work (a 
book or an article) is being written from scratch, but in creating a highly 
biased impression of a specific study by simply ignoring its most significant, 
important, or relevant features to mislead others about the contents of the 
work, which is another form of special pleading. (p. 235) 
The third level of disinformation occurs by abusing the man (the ad 
hominem) by attacking the author or editor of a work on irrelevant or 
misleading grounds that have little or nothing to do with the position the 
author or editor represents. (p. 236) 
The second level of disinformation occurs when available evidence that is 
relevant and therefore ought to make a difference to some conclusion, 
hypothesis, or conjecture under examination is simply dismissed or ignored. 
(p. 237) 
The first level of disinformation might … be characterized as apparent 
incompetence by someone who assumes the task of offering a critique 
when it is one that he is not well-positioned to provide. (p. 237) 
As with other forms of CNI such as false memories (described in Section 1), 
these five levels of disinformation qualify as CNI because they prevent people 
from seeking or using information. Fetzer's five levels demonstrate authoritarian 
control because, according to Fetzer, people in a position of authority created 
conditions leading to the disinformation: 
The government has used false information to conceal, deceive, and 
confuse the public about the death of JFK in the past, a deception, alas!, 
that it continues to practice skillfully to this day. (p. 239) 
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3.3) Explicit and implicit authoritarian disapproval  
 Explicit and implicit authoritarian disapproval describes the CNI practiced 
by the state of Rhode Island when it prohibited the publication of liquor price 
information in advertisements. Ostensibly to prevent "price wars" that might 
encourage alcohol consumption, the state used fines and the expense of 
protracted litigation to punish the use of the word "WOW!" in liquor 
advertisements (Richards, 1997). In this example, the state explicitly disapproved 
of the publication of prices through fines and litigation and implicitly disapproved 
of the word "WOW!" by including it implicitly in the category of advertised liquor 
prices. The state's failure to make explicit its disapproval of the use of the word 
"WOW!" led to protracted litigation and eventual defeat of the state's position. 
 More far-reaching examples of authoritarian control occurred in Tsang 
(2002, p. 40), where "displacement of responsibility" allowed Germans to blame 
the Nazi state for the murders that Germans, Nazi and non-Nazi, committed. 
According to Tsang, the German government had instilled in its people a high 
value for obedience (an example of explicit disapproval of disobedience), 
granting tacit and explicit permissions for carrying out "acts of the state": 
The obscuring of causal agency can occur in displacement of responsibility, 
when an individual is ordered or feels compelled to perform a particular 
activity. Rather than blaming the self, the individual blames those who gave 
the orders. (p. 40) 
Such orders, coupled with the promise of rewards and punishments, permitted 
otherwise non-murdering Germans to avoid the realization (acceptance of 
information) that they were responsible for murders. Referring to Bateson's 
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definition of information as "a difference that makes a difference," the possibility 
occurs that, if Germans of that era had used the information about mass murders 
that became available after the defeat of the Nazis, the information might have 
made a difference in their behavior. The fact that the Nazis went to such lengths 
to hide this information from the German people (Arendt, 1963; Tsang, 2002) 
substantiates this possibility. This example also involves the element "trust of a 
cognitive authority," described further in Section 6.2 below. 
 In a similar example of explicit and implicit authoritarian control, the U.S. 
government used the mass media to spread misinformation about the necessity 
of the Iraq War: 
[T]hose who consumed more television in the period following 9/11 
exhibited greater levels of trust in the government. This trend was 
particularly pronounced among those who identified themselves as 
Republicans. This suggests that, while television coverage that promoted 
the Bush agenda may not have changed people’s opinions in favor of the 
war, by presenting misinformation without an adequately critical filter 
television coverage reinforced trust in the government, which translated into 
support of the war. (Arsenault & Castells, 2006, pp. 299) 
This example also involves "trust of a cognitive authority" and "least conflict," 
elements of the taxonomy discussed in Section 6.2 below. Arsenault and Castells 
implied that, in this example, the media's audience attributed cognitive authority 
to both the government and the media: 
Media both convey and filter the messages of the agenda-setting political 
agency, while keeping in mind the mood of the audience. The more these 
media channels conveyed rather than filtered information released by the 
administration, the more misinformation was channeled to the audience, 
thereby increasing the extent of the misperceptions held by audience 
members. (Arsenault & Castells, 2006, pp. 301-302) 
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Arsenault and Castells reported that government controls were implicit in the 
form of preferential news "leaks" to reporters who would write news stories that 
reinforced the government's rationale for initiating the war. The media benefited, 
too, by responding to market forces that rewarded the broadcasting of 
sensational material: 
[P]ressure to conform to market forces plays a key role in facilitating the 
close interaction between the media and politicians …. News outlets need 
political actors to deliver sensationalist stories that attract audiences as 
much as they need political decision-makers to relax regulation and 
conglomeratization laws. At the same time, politicians need media 
organizations to deliver their messages to the public in a way that activates 
the median voter. (p. 288) 
Thus, countless American citizens supported the Iraq War through nonuse of 
information that refuted government claims of Iraqi support of terrorism or Iraqi 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. Does this action mirror that of 
German citizens during the Nazi era? Arsenault and Castells addressed a 
tangential question, the question of contemporary American versus German 
ability to disregard information corrections: 
In a crossnational study, they [Lewandowsky et al. (2005)] found that 
Americans were more likely than Germans or Australians to disregard 
corrections in information about the Iraq War. (p. 292) 
These elements of the taxonomy (governmental misinformation and public non-
acceptance of corrections) prevent information from making a difference in the 
continued killing of approximately 20 (Dardagan & Sloboda, 2008) to 33 (Ford, 
2003) Iraqi civilians for every U.S. military death in Iraq. 
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 Mickiewicz (2005) described another mechanism of authoritarian control 
that occurred in Russia and in the U.S., media "framing" or "priming" (described 
more fully in Section 5.4 below). Mickiewicz quotes Entman (2004, p. 5) in 
defining priming: "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and 
making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, 
evaluation and/or solution." In Russia, 70 years of authoritarian (Soviet) control of 
the media prepared the citizenry to evaluate news skeptically. "Priming" by the 
media simply did not work in Russia because many citizens expected it and 
greeted it with well-developed skepticism. In America, however, perpetual 
governmental framing created "a world that sets a low bar for citizen 
competence" (2005, p. 355). Mickiewicz quoted Graber, who said: 
In the vast majority of political news stories, framing does not match the 
manner in which ordinary Americans tend to store such information, making 
matching difficult or impossible. Stories tend to be overloaded with facts 
and figures and names, which are search cues that most people fail to 
store. ... For example, journalists often refer to pending congressional 
legislation only by the name of a particular bill or by its expected price tag. 
They give little substantive identifying information …. Audiences then find it 
difficult to process the information and may therefore abandon the effort--
which means that incompatible framing has prevented learning. ... 
Incompatible framing of questions may prevent retrieval of information that 
is actually present in memory. (Graber, 2001, p. 26-27) 
The phenomena described by Graber represent a number of elements of the 
taxonomy: lack of threshold knowledge (described further in Section 4), 
avoidance of cognitive overload and perceived cost exceeding perceived benefit 
(both described further in Section 6.1), and avoidance of conflicting information 
(described further in Section 6.2). Yet, this example by Mickiewicz and Graber 
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qualifies as authoritarian control because governments and media employ these 
elements in a manner that apparently is deliberate. 
 Seife (2001, p. 1474) illustrated the power of an authority, the Vatican's 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences, to control the use of information by others. For 
example, the Vatican appears to have decreased CNI through explicit approval of 
recombinant DNA technology: 
"There was a great deal of alarm at the time whether it was appropriate to 
use," says Alexander Rich, a biophysicist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. But [Pontifical Academy] members, including [David] 
Baltimore, drafted a statement supporting the use of recombinant DNA. The 
pope followed with his own statement giving the nod to genetic research. 
"Some said, 'Let's not unleash this technology at all,' " says Sheldon 
Krimsky, a science policy scholar at Tufts University in Medford, 
Massachusetts, and a nonmember of the academy. "The Vatican's position 
on [recombinant DNA] helped to blunt ideological opposition to the use of 
recombinant DNA technology."  
Seife also described Pontifical Academy studies that increased CNI. In the 
radiocarbon dating of the Shroud of Turin, the Vatican dictated to the Academy a 
methodological protocol that returned an ambiguous provenance for the shroud. 
In this example of authoritarian control, CNI resulted from "trust of a cognitive 
authority" (described further in Section 6.2) and "explicit reward," because the 
Vatican funded the study. Seife explained the explicit reward: 
In return, the scientists get the ear of one of the most important people in 
the world--and, through him, a chance to influence whether people accept 
or reject new knowledge and technology. 
 As quoted earlier, Arsenault and Castells (2006, pp. 299) demonstrated 
that "those who consumed more television in the period following 9/11 exhibited 
greater levels of trust in the government." In other words, trust in television 
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mirrored trust in the government. Television and government became 
authoritative sources of information. When the government used the media to 
disseminate misinformation, both the government and the media were exercising 
authoritarian control by reducing television viewers' access to other information.  
 Hoffmann (2004, p. 77) postulated a model for this reduction of 
information. He suggested that two worlds existed: a world deliberately 
"mediated" by media and a world unmediated by media. He compiled a list of six 
values, defining "values" as "constructions that are shaped by world views and 
paradigms both in broader American society, and within the media industry." His 
list, quoted here verbatim, included: 
1) Consumerism and materialism. Success often is measured by what we 
own, where we live, what kind of car we drive or what clothes we wear in 
the mediated world. 
2) Patriotism. The United States' way of life--freedom, free market economy, 
etc.--is the best in the world. This value has been conveyed even stronger 
since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack. Conversely, those who disagree 
with our way of life are considered the enemy, evil-doers, oppressors, etc. 
3) Physical attractiveness is very important. This value begins in teen 
magazines and other media geared at young people, especially female 
young people. It is carried on through adult media. 
4) Information must be entertaining. That means it must be relatively easy to 
understand--dumbed down in some of our opinions--fast-paced, delivered 
by those physically attractive people mentioned a paragraph earlier. 
5) Individualism. You can be successful if you act aggressively and take on 
the world yourself. Work hard, compete, be tough. After all, it's you against 
the world. 
6) The natural world primarily provides resources for humans--fuel, food, 
materials for shelter, recreation, etc. (Hoffmann, 2004, p. 77) 
 
 142
These values, then, compelled people to avoid information from the 
"unmediated" world through a variety of CNI mechanisms. For example, repeated 
viewing of messages promoting personal wealth and physical beauty (Values 1 
and 3) appears to lead a viewer to reject values promoting inner worth, through 
"least conflict," described in Section 6.2 below. Repeated exposure to 
Hoffmann's Value 4 resembles "entertainment over information," described in 
Section 6.1 below. Value 6 resembles Narcissistic Personality Disorder, 
described in Section 1 above.  
 Hoffmann suggested that mass media implemented these six values by 
creating a mediated world. Some of the six values, however, appeared to have 
originated in other sources, sources that used the media to convey the values to 
viewers. For example, Hoffmann's Values 2 and 5, "patriotism" and 
"individualism," appear to parallel the political interests of the United States 
government, because Hoffmann noted that these two values became "stronger 
since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack" (2004, p. 77), with dissenters portrayed 
as evil and as enemies. Hoffmann's "consumerism and materialism," "physical 
attractiveness," and view of the "natural world" values appear to parallel the 
financial interests of the U.S. mercantile sector, such as the producers and 
distributors of consumer goods. Similarly, Hoffmann suggested no specific 
source for the "information as entertainment" value (described further in Section 
6.1 below), but he portrayed this value as a deliberate appeal by the mass media 
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to the less thoughtful or less educated portion of society through his use of 
phrases such as "dumbed down" (2004, p. 77).  
 Arsenault and Castells (2006, p. 289) expressed a more venal view of 
media manipulation of society (quoting Kellner, 2005, p. 37):  
[I]t is in mainstream media’s best interest to adopt the Bush administration’s 
frame of fear in order to keep Americans in a "constant state of alert, with 
their eyes fixed on media screens, thus increasing corporate profits." 
Hemsley-Brown and Sharp (2003) described a more specific example of a local, 
"institutionalized culture" influencing nonuse of information by exerting 
authoritarian control: 
Louis suggests that all knowledge is local and knowledge created 
elsewhere must be compatible with existing belief structures so that it 
becomes legitimised and has utility within the local setting. She suggests 
that research knowledge generated in universities or research institutes is 
only one source of knowing and that its use must be negotiated through the 
dissemination process. … Louis concludes that the main barriers to 
knowledge use in the public sector are not at the level of individual 
resistance but lie in an institutionalised culture that does not foster learning. 
(p. 459) 
Hemsley-Brown and Sharp described in this example an authoritarian culture that 
did not encourage learning. In this example, lack of encouragement to learn 
prevented nurses from using information derived from new research. The 
account does not indicate whether this lack of support was explicit or tacit, or 
whether it was a result of organizational inertia, or simply a mistake. Regardless 
of the intentionality of the authoritarian behavior, however, the example describes 
authoritarian control leading to CNI. 
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 Hooper (2007, p. 14) reported the analysis by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists about ExxonMobil sponsorship of studies denying global warming 
(e.g., "carbon dioxide emissions posed no warming threat," p. 14) and likened the 
sponsorship to tobacco industry practices denying a connection between 
smoking and cancer. In such examples of disinformation, the incorrect 
information (denial of global warming; smoking is unconnected to cancer) 
compelled the nonuse of correct information in two ways. First, the effective 
doubling of the messages about global warming (it exists; it does not exist) and 
the complexity of the issue can compel nonuse of information through avoidance 
of information overload (described in Section 6.1 below). Second, the 
introduction of conflicting messages can result in schema conflict (described in 
Section 6.2 below). Regardless of the CNI mechanism employed, this example 
qualifies as authoritarian control, because it reports deliberate dissemination of 
disinformation: "ExxonMobil, for example, spent some $16 million between 1998 
and 2005 … funding 43 bodies critical of claims of climate change." (p. 14) 
Summary of Section 3: Authoritarian controls 
 The foregoing examples invoke the techniques of authoritarian control 
described by Foucault, from the somatic to the cognitive, and from the overt to 
the covert. As mentioned before, "A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with 
iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of 
their own ideas" (1977, p. 102). Authoritarian barriers continue to be 
predominantly somatic CNI, however, even though they may use cognitive 
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methods. The next several sections describe cognitive barriers to use of 
information. As noted in Section 3, Foucault's true politicians employ a number of 
these cognitive barriers to constrain their constituents. 
Cognitive barriers to use of information 
 Cognitive barriers control a person's cognition. The following facets of CNI 
mark a movement from somatic involvement to cognitive, even though that 
cognition is pre-cognition or intuitive or "instant" cognition, rather than deductive 
or inductive cognition (cf. Figure 1.4: The continuum of cognition). In other words, 
the following elements of the taxonomy may or may not rise above a threshold of 
awareness, but they do NOT involve conscious deduction or induction. 
Conditions that involve deductive or inductive cognition and result in nonuse of 
information become volitional nonuse of information (VNI), which is beyond the 
scope of this study. The following conditions that lead to CNI also represent a 
cognitive "lack of pull" from a person, as explained in the introduction to this 
chapter, rather than the "push" that somatic barriers represent (cf. the bell jar 
analogy depicted in Figure 4.1). Cognitive barriers clustered in three broad 
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Figure 4.5: Cognitive barriers that cause CNI. 
4. Threshold knowledge shortfall 
 "Threshold knowledge shortfall" derives its name from an analogous term 
in chemistry: threshold energy, or activation energy. In 1889, noted Swedish 
scientist Svante Arrhenius formulated the concept of threshold energy to explain 
the energy barrier that must be overcome before two molecules can react with 
each other. In other words, a specific level of energy (heat and/or pressure) must 
be present for one molecule to make a difference in another molecule, and this 
level varies depending on the types of molecules. Analogously, a priori 
information must exist in a person as knowledge before new information can 
make a difference in that person's behavior, and the type and amount of 
knowledge required depends on the nature of the new information. For example, 
no amount of a priori knowledge about reading Turkish will help a person to read 
a newspaper written in Chinese, whereas an a priori knowledge of Chinese 
ideographs will permit the information in a Chinese newspaper to make a 
difference in a person's behavior. The following section presents a series of 
conditions, one building upon the other, that can compel nonuse of information. 
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This series of conditions begins with literacy / illiteracy and adds additional 
barriers such as mutually unintelligible languages, dialectal and idiomatic 
differences, use of euphemisms, lack of extra-lexical information, and lack of 
awareness of the availability of information. 
 Menou (1983, p. 123) described illiteracy as something of a geographical 
phenomenon, with peoples of the "south" more likely to not read or occasionally 
not to possess an alphabet. However, CNI can persist in the presence of literacy. 
McKnight (2006, p, 149) described the problems of literate nurses:  
The nurses encountered barriers to information acquisition in both manual 
and computer systems. The most common problem in manual systems was 
illegible handwriting. Electronic records systems eliminated the difficulties of 
handwriting interpretation. However, navigability of electronic systems 
presented another set of barriers to finding information. 
Presumably, the creators of those manual and electronic information sources 
could use the information in those sources because the creators would be 
familiar with their own handwriting and navigation conventions. Volk (2007) noted 
that most medical patients and their families did not possess the abilities that 
allow librarians to use systems that locate information: 
It seems that, despite the penetration of the Internet in society, other 
barriers may prevent patients and families from accessing relevant 
information when they need it. ... The data suggest that the librarian's 
specialized skill set and knowledge of the principles of information 
organization and retrieval are essential to locating information on the vast 
Internet. (p. 203) 
Ikpeze and Boyd (2007, p. 645) implied that lack of experience prevented novice 
users of information systems from navigating electronic systems: 
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It is unlikely that many students who use the Internet possess adequate 
skills and strategies to efficiently and effectively negotiate the realms of 
available information to learn new content knowledge. 
R. J. Lewis et al. (1986) noted that information derived from prior experience 
enhanced remembering of sexual facts: 
As expected, subjects who were more experienced sexually made fewer 
errors when recalling material from the sexual vignettes than did those who 
were less experienced. Thus, it would appear that these sexually 
experienced subjects ... appear to be fairly adept at processing information 
that is relevant to their area of relative "expertise." ... In short, the 
experienced subjects had cognitive as well as behavioral experience in the 
area of sexuality, which presumably led to the development of more 
complex sexual schemas [sic]. These schemas, in turn, enabled them to 
process the sexual information more efficiently. (pp. 487-688) 
 CNI can persist, even if a person is literate, familiar with handwriting 
conventions, skills and strategies for using electronic systems, and possesses 
experience. Black (1983, p. 307) described threshold knowledge barriers with 
reference to mutually unintelligible languages, saying specifically: "the language 
barrier has been one of the most significant problems in information transfer." For 
example, if a person has never learned to read Turkish, that person will be 
compelled not to use the lexical content of books, magazines, and newspapers 
written in Turkish. Yet, even with literacy, familiarity with handwriting conventions, 
skills and strategies for using electronic systems, experience, and a mutually 
intelligible language, CNI can persist because of dialectal and idiomatic 
language. For example, Muha and Smith (1998, p. 118) noted that, in relation to 
cancer patients seeking information: 
The data in this survey emphasize the point that … information providers 
should consider that many health information seekers may lack a basic 
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understanding of human biology and anatomy and may not be familiar with 
technical terms and concepts. 
Giacalone et al. (2007, p. 369) studied one segment of the cancer patient 
population and found that: 
[O]lder patients believe their low level of education limits their knowledge 
and understanding of medicine (55.7% of the enrolled elderly patients had 
none or a low education). The incapacity of understanding medical 
language is also a limiting factor for the information seeking behaviour. 
Chute and Wiener (1996, p. 223) addressed the lack of knowledge of aircraft 
terminology and aeronautical information among flight attendants: 
Katherine Say (deceased flight attendant) may have been under the 
impression that the F-28 was equipped with ground de-icers, which it was 
not …. The Board of Inquiry cited this as an example of the need for joint 
training with the cockpit crew in order to educate cabin crews [flight 
attendants] on the hazards of take-off with contaminated wings and on 
proper de-icing procedures. 
In this example, the lack of a priori information about the absence of ground de-
icers apparently compelled flight attendant Say to not use information about ice 
on the aircraft's wings. In other words, the stimulus (observation of ice on the 
aircraft's wings) did not make a difference in flight attendant Say's response 
(informing the pilot about the ice). The lack of threshold knowledge about ground 
de-icers compelled flight attendant Say not to use information about ice on the 
aircraft's wings. Quoting Chute and Wiener again: 
We have discussed the problems created by the flight attendants' relative 
lack of knowledge of aircraft terminology. We have also advised against the 
blind trust that flight attendants place in pilots' abilities. We recommend that 
research be conducted to determine just what aeronautical information flight 
attendants need to communicate safety critical information to the cockpit 
and that this become part of their training. (p. 228) 
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Thus, lack of threshold knowledge in the form of specialized vocabularies can 
compel even literate, skilled people to not use information.  
 CNI also can occur as a lack of enough of a language. For example, Zulu 
(2003) described students who spoke English but did not speak it well enough to 
attend special instruction classes designed to improve their knowledge of 
English:  
It is a catch-22: students don’t attend sessions because they feel alienated 
by their lack of knowledge, but the knowledge gap can only be closed by 
attending and participating in sessions. (p. 59) 
Given fluency in a language and its dialect and idioms, semantic differences still 
can cause CNI, as when the Nazis created and used euphemistic language. For 
instance, the Nazis allegedly termed death camps "charitable foundations for 
institutional care.” Some German citizens of that time could not accept 
information about the lethal purpose of the camps identified as charitable 
foundations (Arendt, 1963, p. 109; as cited by Tsang, 2002, p. 40), whereas 
those whose CNI had been mitigated by sufficient additional information, such as 
information about the lethal purpose of the camps or information about Nazi 
terminology, could. 
 The previous paragraphs have described lack of threshold knowledge 
caused by illiteracy, unfamiliarity with handwriting conventions, lack of skills and 
strategies for using electronic information systems, inexperience, language 
differences, lack of enough of a language, and euphemistic use of language. 
Beyond these situations lies the threshold of extra-lexical information. L. M. 
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Meyer (2000) gave examples of lack of threshold knowledge as a barrier to 
second language acquisition as it affected the student and the teacher: 
How would teachers act out the word "water"? Would they turn on an 
imaginary faucet, then pretend to fill and drink from a glass? Would they 
display a glass of water and point out the wet, transparent liquid inside? 
What would these actions mean to the child who recalls cranking water 
from the village well or lugging it from the river in a plastic bucket? Or to the 
child who honors water ritually as a sacred element of the natural world? 
How could the teacher's translation of the word "water" into agua or yacu or 
tikui or nduta bring to life the intended meanings if this word in the child's 
home language triggers the scenes and uses of the word within the child's 
cultural experience, not the teacher's? (p. 230) 
In this example, the teacher's lack of a priori extra-lexical knowledge (the cultural 
context of "water") might compel the teacher not to use (i.e., not explain to the 
student) the correct information to describe "water." This behavior then would 
compel the student not to use (i.e., not to adopt) the meaning of "water" that is 
appropriate to the learning situation. Lack of extra-lexical information appeared in 
the study corpus also in other forms. Godlee et al. (2004) named a number of 
extra-lexical conditions leading to CNI: 
Known and assumed barriers to using information in practice (many of 
which are also experienced by health professionals in developed countries) 
include: lack of awareness of what is available; lack of relevance of 
available information (not meeting people’s needs in terms of scope, style, 
language, or format); lack of time and incentives to use information; and 
lack of interpretation skills. (p. 298) 
Godlee's "lack of awareness of what is available" is one of the most profound 
lacks of threshold knowledge. For example, if a person is not aware of the 




Summary of Section 4: Threshold knowledge shortfall 
 This section demonstrated that a lack of threshold knowledge can prevent 
information from making a difference, as Bateson put it, much as a lack of 
threshold energy can prevent one molecule from reacting with another. Examples 
of lack of threshold knowledge included illiteracy, unfamiliar handwriting and 
electronic information systems, lack of skills and experience, mutually 
unintelligible languages, dialectal and idiomatic usages, lack of extra-lexical 
information, and lack of awareness of the availability of information. Each of 
these examples compels nonuse of information. 
 In addition to shortfalls in threshold knowledge, CNI can result from 
another group of shortfalls. The next section describes them under the umbrella 
term "attention shortfall." 
5. Attention shortfall 
 For the purposes of this study, attention is the focusing of cognition on a 
phenomenon. Attention shortfall, then, would be the lack or loss of that focus. 
Types of attention shortfalls cluster into four sub-categories, outlined in Figure 
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Figure 4.6: Attention shortfalls that lead to CNI. 
5.1 Engrossment  
 Engrossment is a mental state involving the engagement of attention by a 
task to the exclusion of attention to other information. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) 
referred to engrossment in creative efforts as flow. Reed and Schallert (1993) 
referred to engrossment among students as involvement. Jacobson (2001) 
referred to engrossment in the imagined/imaginary/virtual worlds of computer-
assisted communications as presence. Engrossment also appeared in the 
psychology of dysphoria as rumination (clinging to negative thoughts and 
feelings: see Broderick, 2005, p. 502; Hofmann et al., 2005, p. 465). When 
rumination appears as a symptom of clinical depression, it interferes with a 
mechanism underlying memory retrieval: executive control ("the process by 
which the mind programs itself," Logan, 2004, p. 227). Reduced executive control 
then results in CNI. As Williams et al. (2007, p. 143) express this process of 
reduced executive control: 
[E]ach of these two factors, avoidance and capture/rumination, interacts 
with impairment [clinical depression] in a third major mechanism underlying 
memory retrieval: executive control. Reduced executive control results in a 
failure to inhibit competing information. The result is a greater likelihood of 
retrieval being “hijacked” by task-irrelevant material. 
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Riskind et al. (2006, p. 786) postulated an engrossment similar to rumination, 
which they called a looming cognitive style or worry: 
Additionally, worry, as well as more abstract meta–cognitive activities such 
as meta–worry (i.e., worry about the degree to which one is worrying; Wells, 
1995) can absorb so much of the vulnerable person’s mental capacity that 
these activities may reduce the amount of attention that the person can 
allocate to managing frightening mental representations. In some cases, 
events can be moving so quickly that worry and meta–worry cannot provide 
adaptive, short–term coping options that serve to lessen, or transform, 
mental representations of rapidly intensifying danger. Once this threshold is 
reached, the individual is likely to engage in wishful thinking or thought 
suppression as the primary avoidance strategy. 
In other words, engrossment via looming cognitive style can occupy attention to 
the exclusion of non-threatening information, compelling nonuse of that non-
threatening information. Conversely, the looming cognitive style not only can 
increase CNI by decreasing use of the non-threatening information, it also can 
decrease CNI under other conditions. According to Riskind et al.: 
The subjective sense of looming vulnerability is proposed to elicit anxiety, 
sensitize the individual to signs of movement and threat, bias cognitive 
processing, and impede habituation to threat stimuli. (p. 779) 
Habituation itself is a CNI (described in Section 1 above), so that, when 
engrossment via looming cognitive style impedes habituation, it decreases CNI. 
Meta–worry (worry about worry, Wells, 2005, p. 108) also appeared in the study 
corpus and functions as another form of engrossment, in that it occupies 
attention to the exclusion of non-threatening information.  
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5.2 Distraction  
 Distraction resembles engrossment, but a subtle difference in timing 
differentiates distraction from engrossment. Engrossment in one task prevents 
the inception of another task, but distraction interrupts a task already underway. 
For example, the airline catastrophe described on page 1 of this dissertation 
occurred because the pilot, first officer, and air traffic controller were distracted 
from critical take-off duties by less-important tasks and by talk about personal 
matters (National Transportation Safety Board, 2006). 
 McKnight (2006, p. 150) reported the effect of interruptions on nurses: 
Someone who was interacting with one information system (human, paper, 
or automated) might be interrupted with another and not complete the task 
begun in the first system. (p. 149) 
Radeborg et al. (1999, p. 776) determined that the number of automobile traffic 
accidents increased when drivers engaged in telephone conversation.  
A driver engaged in a demanding conversation is faced with two attentional 
problems: (1) mustering of sufficient attentional resources, and (2) 
allocating the available attentional resources in an optimal way to the two 
tasks. In previous studies of mobile telephone use while driving, the 
question of traffic safety, namely how driving is affected by the 
simultaneous use of a telephone, has generally been central. The 
conclusions reached in such studies have varied somewhat, although the 
results have basically indicated that telephone use enhances the risk of 
traffic accidents, at least when it is concurrent with other activities that place 
demands on the drivers' attention. (p. 776) 
In a less life-threatening but no less important situation, Tyree and T. A. Fiore 
(1994) suggested that a textbook's content should "avoid 'seductive details'--
trivial or unimportant points that may heighten interest to the point of distraction 
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from important content" (p. 370). Situations of extreme distraction resemble 
overload, described in Section 6.2 below. 
5.3 Affect  
 Affect appears as emotion or mood, with emotion being a shorter 
phenomenon than mood (Beedie et al., 2005, pp. 864-865 & 868-869).  
In the literature, it is frequently argued that, whereas emotions are acute 
and phasic episodes, moods, which are sustained and enduring, are ever 
present and we are constantly in a mood of one sort or other. (p. 869) 
Affect compels nonuse of information in a manner similar to engrossment 
(described above in Section 5.1) and distraction (described above in Section 5.2) 
in that affect can interrupt or forestall use of information. Affect appears in the 
taxonomy as an element separate from engrossment and distraction, however, 
because it describes phenomena not required for engrossment or distraction 
(namely, emotion and mood), and because it does not necessarily lead to 
engrossment or distraction. 
 Affect can cause selective attention or selective memory in a wide variety 
of circumstances, leading to CNI. Many of these circumstances appear to involve 
CNI as a response to threat: threat to life, threat to health, or threat to a person's 
ego. The sequence of events from presence of information to CNI appears in 
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Figure 4.7: The role of affect in CNI. 
The following examples discuss five facets of affect, outlined in Figure 4.8 and 
explained below. 
 
 5 Attention shortfall 
 5.3 Affect 
  a CNI as a reaction to a threat to life 
  b CNI as a reaction to a threat to health 
  c CNI as a reaction to a threat to self-image or ego 
  d CNI as a reaction to the unknown 
  e Factors compounding the effect of threat on CNI 
 
Figure 4.8: Five facets of attention shortfall caused by affect. 
Threat to life 
 Terror Management Theory (TMT, cf. Mikulincer et al., 2003, p. 20) 
postulates that self-preservation, when coupled with awareness of mortality, 
creates intolerable feelings of helplessness and terror. To tolerate these feelings 
of helplessness and terror, humans suppress thoughts about death, treat death 
as a distant problem, adopt a worldview that denies death, or enhance self-
esteem. Enhancing self-esteem perhaps helps a person to believe that others will 
remember the person after the person's death, granting the person's memory a 
sort of immortality. Information about one's own death is, in many situations, the 
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most affective and affecting information that a person can use or not use. In other 
words, information about one's own death can make a larger difference in one's 
own behavior than can other kinds of information. For the purposes of this study, 
I generalize information about death to include "bad" news, where "bad" news is 
information that results in negative affect. For example, Deveney (2004) 
described the aversion among clinically non-depressed people to "negative" (i.e., 
threatening) faces: 
[T]he physiological bias in the nondepressed controls appeared not to be 
the result of an enhancement of positive stimuli processing in the controls, 
but rather an avoidance of elaborative processing of negative stimuli in the 
controls (Deldin et al., 2000). These results suggest that the enhanced 
recognition of positive faces as compared with negative faces observed in 
several behavioral studies (e.g., Ridout et al., 2003) may be due to the 
decreased elaboration of negative faces relative to positive faces during 
working memory. 
In other words, threatening faces provoked reduced processing of information 
and a resultant CNI. 
Fear of death-reminders  
 Fear of death-reminders might explain the phenomenon reported by Scott 
and Stradling (1997), in which sufferers of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
frequently rejected PTSD habituation therapy that relied on reliving the traumatic 
event: 
Clients seen in clinical practice seem likely to benefit from exposure 
treatments if they find them acceptable, but many do not. Data … suggest 
those with more severe symptoms and those with higher levels of co-
morbid depression may be the clients least likely to tolerate exposure 
treatments. (p. 526) 
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Giacalone et al. (2007, p. 369) reported that elderly patients: 
[H]ave a pessimistic point of view as to the meaning of a cancer diagnosis 
and the likelihood of survival. … Sources of further information were not 
referred to by one third of the elderly patients (43/122) but only by 2 [of 52] 
young patients (p<0.0001).  
Fear of death-reminders appeared to correlate to advanced age in the Giacalone 
et al. study, suggesting an outdated view of cancer. In other words, a lack of 
threshold knowledge about advances in cancer research may have contributed to 
fear of death-reminders and compelled nonuse of information.  
 Weisgerber (2004, p. 561) described a medical condition known as sleep 
paralysis (SP). She suggested that the abject terror accompanying the condition 
might account for the sufferer's nonuse of the well-defined medical explanation, 
hypnagogic hallucination (a distortion in a person's perception of reality, typically 
accompanied by a powerful sense of reality, occurring between wakefulness and 
sleep): 
Many … drew on their religious background and religious beliefs in an effort 
to make sense of the unusual phenomena they experienced during SP 
attacks. Since SP is frequently characterized by a sensed evil presence and 
hypnagogic hallucinations in the form of a dark shadowy figure or an 
intruder …, SP victims often linked the intruder figure to the devil. 
[P]aranormal constructions of SP [were] linked to accounts of out-of-body 
experiences (OBEs) and related beliefs in astral projection and contact with 
the spiritual world. It was a widely shared view … that SP can result in 
OBEs or lucid dreams if the person experiencing the paralysis stops fighting 
it and relaxes instead…. 
The attribution of SP to devils, astral projection, or contact with the spirit world 
has several affective components. I conclude that attributing SP to external (and 
therefore uncontrollable) devils both relieves the sufferer of personal 
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responsibility for the frightening episode and denies the finality of death. For 
example: "If devils exist, gods must exist; if gods exist, an afterlife must exist, and 
I will not really die." Attributing SP to paranormal phenomena such as astral 
projection or contact with the spirit world reassures the sufferer about the 
existence of an afterlife and also increases self-esteem through social 
prominence among other believers, for example: "I have seen the other side, it 
does exist, and I am its messenger, so respect me." 
Threat to health 
 Threats to health, while not as extreme as threats to life, also invoke 
affective mechanisms that result in CNI. Brunel and Pichon (2004, p. 366, 368-
369) described the strategies and provided the quotations listed here, strategies 
by which people justified to themselves their eating of food that could be "a risk to 
their health" (p. 360): 
Behavioural disconnection: "I keep turning the packet so as to find out what 
the ingredients are, this infuriates me, but I keep eating because they are so 
good." [This behavior compels nonuse of information from the ingredients label.] 
Denial: "from a statistical point of view, one has such a small chance of 
becoming ill, that it is perhaps disproportionate to the seriousness of the potential 
malady." [This behavior compels nonuse of information about the nature of 
statistical medical risk, for example, that if a condition kills one in 100,000 
Americans every year, then that condition will kill about 3,000 Americans in a 
year.] 
Fatalism: "I am a fatalist, I think that one is perhaps already blasé, one eats so 
many unhealthy things, in any case, that it is just one more among others." [This 
behavior compels nonuse of information about the fundamental principles of 
mathematical probability and about the additive and cumulative threat to health of 
eating unhealthy foods.] 
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Cognitive repression: "when I buy a product I don’t do it according to a plan. If I 
made a plan by saying to myself: take care, if I buy this product such and such a 
thing might happen to me, I would probably not buy it. So I prefer not to think 
about it and buy the product anyway." [This behavior compels nonuse of 
information about the "thing" that "might happen."] 
Magic thought: "The body has been conceived to fight against all sorts of 
exterior aggressions. The body is, in any case, resistant to lots of things." [This 
behavior compels nonuse of information about the body, i.e., that bodies do not 
resist "lots of things," as the obituary column in any newspaper will substantiate.] 
Confidence in the producer: "I buy fresh pork sausages at the butchers, I don’t 
eat those packaged in a supermarket." [This behavior compels nonuse of 
information about any similarities that might exist between the meat processing 
industry that terminates in the butcher shop and the meat processing industry 
that terminates in a supermarket.] 
Confidence in the retailer: "If he is a butcher I am confident that I can leave him 
to make the choice, rather than imposing my own choice." [This behavior 
compels nonuse of information about the expertise and motivations of the 
retailer, information that might undermine the consumer's confidence.] 
Confidence in the state: "This class of risk reducers includes official signs of 
quality, traceability and precautionary principles." [This behavior compels nonuse 
of information about the expertise and motivations of the state, information that 
might undermine the consumer's confidence.] 
Confidence in associations: "Interviewee 23 sometimes buys food that is 
‘stamped, product elected as product of the year'." [This behavior compels 
nonuse of information about the expertise and motivations of the association and 
information about the merits of the product, itself, information that might 
undermine the consumer's confidence.] 
These strategies compelled people to avoid information that might create fear 
about the health risks of the food they were eating. 
 Studies of breast cancer treatment have revealed multiple elements of the 
taxonomy that result in women refusing information about the condition. Kreling 
et al. (2006, p. 1069) described women for whom: 
[A]nxiety interfered with their ability to read materials. Some women said 
they found the information frightening and disturbing. One woman had a 
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lengthy conversation with her doctor who then told her to get Dr Susan 
Love’s Breast Cancer Book [sic]. She said, ‘One of my daughters went out 
and got (Susan Love’s Breast Cancer Book) for me and I couldn’t read it. It 
burned my hands. I couldn’t read it. You know? I couldn’t, it upset me a lot. 
(p. 1069) 
Other studies have reported influences that exacerbate the effect of health threat 
on CNI. For example, Azaiza and Cohen (2006, p. 528) described cultural and 
religious barriers to acquisition of information about breast cancer: 
[T]he difference between the Christian women and the Muslim and Druze 
women in barriers concerning feelings of discomfort and embarrassment 
and the belief in no cure in the case of a positive result may be understood 
in light of traditional cultural and religious beliefs. In addition, modesty is 
rigorously maintained by women of traditional Arab society. … Level of 
religiosity accounted for low attendance at CBE [clinical breast exam] 
screening but had no significant effect on mammography screening. CBE 
involves an invasion of a woman’s privacy and is usually performed by a 
male physician (unlike mammography, usually administered by female 
technicians). CBE thus causes greater feelings of embarrassment, which 
might explain why religious women avoid it more than mammography. 
Such cultural and religious barriers to use of information exacerbate the "threat to 
health" element of the taxonomy through a "belief in no cure," as reported above. 
The barriers also illustrate the "least conflict" group of elements described in 
Section 6.2 below.  
 Volk (2007) cited a number of barriers that compelled patients not to seek 
medical information, including unspecified affect: 
Seven users described specific mental or physical barriers that prevented 
them from doing research on their own, such as not having an Internet 
connection at home, not feeling well enough to do their own research, or 
just lacking the time. These comments suggest that the extra stress brought 




This section has presented documentation of threats to life and threats to health 
that appeared in the study corpus. Both types of threats resulted in selective 
attention or memory, leading to compelled nonuse of information.  
Threat to ego 
 The study corpus contained examples of element 5.3.3 of the taxonomy, 
threat to ego, and these examples portrayed threat to ego as a threat just as 
intense as a threat to life or health. Examples in the corpus presented several 
different aspects of ego, such as a person's self-image, another's image of that 
person, and attribution theory. The next several sections describe these aspects 
of ego and the ways in which threats to these aspects affect nonuse of 
information. 
 Self-image is an aspect of a person's ego that can affect the way the 
person accepts health messages. Sherman et al. (2000, p. 1057) suggested 
bolstering the self-images of people to increase their acceptance of information 
that might affect their self-images, somewhat like administering sugar with 
medicine: 
Because people smoke or drink or have sex with self-image concerns at 
stake, it is important to consider the role of these behaviors in the 
individual’s self-image. If these acts are relevant to the person, then this 
article offers an alternative to putting the person’s self-image at stake; with 
the self-image bolstered by other means [e.g., encouraging college 
students to reflect on their central values], the health message can become 




Moradi et al. (2006, p. 58) presented a hypothesis to explain why information that 
conflicts with self-image can generate affect, selective attention, and CNI:  
Situations are threatening to the extent that they are perceived to have the 
power to change one’s core constructs, such as the self, in profound and 
intolerable ways. For example, a person who construes herself or himself 
as good, kind, and warm might feel threatened by being told that she or he 
is cruel because the notion of the self as cruel would fundamentally 
transform the person’s self-concept in an undesirable manner. When faced 
with threatening material, … persons distance themselves from and reject 
the material completely and seek validation and reaffirmation of their 
original construal. … (i.e., “Cruelty is bad. I despise cruelty; therefore, I am 
good”). As such, expressing rejection of the threatening material serves to 
validate the initial construction of the self and reaffirm the self as good. 
In other words, information that conflicts with self-image will threaten a person's 
core constructs with intolerable change. If Sherman and Moradi are correct, the 
larger the change in self-image, the greater the degree of bolstering that will be 
required to effect the change. 
 Articles in the study corpus suggested two classifications of ego-
threatening messages: "negative face" versus "positive face" and shame versus 
embarrassment. Brown and Levinson (1978, p. 67): explained "negative face" as 
"the want of every 'competent adult member' [of society] that his actions be 
unimpeded by others." In other words, negative face is the expectation to be 
autonomous and left alone. In extreme examples, negative face becomes 
resignation, described further in Section 6.1. Brown and Levinson (1978, p. 67) 
explained "positive face" as "the want of every member that his wants be 
desirable to at least some others." In other words, positive face is a desire for a 
positive image of the self as held by other people. Goldsmith (1999) investigated 
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ways to avoid threats to an advice recipient's positive and negative face in a 
counseling situation, because threat to the advice recipient's face could cause 
negative affect, leading to selective attention and nonuse of the advice. 
 Another method of classifying ego-threatening information (after M. Lewis, 
2001) categorizes threat by its affective reaction: as embarrassment (negative 
affect resulting from public attention) or shame (negative affect resulting from a 
change in self-image). Zulu (2003, p. 59) described embarrassment as a result of 
peer intimidation in second language acquisition: 
[T]he students reported that they did not attend SI [Supplemental 
Instruction] regularly because they did not understand the concepts 
discussed in the sessions …. Moreover, they reported feeling intimidated by 
their peers whose preparation was stronger. 
Dore (1994) reported shame resulting from "a lifetime of subtle and not-so-subtle 
inferences of personal inadequacy," resulting in a lowering of self-image that 
created anxiety and nonuse of information in educational settings. Specifically, 
Dore described: 
[T]he intuitive/affective barrier, [which] is aroused by anxiety concerning 
personal mastery and prevents the absorption of new material. According to 
Dunn, women may be particularly vulnerable to this learning barrier 
because of a lifetime of subtle and not-so-subtle inferences of personal 
inadequacy in educational settings. (Dunn, 1987; cited in Dore, 1994, p. 99) 
Both emotions, embarrassment and shame, led to lack of learning on the part of 
the students. In these examples, I treat learning as a use of information, with the 
learning "making a difference" (in Bateson's terms) in the cultural, social, and 
economic capital of the students. In other words, learning (in these examples) 
could have led to increased knowledge of a culture (cultural capital), a larger 
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network of mutual acquaintance and recognition (social capital), and better-
paying jobs (economic capital). Not learning led to the students' not making a 
difference in their capital, justifying "not learning" in these examples as CNI. 
 Threat to one's image as held by others was more powerful than threat to 
life in the study reported by Shehryar and Hunt (2005, p. 282): 
It may be argued that death is the ultimate consequence and is inherently 
more fear arousing than any other threat. However, getting arrested and 
being put in jail for drinking and driving poses a significant threat because of 
potentially embarrassing and troublesome consequences. 
As a result of their research, Shehryar and Hunt suggested that campaigns to 
reduce drunk driving would be more effective if they focused on social 
consequences such as embarrassment, rather than on somatic consequences 
such as death. Jones and Leary (1994) found that information about threats to 
appearance provoked more safe-sun behavior than information about threats to 
health. Jones and Leary also found, however, an exception: 
Appearance-motivated people who tan to enhance their appearance may 
be particularly threatened by messages that try to deter them from tanning 
with information about the effects of the sun on appearance. As a result, 
they may experience greater reactance than people lower in appearance 
motivation and, thus, be more likely to reassert their freedom by resisting 
the antitanning message. 
Thus, Jones and Leary found that a perceived threat to freedom (a threat to self-
image) could override threats to one's image as held by others. Sedikides and 
Green (2000, p. 919) discussed the relationship between "threat to self-image" 
and "others' negative image of one's self": 
The human information processor is not concerned with reconciliation. 
Instead, he or she strives to neglect the appalling impression that other 
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individuals may have of her or him, even when this impression is 
hypothetical.  
In other words, Sedikides and Green determined that people usually have a 
much better impression of themselves (self-image) than others have of them, and 
that this impression compels nonuse of even hypothetical hints of personal 
inadequacy under experimental conditions, such as "would borrow other people's 
belongings without their knowledge" (p. 922). This example presents aspects of 
two elements of the taxonomy, ego threat and "least conflict." Ego threat appears 
to rest on a person's existential fear of the death of the person's favorable public 
image, justifying the inclusion of this example in this section about affect. As with 
threat to life and threat to health, threat to ego leads to affect, which leads to 
selective attention or memory, which lead to CNI. "Neglect[ing] the appalling 
impression" resembles the taxonomy element conflicting schemata and justifies 
the inclusion of this example in Section 6.2 (least conflict) below. 
 Attribution theory (Weiner, 1974) postulated that people will attribute their 
own and others' behaviors to causations that bolster self-image. In other words, 
people will not "use information" (allow information to make a difference) that 
damages self-image. For example, Tsang (2002, p. 42) noted that Nazis blamed 
Jews for the Holocaust ("They shouldn't have threatened the state."), rather than 
blame themselves ("We had no choice. We had to obey the state / kill Jews, or 
be killed, ourselves."): 
Perpetrators of evil can also rationalize their actions by shifting attributions 
of blame …. For instance, perpetrators can shift the blame from themselves 
to their victims …, as when the Nazis claimed that Jewish people deserved 
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to be killed. Alternately, perpetrators can blame the circumstances around 
them for their crimes. Actors might feel controlled by other people or by the 
situation and feel that they are faultless, helpless victims. For instance, 
many Nazi doctors who participated in forced experiments and killings in 
concentration camps felt morally opposed to these actions. Yet, they 
continued to engage in these acts because they believed that if they 
disobeyed orders, they would be killed …. Therefore, they were able to 
justify their actions by assigning responsibility to their circumstances and 
not to themselves. 
Attribution theory suggests that this attribution of motivations is not a product of 
traceable cognition and occurs at the intuitive level of cognition (cf. Figure 1.4: 
The continuum of cognition). Thus, this attribution is not under the control of the 
person doing the attributing. As such, the attribution compels people not to allow 
information about self-image and information about the image of others to "make 
a difference," in Bateson's terms. For these reasons, this attribution qualifies as 
CNI. 
Fear of the unknown 
 Fear of the unknown compels nonuse of information simply because the 
information is new and unknown. As with other elements of taxonomy, "fear of 
the unknown" acts at the intuitive or pre-cognitive level (cf. Figure 1.4: The 
continuum of cognition), meaning that it represents a compelled nonuse of 
information rather than a volitional nonuse of information. For the purposes of 
this study, "fear of the unknown" includes "fear of the new" and fear of specific 
unknowns, such as "fear of bad news." 
 As mentioned above in Section 2 (prejudice), Bergen (2001, p. 161) 
stated: "If confronted with a new way of looking at things, they stick to the old, 
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tried way as if only the past can provide safe anchorage." In this context, 
"sticking to the old" resembles priming, discussed in Section 5.4 below. Priming, 
however, results in the rejection of new information because some facet of "old" 
information conflicts with acceptance of the new information. With "fear of the 
unknown," no conflicting "old" information exists. No examples in the study 
corpus demonstrated a specific "fear of the unknown," but Carl R. Rogers (1961) 
suggested a possible motivation: "we all fear change" (p. 18). "This risk of being 
changed is one of the most frightening prospects most of us can face." (p. 333) 
Conditions modifying the effect on CNI of "threat to life, health, and ego"  
 In the study corpus, researchers reported three conditions that can 
intensify or decrease the effect on CNI of a threat to life, health, or ego. These 
conditions include a person's perceived "self-efficacy" (ability to produce a 
change in the threat), a person's affective state pre-existing before the threat, 
and the proximity of the threat to the person, that is, whether the threat refers to 
the person or to others. 
 Self-efficacy appeared in a study by Sprinkle et al. (2006, p. 95) as a 
modifier of CNI in the presence of threat. 
When a message creates a high perceived threat but the perceived 
response efficacy remains low, fear control processes are engaged and will 
dominate a person’s behavior, resulting in message rejection, denial, or 
minimization. However, when a message creates high perceived threat and 
the perceived response efficacy is also high, danger control processes are 
engaged and will dominate a person’s behavior resulting in message 
acceptance and attitude, intention, and behavioral changes. 
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In other words, a threatening situation provoked more CNI when the threatened 
person also felt ineffective in changing the threatening situation. M. M. Turner et 
al. (2006, p. 151) determined that people facing high threat and low feelings of 
self-efficacy sought and found information, but did not retain it: 
[I]t is imperative to impart efficacy-building information. At a minimum, 
individuals’ anxieties should be addressed. In the absence of this provision, 
it is likely that further information delivered by the physician (after informing 
the patient that his or her risk is high) may not be processed or 
remembered, patients’ desires to obtain information notwithstanding. This 
situation can potentially lead to adverse consequences because it is quite 
likely that important risk-reducing information, one that usually follows a 
high-risk diagnosis, will be lost on patients. 
In the situation reported by Turner et al., lack of "efficacy-building information" led 
to low feelings of self-efficacy, which led to selective memory and CNI. 
 Pre-existing affective states emerged as an influence on CNI in a study by 
Keller et al. (2003, p. 60). People in a negative mood did not respond to 
"negative" information that emphasized health threats, while people in a positive 
mood did not respond to "positive" information that emphasized health 
improvements: 
[P]articipants who were in a positive affective state were more persuaded 
by the loss-framed than the gain-framed message, whereas participants 
who were in a negative affective state were more persuaded by the gain-
framed than the loss-framed message. 
Pre-existing affective states influenced CNI in the presence of threat to life, 
health, or ego, but Agrawal et al. later found this influence to depend somewhat 
on who was threatened, as explained in the next paragraph. 
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 The proximity of the threat to a person, that is, who is threatened, 
emerged as a modifying influence on CNI in a study by Agrawal et al. (2007): 
[W]hen people are in happy emotional states, self-referent health appeals 
are more effective than family-referent appeals, whereas the converse 
occurs when people are in peaceful emotional states. When people are in 
negative emotional states--when they are sad (versus agitated)--compatible 
self-referent health appeals are less effective than family-referent appeals. 
In other words, calm, happy people paid less attention to information that might 
affect the health of their families than to information that might affect their own 
health, while sad or agitated people paid less attention to information that might 
affect their own health and more attention to information that might affect the 
health of their families.  
 Wolfson (2006) analyzed the public outcry over Terri Schiavo's dying, an 
outcry in which many people ignored the published medical information about her 
death and responded instead to a perceived threat to her life. For example, all 
medical records in the case stated "consistently and without reservation that 
[Terri] was in a persistent vegetative state and that there was no hope of 
recovery" (p. 116). Further, all conventional revival therapies and even 
experimental electrode implantation had had no effect during the 14 years that 
doctors declared Terri to be in a persistent vegetative state. Yet, the decision to 
end artificial life-support aroused international outcry: 
Some of it was media hype; some was political opportunism; and much was 
sincere and honest distress about the way Ms. Schiavo was dying, given 
the totality of circumstances. (p. 118) 
 
 172
I believe that the "sincere and honest distress" and its manipulation by the media 
and by the federal and Florida state governments compelled many observers to 
ignore information necessary for a just analysis of the case. Specifically, Wolfson 
reported that people identified the case with religious and political arguments 
surrounding abortion, with conflicting statements about artificial life support 
issued at that time by the Catholic Church, and with sensationalist accounts of 
termination of artificial life support: 
A constant theme was the ‘‘horror’’ of removing food and water. This horror 
bound together the vocal constituency that sought to keep Ms. Schiavo 
alive, and combined with the well-publicized willingness of her parents to 
care for her, baffled and even angered many. (p. 117) 
The amount of end-of-life legislation engendered by this case suggests that 
many people reacted with negative affect (horror) and used the case to influence 
legislation (e.g., State of Florida House Bill No. 35-E, which became Florida 
Public Law, Chapter 2003-418, and United States Senate Bill S. 686 CPS, which 
became Public Law 109-3). Wolfson reported that many of the people who 
encouraged this legislation reacted with horror to the details of the Schiavo case, 
specifically to the details about termination of nutrition and hydration.  
 I conclude that these people perceived a threat to their own lives if placed 
in a similar life-support situation, felt the utter lack of self-efficacy that the 
persistent vegetative state entails, and worked to change the law to provide yet 
more safeguards against premature termination of life support. Judging only from 
the Wolfson article, I conclude that affect and perceived lack of self-efficacy 
compelled many observers of the Schiavo case to use selective memory and 
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selective attention, resulting in CNI. Specifically, they did not consider information 
about similar life support terminations that occur every day in the U.S. "without 
fanfare" (p. 114). Neither did they appear to consider the fate of the $700,000 
trust fund created for Terri Schiavo's maintenance or the windfall to attorneys that 
resulted from the Schiavo litigation and subsequent legislation. To quote Wolfson 
again: 
Some people did not like or accept the facts. Some people did not like or 
accept the law. As a consequence, some states may elect to modify their 
end-of-life and guardianship laws. But these decisions must be made with 
exceptional care to avoid doing damage to millions of people who have 
already executed living wills and have expressly indicated their intentions 
not to be maintained, as Ms. Schiavo had been. (p. 119) 
Thus, affect compelled many people to not use information about Terri Schiavo's 
death (the persistent vegetative state; similar terminations that occur daily) and to 
focus instead on an imagined threat to her life. 
Examples of conditions modifying the effect on CNI of "threat to life, health, and 
ego"  
 Arsenault and Castells (2006, p. 289) presented an example in which 
perceptions of self efficacy, pre-existing affective state (fear), and proximity of the 
threat affected CNI. They postulated that a climate of fear facilitated acceptance 
of government misinformation (described more fully in Section 3 above) by the 
American public about the need for a war with Iraq: 
In Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism & Democracy, Barber (2003) maps out 
the role that fear played in promoting the Bush agenda. By framing 
American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the War on Terror, 
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Bush and his collaborators created a general climate of fear in which 
political dissent was considered subversive. (pp. 288-289) 
If Arsenault and Castells are correct, fear of being harmed by terrorists and fear 
of being labeled subversive contributed to nonuse of information that conflicted 
with the information promulgated by the Bush administration. I conclude that 
other conditions also led to CNI, such as perceptions of self-efficacy: 
Terror threats and more vague warnings of impending danger had no effect. 
… only the Iraq War has significantly correlated with longer term increases 
in presidential approval ratings. As the following section will illustrate, this 
climate of fear was also crucial in amplifying political trust, which also 
played a crucial role in the widespread acceptance of misinformation about 
the Iraq War. (p. 298) 
In other words, people felt ineffective about fighting terrorism before 9/11, and 
they ignored information portending terrorist attacks. After 9/11, they still felt 
ineffective, but the perceived threat had become greater. According to Sprinkle et 
al. (2006, p. 95) and M. M. Turner et al. (2006, p. 151), both quoted above, high 
perceived threat and low perceived efficacy lead to "fear control processes." I 
conclude that CNI was one such process: by supporting the invasion of Iraq, 
people felt that they had some efficacy. I conclude that these people would have 
felt less efficacy had they not accepted the information promulgated by the Bush 
administration and accepted conflicting information.  
 Ray described a mechanism for the interaction of perceived threat and 
perceived self-efficacy, in effect describing the point at which CNI appears: 
[T]here is a critical point when perceived threat is greater than perceived 
[self-]efficacy. At this point we stop thinking we can avert the threat and 
begin to control our fear rather than the danger, and reject the [threatening] 
message. (2003, p. 187) 
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 Pinquart (2002, p. 319) presented another example in which perceptions 
of self efficacy, pre-existing affective state (fear), and proximity of the threat 
affected CNI. Pinquart determined that older adults rejected negative old-age-
stereotyped information for a number of reasons: 
First, they may reject negative age-stereotyped information [characterizing 
the elderly as, for example, incompetent, fragile, senile, inarticulate, 
depressed, lonely, and neglected (p. 318)] as inapplicable to older adults in 
general, or as inapplicable to themselves, for example, because they do not 
perceive the source of information as trustworthy, or they do not perceive 
themselves as old, or because they restrict the applicability of the negative 
information to a subgroup of older adults they do not belong to (e.g., the 
oldold, or nursing-home residents). Second, older adults may shift their 
reference point of self-evaluation, by comparing oneself against the 
stereotyped negative view of old age in general instead of integrating the 
stereotyped information into their self-perceptions. Downward social 
comparisons (comparisons with other older adults in worse circumstances) 
have been characterized as an important mechanism of psychological 
adaptation of older adults …: People selectively choose less fortunate 
social referents or actively derogate them so that their own standing is 
enhanced. 
Mechanisms underlying Pinquart's reasons that older adults reject negative old-
age-stereotyped information include protection of ego and self-image, fear of 
death-reminders, and perceived lack of self-efficacy in controlling the aging 
process. All of the reasons appear to compel nonuse of information. 
Summary of Section 5.3, affect 
 This section described examples of CNI caused by affect: threat to life, 
threat to health, threat to ego, attribution theory, and fear of the unknown. The 
following section describes CNI caused by priming. Affect may appear in the 
examples of priming, and some examples from the study corpus may appear in 
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both sections, affect and priming. Priming consists of a category separate from 
affect, however, because priming does not require affect to compel nonuse of 
information, and affect does not require priming to compel nonuse of information. 
5.4 Priming  
 Priming describes a method of apportioning attention, in which the 
presentation of a stimulus alters the detection or identification of a subsequent 
stimulus (after Winn, 2001, p. 1253). As with other forms of selection, priming 
compels nonuse of any contradictory information. Priming superficially resembles 
habituation (described in Section 1.2 of Chapter 4), in that both phenomena 
create a predisposition for some information at the expense of other information. 
Habituation, however, relies on a physiological rejection of stimulus, while 
priming relies on a cognitive bias for accepting stimulus. Priming resembles the 
taxonomy elements described above in Section 2 (prejudice) and Section 3 
(authoritarian control). The elements of Sections 2 and 3, however, represent 
somatic barriers pushing against information, while priming results from a 
cognitive barrier representing lack of pull (cf. Table 4.1). Some elements of 
priming also resemble "least conflict" (described further in Section 6.2), but an 
important distinction differentiates priming from "least conflict." in cases of 
priming, a person rejects information based on the nature or source of the 
information. In cases of "least conflict," however, a person rejects information 
based on its ability to contradict previously acquired information. For example, 
consider the curious sentence: "Time flies like an arrow, but fruit flies like a 
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banana." From the first clause, most people will think of "flies" as verb. The first 
clause will prime them not to use "flies" as a noun in the second clause. With 
most people, the priming of this example will be of very short duration. That is, 
the stimulus created by the verb "flies" in the first clause will be replaced very 
quickly the stimulus created by the noun "flies" in the second clause. In any 
priming situation, however, in which a person must respond to the stimulus 
before the priming effect disappears, the person will respond to the previously 
primed (wrong) information. In other words, priming will compel nonuse of the 
correct information. For example, I was driving in Mexico once, and my guide 
kept saying "derecho, derecho" (keep going straight). At one point, she said with 
little warning "derecha" (turn to the right). Being primed to expect derecho, I did 
not recognize derecha until the turn had passed. The priming compelled me to 
not use the correct information until it was too late. The following examples 
discuss four facets of priming, outlined in Figure 4.9 and explained below. 
 
 5 Attention shortfall 
 5.4 Priming 
  a Lexical priming 
  b Priming with respect to the source of the information 
  c Potential sources of priming 
  d Priming via naïve conceptions 
 




 Hoey (2005) formulated a new theory in language processing, which he 
called "lexical priming." In brief, the theory states that people choose a word 
because they have encountered the word before under similar circumstances 
more than they have encountered other words under those circumstances. That 
is, a person's experience of a word determines the choice of the word. According 
to the theory of semantic priming, the proximity in the example given above of 
"flies" as a verb to "flies" as a noun primes an incorrect interpretation of "flies" as 
a verb, rather than a noun, in the second clause. According to the theory of 
lexical priming, however, the familiarity of the phrase "time flies like an arrow" 
primes the incorrect interpretation of "flies" in the second clause. For the 
purposes of this study, lexical priming and semantic priming have similar effects, 
and this study uses the phrase "lexical priming" to refer to priming based on 
linguistic phenomena. 
 Gernsbacher and others (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher, 
1993; Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995) determined that the speed of the 
rejection of the incorrect meanings of words increased as a reader gained skill in 
reading. That is, skilled readers, more often than unskilled readers, chose the 
correct meaning of words. Paulson found somewhat different results under 
somewhat different conditions: both skillful and non-skillful readers read only 60 
to 70% of words and interpreted passages based on the words they read: 
"Expectations, predictions, and hypotheses are crucial to perceptions, both of the 
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world in general and of text." (Paulson, 2002, p. 62) The predisposition that leads 
skillful and non-skillful readers, this selective attention to 60 to 70% of words, 
compels nonuse of the information from the unread 30 to 40%. 
 Regardless of reading experience, CNI via priming can occur through the 
use of euphemisms. For example, Tsang (2002, p. 40), citing Arendt (1963), 
suggested that the Nazis used euphemisms such as "final solution … not to keep 
people ignorant of the massacres but to 'prevent them from equating [the 
massacres] with their old, "normal" knowledge of murder and lies' (p. 86)." As 
described in Section 2 above, in the example of Nazis referring to death camps 
as "charitable foundations for institutional care,” threshold knowledge shortfall 
(Section 4) will exacerbate the CNI that results from priming (Section 5.4). All of 
these examples (Gernsbacher et al., Paulson, and Tsang) of experience affecting 
word choice and word choice affecting experience indicate to me the applicability 
of Hoey's theory of lexical priming. The next section discusses priming based on 
a very different mechanism, source priming. 
Source priming 
 Chute & Wiener (1996) described priming with respect to the source of the 
information. They found that many commercial airline pilots expected flight 
attendants to know nothing about flight operations. The pilots tended to ignore 
trouble reports from people that the pilots expected to know nothing, so they 
ignored reports from the flight attendants. The pilots rejected the trouble reports 
based on the source, rather than on the reports themselves. This element of the 
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taxonomy resembles the socio-environmental barrier of prejudice based on lack 
of cultural capital, described in Section 2 above. Prejudice, however, reflects the 
somatic barrier of lack of capital pushing against information, while source 
priming reflects a cognitive barrier caused by lack of pull (cf. Table 4.1). Whether 
elements of prejudice or elements of source priming predominate in a given 
situation, both contribute to CNI. The following section continues the discussion 
of these two sources of CNI, prejudice and priming. 
Potential sources of priming 
 Judging from the co-occurrence of prejudice and priming examples in the 
study corpus, prejudice and priming frequently work together to compel nonuse 
of information based on the source of the information, with prejudice reflecting a 
push and priming reflecting a lack of pull (cf. Table 4.1). One reason for the co-
occurrence of prejudice and priming could be that prejudice can lead to the form 
of priming known as source priming, in which a person is compelled not to use 
information because of a prejudice about the source of the information. As with 
authoritarian control (Section 3), priming can result from both inadvertent and 
intentional installation of prejudice. For example, the instillation of prejudice in 
children by their families could be an example of inadvertent priming if the 
models from whom the children learned were unaware of the prejudice and 
priming. Bergen (2001) described instillation of prejudice:  
Models have their most powerful influence on children below the ages of 7 
or 8. Early in their preschool years children can define their race and other 
physical, mental or ethnic categories. Preschool children show bias in favor 
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of their own sex, favor classmates over unfamiliar children, choose more 
negative adjectives to describe others and often show bias toward other 
ethnic groups. The child can become prejudiced by adopting the biases and 
attitudes of the family and by living in an environment that fosters prejudice. 
(p. 154) 
Bergen linked this instillation of prejudice to fear of the new or unknown: "If 
confronted with a new way of looking at things, they stick to the old, tried way as 
if only the past can provide safe anchorage." (p. 161) Section 5.3.4 (above) 
described fear of the unknown. "Source" priming differs from "fear of the 
unknown" because source priming bases the nonuse of information on a known 
phenomenon (the source of the information) while "fear of the unknown" rejects 
information because the information is new. 
 The mass media can be a source of intentional source priming via 
authoritarian control. Intentional source priming pervades societies with mass 
media to the extent that the practice of this priming has its own jargon. Such 
media use of priming is known as "framing": "selecting and highlighting some 
facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to 
promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution." (Entman, 2004, p. 
5; quoted by Mickiewicz, 2005, p. 357). As with prejudice, the use or nonuse of 
information occurs because of the source, rather than because of the 
information. With lexical priming and source priming, a third source of priming is 
priming via naïve conceptions, discussed next. 
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Priming via naïve conceptions  
 "It is what we think we know already that prevents us from learning" 
(widely attributed to Claude Bernard [1813-1878]). This study adopted the term 
"naïve conceptions" from the article by Reiner et al. (2000, p. 1), in which naïve 
conceptions referred to "an underlying commitment to existing knowledge," 
where the existing knowledge was based on misconceptions. Olson (1995, p. 46) 
explained priming via naïve conceptions in terms of levels of abstraction:  
[W]hen evidence meeting one's knowledge criteria discredits a highly 
valued knowledge claim, one may use dissociation to revise one's 
knowledge criteria … rather than reject the knowledge claim. … such a 
practice … protects the knowledge claim by moving to a higher level of 
abstraction than the level of the evidence. It resolves an incompatibility in a 
way that not only renders irrelevant the immediate complication, but also 
immunizes the thought system from similar future incompatibilities. 
Dore (1994, p. 99) described two mechanisms of naïve conceptions that were 
similar to Olson's "rendering irrelevant" and "immunizing." Dore used these 
mechanisms to explain why women's prior educational experiences prevented 
them from learning (Dore did not discuss men's prior educational experiences).1 
The first mechanism was based on the information presented in a learning 
situation, and the second mechanism was based on underlying thought 
structures. In the first, women met challenges to belief systems by rejecting the 
information (the "threatening material"): 
According to Dunn, women may be particularly vulnerable to this learning 
barrier because of … the ethical barrier, which is aroused when students' 
values or belief systems are challenged in the classroom. The hierarchical 
authority structure in the traditional classroom gives students little 
                                                 
1 Dore presented three mechanisms, and Section 5.3 (threat to ego) discussed the first. 
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opportunity to openly explore or respond to challenges to their personal 
beliefs or ethical understandings. As a result, students are likely to close 
themselves off and reject threatening material. (Dunn, 1987; cited in Dore, 
1994, p. 99) 
In the second mechanism by which a woman's prior educational experiences 
prevented her from learning, pre-existing thought structures invoked cognitive 
dissonance instead of acceptance of the new information.  
[T]he critical/logical barrier is raised when new learning does not fit into the 
existing thought structure, resulting in cognitive dissonance for the student. 
The hierarchical nature of the traditional classroom does not encourage the 
kind of student/teacher dialogue that would enable students to resolve the 
dissonance causing this barrier to learning. (Dunn, 1987; cited in Dore, 
1994, p. 99) 
Dore's second mechanism of preventing learning resembles Olson's 
"dissociation," "moving to a higher level of abstraction," and "immunization." 
Dore's second mechanism also resembles least conflict via cognitive dissonance, 
described further in Section 6.2. "Priming via naïve conceptions" differs from 
"least conflict via cognitive dissonance" because naïve conceptions prevent the 
acceptance of new information without comparison of the naïve conceptions with 
the new information, while "least conflict" involves some comparison and 
acceptance of the information that causes the least conflict. 
 This differentiation between naïve conceptions and least conflict finds 
substantiation in the discussion of prejudice in the study corpus in the sense of 
prejudice resulting from naïve conceptions. In the following example, 
"miseducation" and "faulty definition" led to naïve conceptions, which led to 
racism. Brandon (2006, p. 197) quoted Joyce E. King in calling "dysconscious 
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racism" "an impaired way of thinking that is a result of one’s miseducation." King 
defined racism as injustice (p. 207). Allport described the pervasiveness of 
prejudice, a pervasiveness that mirrors the fundamental nature of naïve 
conceptions. According to Allport, prejudice: 
[I]s often lock stitched into the very fabric of personality. In such cases it 
cannot be extracted. To change it, the whole pattern of life would have to be 
altered." (Allport, 1958; quoted in Bergen Jr., 2001, p. 161) 
I interpret this statement by Allport to mean that naïve conceptions become so 
closely enmeshed with personality (consistent patterns of behavior) that to 
change the conceptions would change personality. The naïve conceptions lead 
to prejudice, which leads to CNI. 
 The following examples use language that presents CNI as a function of 
naïve conceptions, as Reiner et al. (2000, p. 1) defined naïve conceptions: "an 
underlying commitment to existing knowledge." However, the examples also 
contain overtones of affect, specifically, fear of death and fear of death 
reminders. Morgan and J. K. Miller (2002, p. 166) described the "myths and 
misconceptions" that prevent organ donation in the U.S.: 
• fear of not really being dead 
• fear of feeling pain after death 
• desire to avoid body mutilation 
• distrust of the medical system 
• desire to preserve family harmony 
• respect of limits set by God or nature 
• lack of basic knowledge about organ donation 
• lack of knowledge about brain-death 
• lack of knowledge about Western religion's support of donation 
• lack of knowledge about medical ethics. 
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According to Morgan and Miller, "85% of Americans are already aware of the 
need for organ donors; moreover, the majority feel positively toward donation" (p. 
164). Miller's myths, however, consist of naïve conceptions (as Reiner et al. 
define naïve conceptions) that compel a nonuse of information about organ 
donation. Thus, even though 85% of Americans feel positively toward donation, 
only about 19% of eligible donors have signed donor cards (p. 164). Specifically, 
naïve conceptions prevent the use of information such as statements that the 
medical community does not remove organs until a donor is "really" dead, or that 
virtually all Western religions approve of organ donation (p. 166). Similarly, 
Wolfson (2006) presented causes of the mass hysteria surrounding Terri 
Schiavo's death (described in Section 5.3 above), in which many people clung to 
naïve conceptions about dying and did not use the medical information about her 
death. "Michael Schiavo … had been told consistently and without reservation 
that his wife was in a persistent vegetative state and that there was no hope of 
recovery" (p. 116). Giacalone et al. (2007, p. 369) found that " Elderly patients … 
[had] grown up in an era when cancer was regarded as the ‘unsaid illness’ or ‘the 
incurable disease’." In other words, these naïve conceptions were among the 
elements of the taxonomy (such as affect) that compelled elderly patients not to 
seek or use information. 
 Birch (1990, p. 518) reported another example of naïve conceptions 
compelling nonuse of health-related information: 
Adults like foods that are high in fat, sodium, and refined carbohydrates and 
may also dislike foods that are considered healthy. The limited evidence 
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suggests that these patterns of food acceptance … are primarily learned: 
induced by culture and acquired through experience. Changing diets in 
ways consistent with the dietary guidelines is difficult because these 
changes are counter to existing patterns of food acceptance that have 
taken a lifetime to develop. 
In other words, according to Birch, naïve conceptions (learned patterns of food 
acceptance) were among the elements of the taxonomy (such as affect) that 
compelled elderly patients not to seek or use information (dietary guidelines). 
This example also may include elements of information filtering via cost-benefit, 
an element discussed in Section 6.1. 
Summary of Section 5: Attention shortfall 
 Section 5 presented attention shortfall; that is, the lack or loss of attention 
to a phenomenon. The section discussed engrossment, distraction, affect, and 
priming as the four primary causes of attention shortfall. Section 6 presents 
information filtering, the last of the cognitive barriers compelling nonuse of 
information. 
6. Information filtering 
 Information filtering (the acceptance of some information and the rejection 
of other information) is a cognitive barrier to information use, rather than a 
somatic barrier. As a cognitive barrier, it joins threshold knowledge shortfall 
(Section 4) and attention shortfall (Section 5) on the "lack of pull" side of the 
taxonomy. If the nonuser of information becomes aware of the information 
filtering and continues in the nonuse of information, the nonuse then becomes 
 
 187
volitional (VNI), which is beyond the scope of this study. As with other examples 
of selection, information filtering implies the use of some information and the 
nonuse of other information. Homeostasis could be an example of information 
filtering, but the preponderance of somatic examples of homeostasis qualifies 
homeostasis as an example of intrinsic somatic conditions, described in Section 
1 above. Information filtering takes several forms, but the forms cluster into two 
categories outlined in Figure 4.10 and described below. 
 
 6 Information filtering, caused by: 
  6.1 Least effort 
  6.2 Least conflict 
 
Figure 4.10: Information filtering that leads to CNI. 
These two categories frequently overlap, because conflict requires effort and 
reduced conflict requires reduced effort. For example, Baker, discussing 
defensiveness in communication (1980, pp. 34-35), cites Engel et al. (1968, p. 
205):  
[O]ur basic beliefs, values, and attitudes become so entwined with our total 
mental system that a change in one area has a complex carry-over effect 
on countless other related areas. Thus, changing beliefs and attitudes 
which are most strongly held requires major restructuring of the mind…. 
Stated simply, we would often rather be wrong than change our minds. 
Baker then cites Carl R. Rogers (1961, pp. 18 and 333): "we all fear change…. 
This risk of being changed is one of the most frightening prospects most of us 
can face." Does Rogers's example resemble least effort? Or of least conflict? Or 
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of affect leading to least effort leading to least conflict? Other examples of this 
overlap appear in the following two sections. 
6.1 Least effort  
 This least effort category derives its name from the work of George 
Kingsley Zipf (1949), Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An 
Introduction to Human Ecology. Although many researchers and scholars have 
questioned the application or precision of Zipf's Principle of Least Effort (e.g., 
Newman, 1956; Rapaport, 1957; Wyllys, 1975, 1981), the phrase "least effort" 
provides a succinct way of expressing the attribute that I see to be present in 
each of the four conditions leading to CNI described in this section. In other 
words, when a person responds to stimulus with an information behavior, each of 
the four elements this category of "least effort" represents an information 
behavior involving the least effort that the person can use. For example, intuitive 
(pre-cognitive) avoidance of overload (element 6.1.a) requires less effort than 
facing overload. Resignation (element 6.1.b) requires less effort than not being 
resigned. Avoidance of information where perceived cost exceeds perceived 
benefit (element 6.1.c) requires less effort than using information where 
perceived cost exceeds perceived benefit. Avoidance of activity involving "the life 
of the mind" (element 6.1.d) involves less cognitive effort than engaging in 
activity involving "the life of the mind." This section explains the effect of each of 
these four elements on CNI. Specifically, these elements comprise information 
filtering, similar to the concept of selection mentioned before. The information 
 
 189
allowed through the filter implies the nonuse of information filtered out, 
particularly so when the information filtered out contradicts the information 
allowed through the filter. "Least effort" occurs in the four elements outlined in 
Figure 4.11 and described below. 
 
 6 Information filtering 
 6.1 Least effort 
  a Avoidance of cognitive overload 
  b Resignation 
  c Avoidance of information where perceived cost exceeds 
perceived benefit 
  d Avoidance of activity involving "the life of the mind" 
 
Figure 4.11: Four facets of information filtering caused by least effort. 
Avoidance of cognitive overload 
 C. E. Wilson (1976, p. 63) reviewed the literature discussing information 
overload and concluded: "In sum, information overload is not a clear concept, 
and probably does not need to be; it is a phantom." Others, however, have 
determined that it exists (Flood, 1975, p. 45) and can be quantified in some 
contexts (G. A. Miller, 1956, p. 81).  
 Examples of avoidance of information overload appeared in several of the 
articles in the study corpus and in other corpora. McKnight (2006, p. 149) related 
the stories of critical care nurses who sometimes did not use information 




One person wholly concentrating on using one complex system was one 
thing; many people dealing with several complex systems at once was quite 
another. Something might be different in one information system from what 
was in another. 
In other words, when a nurse worked in an environment where many nurses 
used one complex system or where that nurse simultaneously used several 
complex systems, the information overloaded or threatened to overload the 
nurse's cognitive abilities. In the case of the nurses, CNI could have resulted 
from the distraction of attending to multiple systems competing for attention 
(Section 5.2 above), but I postulate that prolonged or multiple distractions 
constitute cognitive overload.  
 Sir Walter Scott (1816/n.d., p. 94) provided another example of overload 
familiar to many scholars, an inability to locate information through an 
"embarrassment of riches": 
So saying, the Antiquary opened a drawer and began rummaging among a 
quantity of miscellaneous papers, ancient and modern. But it was the 
misfortune of this learned gentleman, as it may be that of many learned and 
unlearned, that he frequently experienced on such occasions what 
harlequin calls l'embarras des richesses; in other words, the abundance of 
his collection often prevented him from finding the article he sought for. 
The Antiquary relied on memory, rather than on finding aids, and the quantity of 
his collection overloaded (exceeded the limits of) his memory. Ikpeza and Boyd 
(2007, p. 645) attributed the difficulty experienced by novice Internet users in 
learning from the World Wide Web in part to information overload: 
Navigational disorientation arises from information overload, where learners 
may be overwhelmed by the vast amount of information on the Web and 
lose track of their search subject or simply become fatigued. Also, the 
nonlinear hypertext environment of the Internet means that information is 
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sometimes unorganized. This places significant cognitive demands on 
learners to make appropriate connections between concepts …. It is 
unlikely that many students who use the Internet possess adequate skills 
and strategies to efficiently and effectively negotiate the realms of available 
information to learn new content knowledge. 
Critical care nurses, experienced scholars such as the Antiquary, and Internet 
novices all experienced or sought to avoid cognitive overload, and cognitive 
overload contributed to their CNI. 
 Aldoory and van Dyke (2006, p. 346) conducted an experiment to 
determine the reactions to a simulated terrorist attack on the food supply. They 
found that "news coverage increased feelings of 'information overload,' which led 
participants to shut down cognitively and deny the need for protective action": 
Cognitively, though, some interesting findings emerged that related to what 
may be termed "information overload," Participants described what 
appeared to be a limited capacity for processing information—when that 
capacity was reached or exceeded some participants shut down information 
seeking. (p. 356) 
Overload and fear of overload are two of several elements that can result in CNI 
through a related element of the taxonomy, resignation. 
Resignation 
 Resignation describes a condition involving indiscriminate nonuse of 
information. If we placed the elements of CNI on an active-passive continuum, 
resignation would occupy the most passive end of that continuum. Resignation 
appears to intensify other conditions leading to CNI, as mentioned in Section 5.3 
(Affect) and Section 6.2 (Least Conflict). Resignation can result from a wish to 
withdraw from an external control, a wish to avoid people or situations, or even a 
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wish to withdraw from life. Precipitating events include an excess of information 
impinging on a person, as mentioned above, or from a person's decreased ability 
to use information. For example, Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005, p. 140) identified 
a condition that they called "hopelessness" and suggested that hopelessness 
decreased a person's ability to try to use information about staying healthy: 
Hopelessness conveys that the person feels that there is no solution to the 
threat (e.g., “In this day and age, it sometimes seems a hopeless task to 
stay healthy.”). 
In this example, hopelessness and apparent lack of a solution led to resignation, 
a failure to see information, and CNI. Brunel and Pichon (2004, p. 366) described 
five such withdrawal strategies that they termed "avoidance strategies." These 
strategies involved a resignation from the use of information about the health 
effects of various foods. In this example, the ultimate truth of the food information 
does not matter, because this study described information that people perceived 
to be true at the time of nonuse. Brunel and Pichon's five strategies include: 
behavioral disconnection (It's bad for me, but I eat it anyway.), denial (It's not as 
bad as they say.), fatalism (We're doomed anyway.), cognitive repression (I don't 
think about it.), and magic thought (My body can handle it.). All these forms of 
resignation lead to CNI.  
 Another manifestation of resignation appeared in Goldsmith (1999, p. 
304). Goldsmith used the term "negative face" to describe "the claim to respect 
for autonomy and rights to non-imposition" by a person who desires to maintain a 
distance or disengagement from others in social settings. Westerners not familiar 
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with the Eastern concept of face might recognize a somewhat corresponding 
term from Western popular culture, "profile." Where face and profile refer to a 
person's standing or appearance in the public eye, negative face and "low profile" 
refer to a person's not being prominent or visible to the public eye. Goldsmith 
specifically described situations in which one person gave advice to another 
person and threatened that other person's negative face: 
[T]he defining features of directives (including advice, asking favors, 
enforcing obligations) involve predicating a future act and indicating the 
speaker thinks the hearer ought to do it—an intrinsic threat to negative face. 
(p. 306) 
In other words, Goldsmith postulated that these situations (giving advice, asking 
favors, enforcing obligations) threatened the information recipient's wish to be let 
alone. One way that the recipient can maintain negative face is resignation--
withdrawal from perceived external control or from people or situations. 
Resignation involves indiscriminate nonuse of information. The next section 
describes information behavior that is less indiscriminate, but still intuitive and 
pre-cognitive. 
Avoidance of information where perceived cost exceeds perceived benefit 
 Cho and Cheon (2004, p. 90) studied the effect of advertisements on 
Internet searching: 
[C]onsumers might feel that the navigation process to locate desired 
content is difficult on the Internet because Internet ads disrupt or intrude on 
their overall search for desired information, which may result in a retreat 
from the source of interference (i.e., ad avoidance). We therefore 
hypothesize that perceived goal impediment, indicated by consumer search 
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hindrance, disruption, and distraction, may evoke ad avoidance on the 
Internet. 
In this example, users measured the cost of using information from the Internet in 
terms of time and effort spent navigating through ads. When the perceived cost 
of finding information on the Internet exceeded the perceived benefit of the 
information, the search stopped, and the users did not find or use the 
information.  
 Freyd (2006, p. 518) added social to cognitive and emotional motivations 
for not using information, defining "social" as: 
[A]ll the reasons individuals repress as a consequence of social pressures 
to not know and to doubt memories, and in response to an implicit need to 
isolate information from awareness in order to maintain a whole host of 
social (intimate, communal, political) relationships. 
In other words, the maintenance of social relationships outweighed the benefit of 
the information. Examples of the information not used included memory of 
"childhood abuse perpetrated by a caregiver" (p. 518), "not knowing about the 
[obvious] adultery" (p. 519), "people systematically remain[ing] unaware of 
observable betrayals by their own government" (p. 519), and knowledge of 
"betrayal (particularly by commanding officers) as a key factor in soldiers’ harm 
from war" (p. 519).  
 Kreling et al. (2006, p. 1096) presented a medical example, in which a 
librarian, trained to "wade through" information, felt that reading general 
information about breast cancer was not worth the effort, unless the material 
pertained to her specific condition: 
 
 195
I couldn’t read it until I knew what I was looking for. I found it extremely 
stressful to wade through this information and, being a librarian, I am 
trained to wade through information. I’m usually very curious about 
everything, but not this time. I didn’t want to know anything except what 
applied to my case.  
In the librarian's case, her doctor had provided information that the librarian 
considered irrelevant and not worth sorting through. Brooks et al. (2003, p. 911) 
suggested a mechanism to explain "cost-benefit": 
Because people have finite cognitive resources, they typically do not 
retrieve all available information about an object when making their 
decision. To conserve their cognitive resources, people attempt to retrieve 
only the information necessary to make their decisions. 
These examples of information filtering by least effort (negotiating Internet ads, 
maintaining social relationships, and "wading through" medical information) all 
compelled nonuse of information for which perceived cost exceeded perceived 
benefit. The next section involves no cost-benefit balancing. The examples of the 
next section appear to weigh only cost and to minimize it. 
Avoidance of activity involving "the life of the mind" 
 Others had used "anti-intellectualism" previously (e.g., Spargo, 1911; 
Fairchild, 1931; Humphrey, 1951; Jeffrey, 1951), but Hofstadter's Anti-
Intellectualism in American Life (1963) popularized the concept of anti-
intellectualism as an attack on the life of the mind by forces that he identified as 
science, business, religion, utilitarianism, egalitarianism, practicality, and 
vocationalism. His book won the 1964 Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction and might 
have had more of an impact on American anti-intellectualism, but the Kennedy 
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assassination eclipsed it (and most other news) in the popular media and, 
therefore, in the popular mind. 
 The Kennedy assassination prompted congressional investigations of 
television-inspired violence, but popular culture continued to center around media 
violence. This study defines media violence as depictions of acts of violence 
such as murder, assault, and rape that appear on television, in movies, and in 
video games. Media violence occurs in presentations that are fictional, fiction 
based on fact, "reality TV," documentaries, and news broadcasts: 
By the time the average American child graduates from elementary school, 
he or she will have seen more than 8,000 murders and more than 100,000 
other assorted acts of violence (e.g., assaults, rapes) on network television. 
(Bushman & Anderson, 2001, p. 478) 
 Media violence in America proved so seductive that it created in America 
a culture in which the media provide continually more violent entertainment via a 
mechanism remarkably similar to addiction. In other words, media violence 
satisfies an artificial need that it has created--and then increases that need: 
[T]he first exposure to violent media can make a person (especially 
children) anxious and fearful …. Repeated exposure reduces these effects 
and leaves the viewer wanting stronger doses of violence. (Bushman & 
Anderson, 2001, p. 481, emphasis added) 
Gathercoal (1999, p. 16) explained the biological mechanism underlying this 
addiction to violence in terms of a homeostatic desensitization to endorphin 
production and uptake: 
In essence, individuals can move their homeostatic need for endorphins 
further along the "normal" continuum. The resulting physical condition is 




Johnston (1993) described the measurement of this addiction in the terms used 
by the television industry: "jolts per minute." He defined a jolt as "the moment of 
excitement generated by a laugh, a violent act, a car chase, [or] a quick film cut" 
and noted that "regular jolts of empty stimulation are the easiest and cheapest 
means of keeping viewers glued to the screen." 
 But does media violence compel nonuse of information? I conclude that it 
does, similarly to the neuro-chemical mandates described in Section 1.2 (e.g., 
psychotropic drugs and alcohol) and the intrinsic somatic conditions of Section 
1.4 (e.g., false memories or Narcissistic Personality Disorder). Media violence, 
neuro-chemical mandates, and psychotic delusions compel a person to inhabit a 
fabricated world. For example, in the world of network television drama, 
approximately 2% of the characters are murdered every night, a percentage far 
higher than the percentage of people murdered in American society (Medved, 
quoted in Bushman & Anderson, 2001, p. 479). Alcohol and drugs create a world 
of artificial emotions and perceptions, which is why driving under the influence (of 
alcohol or drugs) is a crime in most states. A number of the pathologies listed in 
the DSM-IV compel a person to live in a world of delusions. In these fabricated 
worlds, the life of the body dominates the life of the mind. Addiction to violence, 
alcohol, or drugs creates a neurochemical mandate strong enough to preclude 
awareness of the ramifications of the condition. I postulate that living in a 
fabricated world, whether created by media violence, drugs, or 
psychopathologies, acts like other examples of selection, in that acceptance of 
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information from a fabricated world compels the nonuse of some information from 
the world beyond the media, drugs, and mental illness. 
 In addition to addictive mechanisms that compel avoidance of the life of 
the mind, social and physiological reasons for television viewing appeared in the 
literature reviewed for this study. Gathercoal (1999, p. 18) explained the 
addiction to television in terms of repeated stimulation of the limbic system. He 
also presented psychosocial mechanisms such as symbolic modeling based on 
endorphic responses (p. 17). McLuhan and Q. Fiore postulated that the near-
hypnotic draw of the medium (television) was its own message, and little more 
than a massage, as in their book's title, The Medium is the Massage (1967).  
 Hofstadter's discussion of anti-intellectualism, media violence, and the 
near-hypnotic draw of any television provided examples from the study corpus of 
"avoidance of activity involving the life of the mind." Ascribing these phenomena 
solely to "least effort" would be overly simplistic, but least effort appears to 
compel nonuse of information. 
Summary of Section 6.1, Least effort 
 These four phenomena (avoidance of cognitive overload, resignation, the 
perception that cost exceeds benefit, and avoidance of activity involving the life 
of the mind) constitute information filtering by least effort. As noted in the 
introduction to Section 6, "least effort" overlaps with the next section, "least 
conflict," because reduced conflict requires reduced effort. Least effort, however, 
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does not always overlap with least conflict, which justifies the treatment of least 
conflict as a separate element of the taxonomy. 
6.2 Least conflict 
 Least conflict denotes conditions leading to CNI that lessen conflict 
between schemata. In this study, a schema is a mental set, a conception based 
on prior experience, that helps a person to process information (Bartlett, 1932; as 
cited in Winn, 2001, p. 1478). Specifically, "least conflict" compels a person not 
to use information from a schema of the world that might conflict with the 
person's own schema.  
 "Least conflict" superficially resembles other elements of the taxonomy. As 
mentioned in Section 6.1 ("least effort") above, "least conflict" allows a person to 
live in the surrounding environment with a minimum of conflict with that 
environment, and this minimum of conflict requires less effort than living in 
conflict. The elements of the taxonomy described as least conflict, however, 
invoke other concepts that differentiate least conflict from least effort. For 
example, deference to a cognitive authority resembles least effort, because 
questioning a cognitive authority requires more effort than not questioning a 
cognitive authority. Deference to a cognitive authority, however, involves more 
than least effort: it includes the concept of cognitive authority. The added concept 
of cognitive authority qualifies deference to a cognitive authority as an element of 
least conflict, rather than least effort, because I feel that the added specificity of 
the source of conflict deserves to be recognized. Ego threat represents another 
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example of an element that resembles least conflict. For example, Shermer 
(2004, p. 46) determined that people thought of themselves as more moral, 
righteous, and friendly than others: 
Stanford University students … predictably rated themselves higher. Even 
when the subjects were warned about the "better than average" bias and 
asked to reconsider their original assessments, 63 percent claimed that 
their initial evaluations were objective, and 13 percent even claimed to be 
too modest. 
"Affect--threat to ego" could qualify as the CNI mechanism at work in Shermer's 
experiment. A decrease, however, in the students' self-perceptions of being 
"better than average" to a self-perception of their being "average" does not (in my 
opinion) threaten ego as much as it presents conflicting schemata. On that basis, 
Shermer's example qualifies as a "least conflict" element of the taxonomy rather 
than a "threat to ego" element. Substantiating my opinion, Eisenstadt et al. 
(2002, p. 289), citing Greenwald (1980): 
[D]escribed the self as inherently cognitively conservative, capable of 
interpreting and willing to interpret self-relevant information and to 
"remember" personal history in a manner consistent with (and usually 
flattering of) an ongoing and stable self-concept. The stability of the self-
concept is highly functional, allowing people to preserve a continuous self-
identity which makes their world more predictable and themselves more 
predictable to the world. 
According to Eisenstadt et al.'s article, preservation of ego against threat creates 
predictability. The predictability then serves as a basis for filtering information for 
"least conflict." Both "fear of ego threat" and information filtering by "least conflict" 
compel nonuse of information in Eisenstadt et al.'s article, but I use the article as 
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an example of "least conflict" because least conflict appears to me to be the 
condition that leads to CNI, while fear of ego threat leads to least conflict. 
 Least conflict subdivides into four elements, outlined in Figure 4.12 and 
described below. 
 
 6 Information filtering 
 6.2 Least conflict 
  a Avoidance of irrelevant or "wrong" information 
  b Avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
  c Principle of the best 
  d Deference to cognitive authority 
 
Figure 4.12: Four facets of information filtering caused by least conflict. 
Nickerson (1998, pp. 190-197) described several of these elements of 
information filtering by least conflict under the term confirmation bias (the 
inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question…. 
unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence, p. 175). Nickerson 
(1998, p. 197) also postulated motives for confirmation bias, including threat to 
ego (described in Section 5.3 above), avoidance of "wrong" information 
(described below), cognitive limitations (described in Section 1 above), a lack of 
understanding of logic (described in Section 4 above), and the "principle of the 
best," described below. Other articles describe fewer elements. The elements 
that follow appear in the order of my estimation of their increasing susceptibility 
to mitigation. That is, I estimate that mitigating the elements that appear first 
(e.g., avoidance of irrelevant or "wrong" information) will, in general, require more 
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additional information than mitigation of elements that appear later. As stated in 
the introduction to this study, mitigation refers to a modification or reduction of 
CNI. We judge the mitigation sufficient when a person's behavior changes in 
response to the information formerly not used. This concept of additional 
information does not mean that CNI will be mitigated or should be mitigated; only 
that the particular element could be mitigated with sufficient additional 
information. 
Avoidance of irrelevant or "wrong" information 
 This element of the taxonomy, avoidance of irrelevant information, 
resembles the cost/benefit element described in Section 6.1 above. This 
"avoidance of irrelevant information," however, involves no cost/benefit 
comparison, because no perceived benefit exists. For example, Simon-Arndt et 
al. (2006, p. 16), citing Witte (e.g., 1992), postulated that Marines who did not 
feel that they abused alcohol and Marines who drank heavily rejected information 
from an alcohol misuse program as irrelevant to their personal situations: 
[H]eavy drinkers who do not believe they can change their behavior will 
reject the message regardless of discomfort resulting from their level of risk, 
and those who do not feel they are at risk will not respond to it. 
Simon-Arndt et al. reported that approximately 15% of the Marines rejected 
information including: 
Heavy drinking risk information … General alcohol information … including 
facts about legal intoxication levels, underage drinking, safety, myths, 
depressant effects, and how the body processes alcohol. … practical tips to 
reduce the negative effects of alcohol … such as alternating alcoholic 
drinks with nonalcoholic drinks, keeping track of the amount of alcohol 
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consumed, refraining from playing drinking games, arranging to get home 
before a party or drinking occasion, looking out for friends when drinking, 
and information about designated drivers. (p. 16) 
I speculate that Simon-Arndt et al. felt that more Marines should have modified 
their behavior in accordance with the information from this program, because the 
information involved cooperation and the safety of comrades, mainstays of 
Marine Corps tradition. The 15% who rejected information from this program 
might have been unaware of the potential benefits of the program to their 
personae as good Marines. I believe that this rejection was compelled, because, 
in my experience, few Marines act volitionally to the detriment of the Corps or to 
their personae as good Marines. I also believe that this rejection was compelled, 
because the rejection correlated with two groups, those who drank heavily and 
those who did not feel that they were at risk. In other words, psychologic and 
physiologic characteristics compelled these two groups not to modify their 
behavior. Had the lack of behavior modification been volitional, I feel that other 
groups also would have failed to modify their behavior. Therefore, I believe that 
the rejection of the information constituted CNI. 
 In another example of avoidance of irrelevant information, Soliah et al. 
(2006, p. 729) tested 115 college women enrolled in Food Science and Nutrition 
courses and determined that: 
The two dominant reasons for being unable to prepare basic foods were 
they had never been taught (knowledge barrier) and they had no interest in 
learning (attitude barrier). 
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The women were majoring in nutrition science, nursing, allied health, or family 
and consumer science: 
Most of the college women in this study (59%) also developed the habit of 
eating out one to three days/week; the remainder (41%) were eating out 
four or more days/per week. The data from this study indicate that as eating 
out frequency increases, cooking ability decreases.  
I conclude that the availability of food cooked elsewhere resulted in the attitude 
that the information about cooking was irrelevant. This attitude then compelled 
the women to reject the irrelevant food information.  
 The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center prompted Cronin (2005, p. 
399) to investigate the response to warnings received by the U.S. intelligence 
community: "Intelligence consumers often hear what they want to hear and 
ignore evidence that does not fit or support their view of the world." As a result: 
[FBI] agents failed to understand or act upon this information in the broader 
context of information the FBI already possessed about terrorist efforts to 
target or use U.S. civil aviation. (Shelby, 2002, p. 5; quoted in Cronin, 2005, 
p. 397) 
Assuming that Shelby interpreted his evidence correctly, the FBI agents were 
compelled by "their view of the world" to regard information from the Phoenix 
Memo as irrelevant or wrong. 
 Garmon (2005, pp. 282-283), quoting McDiarmid and Price (1990, p. 21), 
reported a situation that resembled "naïve conceptions" (Section 5.4, priming via 
naïve conceptions): 
Educational experiences, no matter how well designed and presented, may 
still prove ineffective because students [the pre-service student teachers] 
"are unlikely to reconsider their deeply held beliefs and unconscious 
assumptions unless these are deliberately confronted and challenged." 
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Garmon's student teachers appear to have been compelled by their beliefs and 
assumptions that the conflicting ideas were wrong. Similarly, Klaczynski et al. 
(1997, p. 471) discovered that college freshmen "use less sophisticated 
heuristics when these strategies enable them to preserve their goals and beliefs," 
even in important matters such as career choice.  
 Kupermintz and Salomon (2005) addressed the problem of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict resolution, in which all participants feared a threat to the 
righteousness of their positions by information perceived to be wrong. To avoid 
this threat to schema, Kupermintz and Salomon asked the participants to study 
the conflict in Northern Ireland: 
A direct approach to help program participants step into their adversary’s 
shoes and legitimize its perspective may arouse strong resistance during 
conflict as it may threaten participants’ sense of righteousness. On the 
other hand, learning about another remote conflict may circumvent that 
obstacle. It paves the way for what Perkins and Salomon (1992) have 
called high-road transfer, which affords the opportunity for mindful 
abstraction--the creation of a bird’s eye view of conflicts. Such a view 
enables the application of conclusions reached regarding the remote 
conflict to the proximal one. The indirect way appears to be an effective 
one. (p. 300) 
In this example, Kupermintz and Salomon reported success in developing 
empathy among the participants. The "bird's eye view" permitted participants to 
accept the value of viewpoints derived from opposing perspectives of an 
intractable conflict and even to accept information garnered from the opposing 
side's perspective. Before the development of empathy, participants had refused 
to consider information that conflicted with their sense of identity and 
righteousness. In short, they perceived that information to be wrong. Marines 
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who did not drink or who drank heavily, college women who did not cook, the 
FBI, school teachers, college freshmen, and participants in intractable conflicts 
all demonstrated a compelled avoidance of information perceived to be irrelevant 
or wrong. 
Avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
 Cognitive dissonance, proposed by Festinger (1957), suggested that a 
person would avoid information that conflicted with self-image, and that self-
image derived from "comparisons with the abilities, achievements, and opinions 
of others" (Case et al., 2005, p. 354). Mills (1965, p. 593) used a Likert-scale 
instrument in a test/re-test protocol to establish that his respondents, groups of 
approximately 70 university women, avoided dissonant information and sought 
out consonant information. Specifically, when offered a choice of one of several 
free cosmetic products, they subsequently preferred to read ads for the products 
that they had chosen, rather than the ads for the products they had not chosen. 
Some mechanism beyond the control of the women compelled them to seek 
information that substantiated their previous choice and to avoid information that 
might have contradicted their previous choice. Avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
resembles fear of threat to self-image, described in Section 5.3 above. Cognitive 
dissonance, however, appears to involve avoidance of conflicting information, 
while threat to self-image appears to involve fear of threatening information. 
Either one tends to compel nonuse of information. 
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Principle of the best 
 This element of the taxonomy derives its name from "Tout est pour le 
mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles" (All is for the best in the best of all 
possible worlds), a phrase used frequently in the novel Candide (Voltaire, circa 
1758). In the novel, Professor Pangloss (said to be modeled after the philosopher 
Leibniz) espoused the principle of the best, also known as "unrealistic optimism" 
(N. D. Weinstein, 1980, p. 806) or the "Pollyanna principle" (Matlin & Stang, 
1978; cited by Nickerson, 1998, p. 197). According to Matlin and Stang, this 
principle notes the apparent compulsion that people experience in giving 
preferential treatment to pleasant thoughts and memories over unpleasant ones. 
Some people might describe this compelled selection as good in that it allows a 
person to survive in a hostile environment. Other people might describe this 
selection as bad in that it might allow a person to miss warnings. This example 
illustrates the importance of studying nonuse of information without imposing 
moral judgments. This element resembles the element of affect, described in 
Section 5.3 above. However, affect appears to compel nonuse based on an 
existential fear of death, whereas principle of the best appears to compel nonuse 
through a conflict with schema. 
Deference to cognitive authority 
 Deference to cognitive authority denotes the acceptance of information by 
virtue of its coming from a trusted source. Sources identified in the study corpus 
included the state, religion, and the "expert." As with other examples of selection, 
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use of the selected information implies nonuse of some of the information not 
selected. In such a situation, the "used" (accepted) information, the information 
that made a difference, comes from a trusted source. Conversely, the nonused 
information comes from sources that possessed less cognitive authority. The 
example on page 1 of this dissertation, the suppression of women's potential in 
American society, provides an example: according to Dore (1994) and Dunn 
(1987), authority figures (educators and parents) lower the expectations of 
female students. Lowered expectations lead to satisfaction with lower 
performance, resulting in the students fulfilling less of their potential as they grow 
up. 
 Tsang (2002, pp. 39-42) described many of the ways in which Nazi 
authorities compelled the German people to support tacitly the events that led to 
the Holocaust. The study reported here has identified several of those ways as 
CNI, including authoritarian control (described in Section 3), threshold knowledge 
shortfall (described in Section 4), affect (described in Section 5.3), and lexical 
priming (described in Section 5.4). Nazis also employed racial prejudice 
(described in Section 2) against Jews and Gypsies and priming via naïve 
conceptions (also described in Section 5.4) to support their theories of race and 
nation. Germans of that era acknowledged the cognitive authority of the Nazis 
(described in this section) and accepted euphemistic language as literal, 
abrogation to the state of personal responsibility, the dehumanizing and blaming 
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of the victims, and assurances of moral justification. These techniques 
constituted CNI.  
 Arsenault and Castells (2006) reported similar acceptance of cognitive 
authority in the U.S.: 
[T]he Waxman Report … details 237 misleading statements released by 
President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, now former Secretary of State Colin Powell, and now 
former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice about Iraq and WMDs 
[weapons of mass destruction]. (p. 292) 
Arsenault and Castells then reported that, during the war that followed, trust in 
cognitive authority continued. I interpret this continued trust as an example of 
CNI, in which the information that the need for war had been falsified was not 
used: 
[O]ver an 18-month period despite the introduction of compelling evidence 
that prewar intelligence was falsified or exaggerated, the belief that the 
Bush administration presented faulty information fluctuated by only 12 
points, rising from 36 percent in February 2003 to 48 percent in November 
2004. Moreover, these polls suggest that skepticism regarding the 
existence of WMDs actually peaked in March 2004 (around 55 percent) and 
then decreased despite mounting evidence that no weapons existed. (pp. 
292-293) 
 Brunel and Pichon (2004, pp. 368-369) described another facet of 
cognitive authority, confidence placed in "risk-reduction transmitters" (p. 368). 
These risk-reduction transmitters provided to food consumers information that 
reduced "psychological discomfort caused by consumption of foodstuffs coming 
from the agricultural and foodstuff industry" (p. 360). They identified these risk-
reduction transmitters in the food production and distribution industry as "the 
producer [of the food], the retailer, the state or even independent organisations 
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(such as consumer associations)." Trust in the benevolence and wisdom of these 
transmitters of information compelled the consumer not to seek or use other 
information.  
 Aldoory and van Dyke (2006, p. 346) provided an explanation for this trust 
of risk-reduction transmitters in their experiment to determine the reactions to a 
simulated terrorist attack on the food supply. They found that "When participants 
perceived the source of information was in 'the same boat' as them, they were 
more likely to pay attention." I conclude that this statement means that the 
German people probably believed that their leaders faced the same threats (from 
internal sources such as minority groups and external sources such as France 
and Poland) as they, and trusted the leaders in part for that reason. Similarly, the 
American people probably believed that the Bush administration faced the same 
threats (from terrorists inside America and a worldwide network of terrorists 
beyond America) as they, and this perceived shared danger may have 
contributed to acceptance of misinformation and disinformation about the need 
for war with Iraq. 
 Granfield (2002) reported an example of mistrust of a cognitive authority in 
a study in which a university administration tried to reduce alcohol use among 
students. The effort failed: 
Nearly 85% of the students report having seen a social norm message on 
alcohol use at least once or twice per week throughout the seven-month 
intervention period. Almost half of these students indicated that they saw 
social messages on a daily basis. … Despite this success with 
implementation, comparison data between the baseline and follow-up years 
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indicated little change in the perceived campus drinking norm or in reported 
alcohol use by students after the intervention. (p. 22) 
Granfield suggested that mistrust by the students of the administration restricted 
the students' acceptance of information about alcohol use reduction: 
By associating the [alcohol use reduction] campaign with an administration 
that they see as trying to exercise increased control over them, students 
have 'framed'… the marketed norms campaign in negative terms that 
restricts most from accepting the information as legitimate. (p. 27) 
Granfield's use of the word "framed" calls to mind priming, described in Section 
5.4 above. As stated at the outset of this study, many conditions leading to CNI 
overlap. Granfield's example appears in this section because it describes a 
specific type of priming that derived from mistrust of an authority, rather than 
priming in general. 
 Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005, p. 140) identified religiosity as a mechanism 
of CNI: “When it comes to the possibility of developing breast cancer, I think it is 
best to pray and put the problems in God’s hands.” This example might resemble 
the resignation of Section 6.1, except that resignation does not incorporate the 
element of displacement of responsibility that appears here as deference to a 
religious authority, a religious authority generally perceived as being omniscient 
and therefore a cognitive authority. 
 Pratkanis and Gliner (2004, p. 283) cited the concept of cognitive authority 
or trusted source as expounded in Plato's dialogue "Laches" (circa 400 
B.C.E./1961): "it is reasonable to follow the advice of a skillful master as long as 
the advice is limited to the expert’s specific domain of expertise." Pratkanis and 
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Gliner, cited Weinstein and Deutschberger (e.g., 1963), who expanded the 
concept of expertise into altercasting, in which one person places another "into a 
social role that specifies an interpersonal task (e.g., message acceptance or 
rejection)." By experimentation, Pratkanis and Gliner determined that people 
tended to trust information from sources in the appropriate altercast role and 
reject information from people in inappropriate roles. In their experiment, a young 
girl urged people to buy an automobile tire in two different commercials, one 
commercial emphasizing safety, and the other emphasizing the technical 
performance of the tire. Then a "tire expert" did the same: 
[T]he pattern predicted by altercasting theory was obtained. Specifically, 
when the child argued for Darnelli tires on the basis of safety (the protection 
theme), she was much more effective … than when she argued for Darnelli 
tires on the basis of performance (the technical message; …). In contrast, 
the expert was most effective when he argued for Darnelli tires on the basis 
of performance … compared to arguing on the basis of safety. (p. 294) 
 A somewhat earlier example of mistrust of a cognitive authority occurred 
in the fable of the boy who cried "wolf" (Aesop, circa 560 BCE/1947, p. 132). The 
boy developed cognitive authority by virtue of his position as shepherd. He lost 
his authority through exposure in a succession of lies. Cognitive authority 
resembles the taxonomy element labeled priming with respect to the source of 
the information, discussed in Section 5.4, except that in Section 5.4, nonuse 
occurred because of the information source while, in mistrust of cognitive 
authority, nonuse occurred because of the information. In other words, with 
priming, nothing the source offered would be accepted while, with mistrust of 
cognitive authority, some information (information appropriate to the source) 
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would be accepted. Both elements overlap with avoidance of irrelevant or 
"wrong" information, as discussed previously. 
Summary of Section 6: Information filtering 
 This section presented a number of elements of the taxonomy under the 
heading of information filtering, as outlined in Figure 4.13. 
 
 6 Information filtering, caused by: 
  6.1 Least effort 
  a Avoidance of cognitive overload 
  b Resignation 
  c Avoidance of information where perceived cost exceeds 
perceived benefit 
  d Avoidance of activity involving "the life of the mind" 
  6.2 Least conflict 
  a Avoidance of irrelevant or "wrong" information 
  b Avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
  c Principle of the best 
  d Deference to cognitive authority 
 
Figure 4.13: Information filtering that leads to CNI. 
These elements, with those of Sections 1-5, comprise the conditions leading to 
CNI that I found in the study corpus. As described elsewhere, other elements 
may exist, and the next section suggests some. 
Other conditions leading to CNI 
 Other expected terms for conditions leading to CNI did not appear in the 
study corpus. Specific terms included Sandstrom's "optimal information foraging" 
(Sandstrom, 1994, 1999), seeking "fit" via Bourdieu's Habitus (Certeau, 1984; 
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Lizardo, 2004), "satisficing" (Simon, 1957; Byron, 1998), the limits of short-term 
memory (G. A. Miller, 1956), and cognitive barriers such as a mismatch between 
eidetic and symbolic imagery (Luria, 1968, ch. 5; Norman, 1993, chapters 2 and 
3). These omissions suggest that the study corpus might not have included a 
wide enough variety of databases and indicate the need for a corroborating or 
refining study. Databases that might include scholarly articles that contain the 
omitted terms include LIS Full Text, Gender Studies Database, Contemporary 
Women's Issues, Annual Reviews Online, Sociological Abstracts, Philosopher's 
Index, and Alt-Press Watch. 
Summary of Chapter 4 
 This chapter presented and explained the elements of the taxonomy of 
conditions compelling nonuse of information, which appeared in Figure 1.1 of 
Chapter 1 above. When considered together, the elements of Figure 1.1 
comprise a taxonomic definition of CNI, one of the five types of definitions 
identified by Spradley and McCurdy (1972), as explained in Chapter 3 above. 
The taxonomy consisted of the six primary categories of elements: 
1) Intrinsic somatic conditions,  
2) Socio-environmental barriers,  
3) Authoritarian controls,  
4) Threshold knowledge shortfall,  
5) Attention shortfall, and 
6) Information filtering, 
and their various subcategories.  
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 Chapter 4 also discussed the criteria used in ordering the taxonomy. Other 
orderings are possible, and Chapter 4 explained the choice of the ordering used 
for this dissertation. A discussion of the dichotomous nature of CNI-VNI followed 
the discussion about ordering, and Chapter 4 concluded by presenting additional 
conditions, conditions that the study was expected to find but did not. 
 Many of the examples from the study corpus depicted CNI pejoratively -- 
advanced age, acceptance of war, avoidance of food and health information, 
gender prejudice, the Terri Schiavo case, illiteracy, Nazi euphemisms, 
resignation -- and these examples do represent situations that most people 
would call undesirable. Had the examples of CNI produced peace, good health, 
or gender equality, Chapter 4 would have included far fewer depictions of CNI as 
negative. This likely outcome illustrates the importance of diagnosing CNI without 
prejudice.  
 The next chapter, Chapter 5, summarizes the study and presents 
recommendations for further investigation of CNI. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 As I conclude this initial study of compelled nonuse of information, I am 
struck by the many examples of nonuse of information that surround each of us, 
inevitably observed through a window rather than in a mirror. And I wonder, what 
information was I compelled not to use in order to initiate and pursue this study? 
Among the hundreds of thousands of academics, pedagogues, orators, 
librarians, and psychologists who have built careers on the use of information, 
does merit exist in an analysis of nonuse? What information might I have 
overlooked that would render this entire study moot? And should such a novel 
topic be investigated through the virtually untried methodology of retroduction? 
But Charles Sanders Peirce said that "no new truth is ever otherwise reached 
while some new truths are thus reached" (1976b, pp. 319-320, from Peirce's 
1902 "Prolegomena"), and the investigation regains importance for me. Whether 
anyone else ever employs this methodology, and whether this study leads to 
"new truths" in the study of information, it has led to new truths for me. One that I 
wish to share with my readers is this: tragedy does not rest on sadness. Tragedy 
rests on the inevitability of sadness. Compulsion, almost by definition, leads to 
inevitability. In situations where nonuse of information leads to sadness, 
compelled nonuse of information leads to tragedy. The study of nonuse of 
information has exposed to me a great deal of tragedy in the human condition, 
for example, greed mistaken for nationalistic or religious fervor and leading to 
empire and war, ignorance leading to fear of the "other" leading to enslavement 
 
 217
or murder, or lack of threshold nutritional knowledge leading to pathology and 
premature death. It is my hope that this study can mitigate some of the 
compulsion that leads to sadness and reduce the inevitability that turns that 
sadness into tragedy. 
Summary of the study and its contributions to information science 
 As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation identified or developed several key 
concepts and potential advancements in the study and practice of information 
science, such as: 
1) presentation of a methodology for investigating a phenomenon for which 
prior study has not established a theory, models, or data; 
2) refinement of the vocabulary of information science through a definition of 
compelled nonuse of information (CNI); 
3) inception of the formulation of a theory of CNI; 
4) presentation of a conceptual or diagnostic tool for information workers; 
5) increased awareness of prejudice against nonuse of information; 
6) theoretical advancement in the design of information systems; 
7) development of nonuse as a Hegelian antithesis to information use; 
8) development of "markers of anti-intellectualism" as an aid to the formation 
of public policy; and 
9) clarification of some of the legal and jurisprudential ramifications of CNI. 
Recapitulation of each of these concepts follows. 
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1. Presentation of a methodology 
 The methodology presented in this dissertation lends itself to any 
investigation of phenomena for which no one has established prior theory, 
models, or data. The methodology consisted of a novel nine-step retroduction 
heuristic that incorporated a novel five-step definition heuristic. This dissertation 
then presented the application of these heuristics to a comprehensive and 
integrated study of CNI.  
2. Refinement of the vocabulary of information science 
 This dissertation defined terms and phrases frequently used in information 
science, such as "cognitive avoidance" and "information behavior." For example, 
the study reported here defined the difference between "volitional" and 
"compelled" and demonstrated the need to discriminate between volitional and 
compelled cognitive avoidance. The study also presented a definition of 
"information behavior" as "a response to a stimulus, where the stimulus is 
information and the response is use or nonuse of that information." This definition 
avoids the common definitions of information behavior that are self-referent, that 
is, that define information behavior in terms of information and behavior. 
 The study reported here rested on additional definitions. Bateson's 
definition of "Information" as "a difference that makes a difference" led to a 
definition of CNI: "CNI describes behaviors beyond the control of a person, 
behaviors that do not allow a difference to make a difference." 
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 In addition to facilitating discourse between people who use these terms, 
the definitions also establish a firmer foundation for information workers who wish 
to influence public policy discussions. As society moves further into information-
based economies and governance, information workers should develop a clearer 
and more assured voice in the formation of public policy, and explicit definitions 
of information science concepts contribute to that voice. 
3. Inception of the formulation of a theory of CNI 
 The study reported here resulted in a descriptive model of CNI where 
none has existed before. The model presented in this study consisted of a 
taxonomy of conditions that lead to CNI, and the taxonomy consisted of six 
primary components:  
1) Intrinsic somatic conditions,  
2) Socio-environmental barriers,  
3) Authoritarian controls,  
4) Threshold knowledge shortfall,  
5) Attention shortfall, and 
6) Information filtering. 
One or more of these six components explained each of the examples of CNI 
discovered in the informal pilot study and formal study described here. 
 The model presented here contains a measure of external validity 
(generalizability) and internal reliability (predictability, coherence) because of the 
retroductive methodology of its creation. In other words, this study employed an 
iterative technique consisting of formulation, testing against a corpus (the 
informal pilot study), reformulation, testing against another corpus (the formal 
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study), reformulation again, re-coding (the re-study), and reformulation again. 
The reformulations eventually became cosmetic, rather than substantive, 
resembling the concept known as data saturation. This decreasing lack of 
substantive change from iteration to iteration demonstrated the degree of "fit," the 
applicability, of the model and its taxonomy to analysis of the rather large body of 
literature examined. 
 As noted in Figure 1.5 above, the model of CNI described the subset of 
information behavior referred to in this study as compelled nonuse. Appendices 2 
and 3 present 118 descriptions of information behavior. As explained in Chapter 
2, very few of those behaviors referred to nonuse of information, and none of 
them discussed CNI. The model presented in this dissertation complements 
those 118 descriptions in the sense that nonuse is the implied opposite of use. 
Thus, the model of this dissertation fills a large gap in the concepts of information 
science. If the study of CNI proceeds as recommended in the next section, this 
descriptive model will become a predictive theory and create a wider basis for 
understanding information behavior. 
4. Presentation of a conceptual or diagnostic tool for information workers 
 The information worker who now encounters an apparent nonuse of 
information must understand the situation in relation to hundreds of theories and 
models of information behavior, such as those noted in Appendices 2 and 3. 
Employment of Figure 1.1 would reduce the analysis to the six elements. If the 
situation did not match one or more of the six elements, then the situation would 
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constitute volitional nonuse (VNI), a useful determination in itself. For example, a 
teacher might confront illiteracy by determining whether the inability to read is 
volitional or compelled. If compelled, what part of the inability is somatic and what 
part cognitive? If somatic, is the illiteracy due to an intrinsic inability, such as poor 
eyesight due to aging? A socio-environmental barrier such as distance from a 
school? An authoritarian control such as the American educational system in the 
days before bilingual education? If cognitive, is the illiteracy due to threshold 
knowledge shortfall such as unawareness of the concept of writing? An attention 
shortfall due to perceived lack of self-efficacy? Information filtering based on 
avoidance of the life of the mind? I contend that an analysis of the CNI by means 
of these six elements of the taxonomy will lead to a more efficient and effective 
response. I also contend that these six elements are relatively easier to 
remember, understand, and apply. 
5. Increased awareness of prejudice against nonuse of information 
 Inherent in any information worker's fruitful response to CNI is a lack of 
prejudice or emotional bias. Information science, however, in its focus on use of 
information, has portrayed nonuse as undesirable, and this portrayal might be 
inefficient and even irrelevant to an examination of CNI. Several examples of this 
portrayal appeared in the corpora examined for this study: 
a. Two articles (Rousseau et al., 1998; Giacalone et al., 2007) portrayed 
advanced age as negative, but S. W. Cornelius and Caspi (1987) noted 
positive aspects of intelligence increasing with age. 
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b. Four articles (Arendt, 1963; Lifton, 1986; Tsang, 2002; Arsenault & Castells, 
2006) discussed the role of deception in facilitating war. Had the examples 
discussed the use of deception in ending war, we might view the CNI in a 
more positive light. 
c. Paulson (2002) noted that most readers ignore 30 to 40% of the words in a 
text, leading occasionally to misunderstanding. This selective attention, 
however, also allows a person to read more quickly, which most people would 
consider to be positive. 
In addition to specific examples of the positive effect of CNI, C. Harris (p. 70) 
suggested more encompassing and fundamental reasons to avoid the 
presumption that nonuse of information is bad, specifically, that 1) reasons might 
exist for a nonuse, 2) that a nonuse might not be a problem, or 3) that a nonuse 
might be an intractable problem. This dissertation presents to information 
workers the need to separate bias and prejudice from a response to nonuse of 
information. 
6. Theoretical advancement in the design of information systems 
 As a diagnostic tool with which information workers can respond to 
nonuse of information, the taxonomy can help to evaluate nonuse of information 
systems. For example, Web sites, library catalogs, highway markers, museum 
exhibit labels, and graphic user interfaces all present opportunities for users to 
not use information. Application of the model of Figure 1.1 might help a designer 
to create more efficient and effective information systems. 
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7. Development of nonuse as a Hegelian antithesis to information use 
 Table 3.1 presented the proportion of articles in the study corpora that 
discussed nonuse and use. Less than one percent of the articles discussed 
nonuse, indicating a trend to approach information science from the thesis of 
use. This dissertation explored a facet of nonuse, CNI, and established its 
magnitude and utility as a tool for information workers. This magnitude and utility 
suggest that nonuse could become an antithesis to the thesis of information use. 
8. Development of "markers of anti-intellectualism" 
 Hofstadter (1963) described what he called anti-intellectualism in 
American life, but he provided no metrics by which anti-intellectualism could be 
measured. Neither does this dissertation present metrics, but it does present 
possible causes of anti-intellectualism, such as element 6.1.4 of the taxonomy 
(avoidance of life of the mind). If defining a problem is instrumental to solving it, 
then this dissertation comprises a step toward formulating public policy to 
address anti-intellectualism. 
9. Clarification of some of the legal and jurisprudential ramifications of CNI 
 Many facets of our legal system take into consideration the intentionality of 
actions. Examples include questions that start: "Did the founding fathers intend 
…?" or "Did the defendant know …?" This dissertation addresses such questions 
through the creation and employment of a volition-compulsion dichotomy as it 
pertains to nonuse of information.  
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Recommendations for further study 
 In pursuing this study, I reviewed the history of a number of topics, for 
example, information science, bibliography, cognitive dissonance, propaganda, 
cognitive authority, the periodic table of the elements, psychology, biological 
phylogeny, and geology. Each of these topics underwent its own introduction, 
historical development, and subdivision into sub-topics. Each sub-topic, then, 
underwent further development and subdivision. This study of CNI represents the 
introduction of a new subdivision of information science. If CNI is to become a 
useful concept for the information worker, its investigation should develop 
through: 
1) replication or refutation of this study, utilizing different databases; 
2) application of retroduction to other topics of study in the humanities and 
social sciences, and refinement of retroduction; 
3) replication of this study, utilizing specific elements of the taxonomy, such 
as priming and the elements that resemble priming; 
4) replication of this study, utilizing specific bodies of information behavior 
literature; 
5) development of a taxonomy of interventions to parallel the taxonomy of 
conditions leading to CNI; 
6) development of taxonomy of compelled use of information; 
7) development of a taxonomy of volitional use and nonuse of information; 
8) development of a theory of CNI; and 
9) quantification of CNI and, eventually, of information. 
An explanation of each of these studies appears below, in the order listed. As 
noted in Chapter 3, retroduction proceeds in an iterative fashion until it produces 
a hypothesis testable through induction. As subsequent studies evolve from 
retroductive to inductive inquiries, the investigator will be able to address some of 
the methodological limitations expressed at the end of Chapter 3. For example, 
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the investigator should measure inter-coder reliability when coding the articles of 
a study corpus for elements in the taxonomy. 
1. Replication or refutation of this study, utilizing different databases 
 As stated before, this dissertation may not have identified all possible 
conditions leading to CNI. It includes enough elements, however, to create a 
taxonomy and to provide a model and a limited corpus of data that provide a 
starting point for future research. Replication of this study by other researchers 
may produce other taxonomies. Comparing and combining the taxonomies of two 
or more studies could produce an overarching taxonomy that would be more 
complete than the taxonomy developed by any one study. 
 One such replication study would employ a corpus derived from 
databases not used for this study, such as: 
• LIS Full Text,  
• Gender Studies Database,  
• Contemporary Women's Issues,  
• Annual Reviews Online,  
• Sociological Abstracts,  
• Philosopher's Index,  
• Alt-Press Watch,  
• Google Scholar,  
• Altavista, and  
• Meta-search engines such as Dogpile, Clusty, and Ez2find.  
Another such replication study might include examples of nonuse of information 
drawn from articles that mention nonuse by implication, rather than explicitly. For 
instance, I limited the study corpus to explicit descriptions of nonuse, for 
example, R. S. Taylor's Process of Asking Questions (1962) provided an explicit 
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example of lack of threshold knowledge. I omitted examples that implied nonuse 
only as the opposite of use, for example, R. S. Taylor's Value-Added Approach 
(1982). Kuhlthau's Information Search Process (1991) explains the impact of 
information searching on affect (emotional state), rather than explaining the 
impact of affect (emotional state, element 5.3 of the taxonomy) on information 
searching. A replication of this study could employ a corpus that included such 
examples of information use that only implied nonuse. 
 Yet other examples of different databases include a database consisting 
of the works of the authors cited in this study or a database of articles drawn from 
a culture very different from my culture, for example, Asian cultures. 
2. Application of retroduction to other topics of study, and refinement of 
retroduction 
 Quoting Charles Sanders Peirce again: "All the ideas of science come to it 
by the way of Abduction [retroduction]." (1931-1958, pp. 144-145) If he was right, 
humans have performed retroduction so intuitively that we did not recognize or 
name it as a method of philosophical inquiry until the 20th century. And if he was 
right, retroduction might prove useful in investigating other completely novel 
topics for which no one has established theory, models, or data. The nine-step 
heuristic of retroduction created for this study served the purposes of this study. 
Application of the retroduction heuristic to other topics in the humanities and 
social sciences might result in a refinement of retroduction, a reduction of 
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retroduction to its essential components rather than its practical manifestations. A 
refined retroduction might then contribute significantly to human inquiry. 
3. Replication of this study, utilizing specific elements of the taxonomy 
 Some conditions leading to CNI command their own extensive literature. 
For example, the role of authoritarian control in CNI occurs unsystematically in 
the literature of political science. The phenomena designated by the omnibus 
term "information overload" appear in the literatures of system theory (e.g., E. M. 
Rogers, 1986), psychology and psychiatry (e.g., J. G. Miller, 1960), sociology 
and political science (e.g., Deutsch, 1963), and information science (e.g., P. 
Wilson, 1995). While this study utilized some examples from the literatures of 
authoritarian control and information overload, it left comprehensive coverage of 
these topics to future research. 
4. Replication of this study, utilizing specific bodies of information behavior 
literature 
 Other disciplines bring their own requirements to a study of CNI, for 
example, nuclear engineering, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The taxonomy 
developed in this study should be applied to the information behavior of other 
disciplines to determine the utility of the taxonomy to multiple disciplines. 
 The taxonomy developed in this study also could be applied to specific 
corpora within information science in an effort to explain the information 
behaviors of those corpora more parsimoniously. Such corpora include: 
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• Writings of Elfreda Chatman. The informal pilot study revealed many 
examples of CNI in those works of Chatman that discuss societal 
disadvantage. Specifically, Chatman discussed the lack of diffusion of 
employment opportunity information (1983; 1985; 1987b), avoidance of print 
media (1987a), alienation theory (1990), gratification theory (1991b), 
knowledge gap theory (1995), self-imposed information poverty (1996; 1999), 
small world theory (1998), and the related life in the round and small world 
theories (1999). In all, Chatman proposed 23 theories or titles of theories (see 
Table 2.1). The taxonomy presented in this dissertation explains those 
theories through five of its six elements. 
• Writings of Carol Kuhlthau: Examples of CNI appeared in some of the works 
of Kuhlthau. She described affect among novice library users (1988; 1991; 
1993b; 1993a) and information overload (1993b) as parts of her larger theory 
of the information search process (ISP). Affect and overload are two elements 
of the taxonomy, elements 5.3 and 6.1 in Figure 1.1. 
• Writings of Robert S. Taylor: CNI appeared in R. S. Taylor's process of asking 
questions (1962; 1967). Taylor postulated that questions evolved in type from 
visceral to conscious to formalized to compromised, ending in a form that an 
information system could answer. Application of the taxonomy of CNI could 
enhance understanding of Taylor's process, for example, CNI 4, lack of 
threshold knowledge, might help to explain the questioner's inability to 
formulate a "conscious" (type 2) question. 
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• Writings of Nicholas Belkin: CNI appears briefly in the works describing 
Belkin's ASK (Anomalous State of Knowledge) theory (Belkin & Robertson, 
1976; Belkin, 1980; Belkin et al., 1982a, 1982b; Belkin, 2000b, 2000a). As 
with R. S. Taylor's type 2 (conscious) question, Belkin postulates that an 
inability to verbalize questions prevents the questioner from finding an 
answer. 
 Application of the CNI taxonomy might help information scientists to 
explain other areas of information behavior, for example, gender or race 
prejudice, nonuse of medical information, and aviation catastrophes. These 
examples appeared in the study but by no means exhausted discussion of other 
topics related to CNI. The following list of topics, presented in alphabetical order, 
include citations encountered more or less serendipitously in this study of CNI. 
The citations within the lists appear chronologically and are far from 
comprehensive in their treatments of the listed topics, but they should appear in 
any study of these topics: 
• Aviation catastrophes and near-catastrophes (Chute & Wiener, 1996; 
National Transportation Safety Board, 2006) 
• Cultural attitudes toward food, food modification and preparation, and diet 
(Birch, 1990; Brunel & Pichon, 2004; McWilliams, 2004; C. Meyer et al., 2005; 
Leschziner, 2006; Soliah et al., 2006) 
• Decision theory (Honderich, 1995, p. 180; Brooks et al., 2003) 
• Financial investing and gambling (Myers, 2002) 
• Game theory (Honderich, 1995, p, 304) 
• Inter-/intimate partner violence (Jost & Hunyady, 2005) 
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• Gender prejudice (Russ, 1983; Hollway, 1984; Lips & Colwill, 1988; Collins, 
1991; McRobbie, 1991; Dore, 1994; Herring, 1994; Parker, 1996; Tong, 1998; 
Matlin, 1999; Reis, 2001; Rose & Rudolph, 2006) 
• Medical pseudoscience ("Why do people detour to quacks?," 1954; Dichter, 
1958; Bernard, 1963; Young, 1967; Bynum, 2001; Weisgerber, 2004) 
• Nonuse of medical information among nurses, doctors, or patients (Cockerill, 
1981; J. L. Jones & Leary, 1994; Muris et al., 1994; S. M. Miller et al., 1996; 
Pifalo et al., 1997; Muha & Smith, 1998; Leydon et al., 2000; Hemsley-Brown 
& Sharp, 2003; Keller et al., 2003; Godlee et al., 2004; Hinton et al., 2005; 
Azaiza & Cohen, 2006; Kalichman et al., 2006; Kreling et al., 2006; McKnight, 
2006; Giacalone et al., 2007; Volk, 2007) 
• Popular misconceptions and apocryphal tales, known as urban legends 
(Clodd, 1920; Cantril, 1940; Schuler & Parenton, 1943; D. Johnson, 1945; 
Medalia & Larsen, 1958; Smelser, 1962; A. Lewis, 1975; Mann & Rosenblatt, 
1979; Massey et al., 1981; Wessely, 1987; Bartholomew, 1989; Boss, 1997; 
Bartholomew & Goode, 1999; Blackman & Walkerdine, 2001) 
• Race prejudice (Allport, 1958; Allport & Ross, 1967; Collins, 1991; Locke & 
Stewart, 1992; R. M. Harris & Dewdney, 1994; Gould, 1996; McWhorter, 
2000; Bergen Jr., 2001; Tsang, 2002; Brandon, 2006). 
The exploratory nature of the study reported here precluded study of these 
topics. Replication of the study utilizing these specific topics of information 
behavior might go far to broaden the study of information from its somewhat 
academic introspection to a tool to understand and address social injustice.  
5. Development of a taxonomy of interventions to parallel the taxonomy of 
conditions leading to CNI 
 As explained in Chapter 1 in the section titled "The rationale for a study of 
CNI," compelled nonuse of information can benefit a person and even be 
necessary to a person's survival. Other instances of CNI, however, are bad, by 
almost any definition of the word "bad." To address bad instances of CNI, a 
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future study of CNI should be conducted with the goal of producing a taxonomy 
of techniques that mitigate CNI. The taxonomy of the study reported in this 
dissertation will guide the information worker in determining which elements of 
CNI are present in a given situation, and the taxonomy of mitigations would guide 
that worker if an intervention becomes necessary. 
6. Development of a taxonomy of compelled use of information 
 Figure 1.5 (above) portrayed the place of CNI in a diagram of compelled 
information behaviors that involve intuition, rather than deduction or induction. An 
expansion of the study reported here would include the development of a 
taxonomy of compelled use of information, CUI. The "nudge," defined as "any 
noncoercive alteration in the context in which people make decisions" (Goldstein, 
2008b, p. B8; citing Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), is an example of CUI. Goldstein 
reported several examples of nudges, including the following. The city of Chicago 
painted lines across Lakeshore Blvd and spaced the lines increasingly close 
together before dangerous curves in the road. Drivers perceived the increasing 
number of lines as evidence that they were traveling faster than they really were, 
and they slowed down for the curves. A school installed mirrors in their cafeteria, 
mirrors that make a child appear somewhat heavier than the children actually 
appear. Children perceived their mirrored selves as unflatteringly heavy and ate 
less. In either example, the nudge apparently worked without the children or the 
drivers processing the information consciously. I base this conclusion on the 
success of the nudges when compared to the failure of consciously processed 
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behavior modification messages such as "dangerous curve ahead" signs and 
public service obesity messages. I believe that the word "intuitive" expresses the 
authors' intent more precisely than does the word "noncoercive," and that "make 
decisions" connotes cognition where no cognition necessarily took place. In other 
words, a more precise definition of nudge is "any intuitive alteration in the context 
in which people modify their behavior." 
 As explained in the definition of "compelled" in Chapter 1, Figure 1.4, 
Figure 1.5, and the introduction to Chapter 4, I view the presence or absence of 
cognition as absolutely crucial to the determination of volitional or compelled 
behavior. For example, a student compelled by a teacher to learn to read has the 
conscious choice of reading, and the high rate of functional illiteracy in the U.S. 
demonstrates that many students do not read after learning how. Expansion of 
the study of CNI to include CUI, therefore, would include intuitive (non-volitional) 
use of information from nudges, while thoughtful use of information resulting from 
scholastic compulsions would fall under volitional use, described in the next 
section. 
7. Development of a taxonomy of volitional use and nonuse of information 
 Following the addition of compelled use to the taxonomy of compelled 
nonuse as described in the preceding section, a parallel taxonomy of volitional 
use and nonuse of information would complete the diagram of information 
behaviors portrayed in Figure 1.5 above. I would not expect such a completion to 
affect the the taxonomy of CNI to any great extent, but the completion would help 
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to classify, evaluate, and apply the thousands of reports now subsumed under 
the heading of "user studies" and contribute significantly to the field of 
information studies. 
8. Development of a theory of compelled nonuse of information 
 As explained in Chapters 1 and 3, this dissertation presents a descriptive 
model of CNI rather than a theory, describing the "what" rather than explaining 
the "how" or "why." Although this descriptive model does not predict, it comprises 
the necessary first step in the development of an explanatory and predictive 
theory of CNI.  
 Lack of theory, however, should not delay implementation of the taxonomy 
in practice. As noted at the end of Chapter 3, information workers use other tools 
(e.g., Bradford's Law) without theoretical underpinning. By the same token, I 
recommend immediate consideration by the helping professions of the taxonomy 
as a short, comprehensive checklist for identification, diagnosis, and possible 
mediation of situations involving nonuse of information. 
9. Quantification of CNI and, eventually, of information 
 As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 4, the ordinal nature of the 
taxonomy demonstrates tentative indications of magnitude and direction 
(push/pull) for the elements of the taxonomy. Magnitude and direction describe 
two of the three necessary properties of a vector, the third property being 
specification of an origin. In the case of nonuse of information, the "origin" would 
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be some measure of a person's behavior before the information use/nonuse, and 
the vector would lead to a measure of behavior after the information use/nonuse 
(cf. Harmon, 1984). Refining the ordinal taxonomy into an interval taxonomy or 
ratio taxonomy would provide a measurement of magnitude. This similarity to 
vectors and Bateson's attempt to create a calculus of information suggest the 
possibility of a more mathematical treatment of CNI and information. 
 The taxonomy presented in this study establishes a basis for further 
investigation of CNI, about nonuse of information in general, and by inference, 
about information use. It could provide a deeper understanding of information 
behavior to practitioners in many disciplines: information science, psychology, 
sociology, political science, education, and communication science. It could 
provide a new tool to analyze information behavior, and a new way of thinking 
about the relationships among the information, the information practitioner, and 
the potential user of the information. 
Postscript 
 I am grateful to those who read and criticized the various drafts of this 
dissertation and its taxonomy. Their contributions should not, however, be 
equated with wider agreement. As a journey into uncharted wilderness, this 
taxonomy represents one of many potentially useful directions. This study does 
not pretend to comprehensiveness: the reader, no doubt, will think of other 
conditions leading to CNI. Rather, this study hopes to approach comprehensivity 
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and to spur further research and definition of the phenomenon of compelled 
nonuse of information. 
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APPENDIX 1: SEARCH TERMS AND DATABASES SEARCHED FOR 
EXAMPLES OF CNI 
 Appendix 1 presents the databases searched on October 18, 2007 for the 
formal part of the study and their dates of coverage: 
Source Print version Electronic version
Academic Search Complete  1965-2007 
ARIST 1966-2007 1966-2007 
Communication & Mass Media 
Complete  1915-2007 
Educational Administration Abstracts   1966-2007 
ERIC, the Educational Resource 
Information Center  1966-2007 
Information Science & Technology 
Abstracts   1960s-2007 
MLA International Bibliography 1925-1980 1963-2007 
PsycARTICLES (exclude book 
reviews, human populations)  1894-2007 
PsycEXTRA (limited to humans)  1894-2007 
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences 
Collection  1965-2007 
PsycINFO (exclude human 
populations)  1806-2007 
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 Other databases might contain articles of interest to a study of CNI. I did 
not search the following databases as a part of this study: 
LIS Full Text, Gender Studies Database, Contemporary Women's Issues, Annual 
Reviews Online, Sociological Abstracts, Philosopher's Index, Alt-Press Watch, 
Google Scholar, Altavista, and meta-search engines such as Dogpile, Clusty, 
and Ez2find. 
 The literatures of several disciplines contributed articles to this study of 
CNI. They included: 
Psychology, sociology, education, communication, philosophy, and information 
science, with findings also from political science, religious studies, multicultural 
studies, and gender studies. 
 Search terms used during the formal part of this study included the 
following. The search terms represent combinations of the words cogniti[ve or 
ition], information, knowledge, and message with the words avoid[ance], barrier, 
blunt[ing or er], refus[ing or al], reject[ion], repress[ion], nonuse, and non-use: 
(cognitive avoidance or cognitive barrier or cognitive blunting or cognitive refusal 
or cognitive rejection or cognitive repression or cognitive non-use) 
or 
(information avoidance or information barrier or information blunting or 
information refusal or information rejection or information repression or 
information non-use) 
or 
(knowledge avoidance or knowledge barrier or knowledge blunting or knowledge 
refusal or knowledge rejection or knowledge repression or knowledge non-use) 
or 
(message avoidance or message barrier or message blunting or message refusal 
or message rejection or message repression or message non-use) 
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APPENDIX 2: SELECTED THEORIES OF INFORMATION BEHAVIOR, listed 
alphabetically. (Described in Chapter 3: Methodology.) 
 
TITLE Date CNI? 
1. Adoption of Intellectual Technologies 
(Wildemuth, 1992): Resource Acquisition, 
Application Development, Adoption/Renewal, 
Routinization/Enhancement, and External 
Adoption 
1992 No. IR (USE), not CNI 
2. Affective Load (Nahl, 2004) need, preference, 
attitude, task motivation, expected and felt 
effort, uncertainty, self-efficacy, optimism, 
relevance, satisfaction, and acceptance of or 
loyalty to the system. uncertainty, frustration, 
anxiety, irritation and rage. uncertainly, 
frustration, time pressure, and pessimism 
2004 5.3, Negative affect 
3. Alienation Theory (Chatman, 1987a, 1990): 
information & most life-events are meaningless 
due to powerlessness, meaningless (jobs), 
physical isolation & lack of trust, self-
estrangement/meaningless work, 








6.2, Least conflict 
4. Anomalous State of Knowledge (Belkin & 
Robertson, 1976) user's lack of knowledge >> 
user's question. 
1980 4, Inability to verbalize 
5. Archival Intelligence (Yakel & Torres, 2003) 
subject expertise, internalized archival theory & 
practice, sense making for holes in the 
documentary record, indirect means to 
evidence 
2003 
4, Inability to 
locate 
information 
6. Barriers to Information (R. M. Harris & 
Dewdney, 1994) "communication accidents" or 
information transfer failures." 
1994 
4, Lack of 
knowledge of 
context 
7. Behavioral Approach to IR Design (D. Ellis, 
1987) starting, chaining, browsing, 





8. Berrypicking (Bates, 1989) "the real behavior 
of information searchers" 1989 
No. IR (use), not 
CNI 
9. Big6 Skills for Information Literacy (Eisenberg 
& Berkowitz, 1988) Task Definition, Information 
Seeking Strategies, Location and Access, Use 
of Information, Synthesis, Evaluation. 
1988 No, volitional use, not CNI 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
10. Choo's General Model of Information Use 
(Choo, 1998) info use & sense making in 
organizations 
1998 No. Use, not CNI 
11. Cognitive Authority (P. Wilson, 1983) 1983 
6.2, Deference to 
cognitive 
authority 
12. Cognitive Perspectives of Information 
Retrieval Interaction (Ingwersen, 1996): IR 
depends on the user, situation, system, & 
domain. 
1996 No, leads to CNI. 
13. Cognitive Work Analysis (Rasmussen et al., 
1994) CWA to guide the design of technology 
for use in the work place 
1994 No, it is system design 
14. Collective Action Dilemma (T. C. Turner et al., 
2005), derived from  
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) 
2005 
4, Lack of 
knowledge of 
context 





6.1, Principle of 
least effort 
5.3.4, Fear of bad 
news 
6.2, Avoidance of 
conflicting 
information 




15. Communicative Action (Habermas, 1973, 
1987) an indestructible moment of 
communicative rationality is anchored in the 




use or nonuse 
16. Communities of Practice (Wenger, 1998) a 
small group with a common sense of purpose 
and a real need to know what each other knows 
1998 No. Use, not CNI 
17. Comprehensive Model of Information Seeking 
(J. D. Johnson et al., 1995) 1995 No. Use, not CNI 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
18. Computer Mediated Communication 
(problems) (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Murfin, 1994; 





2, Tech barriers 
19. Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
(Grudin, 1994) 1984 
No, only in the 
lack of networks
20. Cultural Model of Hall (1959) communicate via 
behavior more than words 1959 




21. Cultural Model of Hofstede (1991) values 
about how things "ought to be" 1991 




6.2, Avoidance of 
conflicting 
information 
22. Cumulative Advantage Processes (Price, 
1976): success breeds success 1976 
No. Opposite 
would be lack of 
capitals 
23. Diffusion of Information Theory (Chatman, 
1983, 1986) value~time, opinion leaders 




6.2, Deference to 
cognitive 
authority 
24. Diffusion of Innovation Theory (E. M. Rogers, 
1962) innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority, laggards. Laggards demonstrate 
CNI: 1) possess no opinion leadership, 2) 
isolates, 3) point of reference in the past, 4) 
suspicious of innovations, 5) innovation-




5.3.4, Fear of the 
unknown 
6.1, Cost-benefit 
6.2, Avoidance of 
conflicting 
information 
25. Domain Analytic Approach to Scholars’ 
Information Practices (Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 
1995)  Socio-Cognitive Theory of Users 
Situated in Specific Contexts & Domains 
(Hjørland, 2002) The person & the field 
determine the classification scheme. 
1995 No. Nonuse only by selection. 
26. Ecological Model of Human Information 
Behavior (T. D. Wilson, 1981) The user 
behaves within a situated context of influences. 
1981 No, can derive from CNI 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
27. Environmental modeling (Kochen, 1969): a 
learning theory 1969 
No, a learning 
theory 
28. Everyday Life Information Seeking 
(Savolainen, 1995) to preserve the coherence 
in her way of life 
1995 
6.2, Avoidance of 
conflicting 
information 
29. Face Threat (Goffman, 1955) 1955 6.1, Cost-benefit 
30. Flow Theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) 
psychological engrossment 1990 
5.1, Psychological 
engrossment 
31. Gender Differences (Herring, 1994): posting 





32. General Model of the Information Seeking of 
Professionals (Leckie et al., 1996) 1996 No. Use, not CNI 
33. Gratification Theory (Chatman, 1991b) life-
events are meaningless due to one's social 
milieu. 1 Information outside world is irrelevant, 
2 low expectation of improvement, 3 information 
from outside is not trusted, 4 time = immediate 
past & present, 5 mass media = escape. 








6.2, Avoidance of 
irrelevant 
information 
34. Imposed Query (Gross, 1995) externally 
motivated information seeking (vs. self-
generated) 
1995 No. Use, not CNI 
35. Impoverished Life-World of Outsiders & self-
imposed Information Poverty (Chatman, 1996) 
a self-imposed policy for self protection, that 





4, Lack of 
knowledge of 
context 
5.3.4, Fear of the 
unknown 









TITLE Date CNI? 
36. Information Acquiring-&-Sharing (Erdelez & 
Rioux, 2000) store, recall, link, share 2000 No. Use, not CNI 
37. Information Encountering (Erdelez, 1995) set 
aside foreground problem to work on 
background problem 
1995 No. Use, not CNI 
38. Information Grounds (Pettigrew, 1999) 
synergistic environments created when people 
come together for a singular purpose 
1999 No. Use, not CNI 
39. Information Horizons (Sonnenwald, 1999) 
social, contextual & collaborative IBs, mapping 
a person's information resources 
2000 No. IH results from 1-5. 
40. Information Intents (Todd, 1997) goals 
determine IB ~ (Limberg, 1997): goals affect 
outcomes. 
1997 No, employs CNI. 
41. Information Interchange (Marcella & Baxter, 
1998) context extended across multiple 
interactors 
1998 No. Use, not CNI 
42. Information Poverty (P. Wilson, 1983, p. 151; 
Chatman, 1996) their world is a tiny place and 
the supply of second-hand knowledge a very 
small one. See also Impoverished Life-World 
and Life in the Round (Chatman, various dates) 









6.1, Cost-benefit  
6.2, Cognitive 
authority 
43. Information Retrieval Interactions (Ingwersen, 
1992) Mediator Model allows user to use own 
abilities during IR. 
1997 No, IR design 
44. Information Search Process (Kuhlthau, 1985) 
the effect of the 7 stages of searching on affect. 1985 
No. It is the IR 
effect on affect, 
not vice versa 
45. Information Search Process (Kuhlthau, 1991): 




46. Information Seeking in Context (Vakkari et al., 
1997): the influences of social life, historical 
precedent, and the pervasive effects of 
communities, organizations and cultures 
1996 No, CNI leads to context 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
47. Information Use Environments (R. S. Taylor, 
1986b) IU Environments contain problems 
along dimensions. Information has problems 
along dimensions. The mesh measures 
success. 
1986 No. System design 
48. Institutional Ethnography: social organization 
of knowledge (Townsend, 1983). Official v 
unofficial forms of knowledge (D. E. Smith, 
1987) 
1983 No. Research philosophy 
49. Integrative Framework for Information Seeking 
&  
Interactive Information Retrieval (Ingwersen & 
Järvelin, 2005) The cognitive approach to meld 
positivistic IR and subjective info seeking 
2005 No, IR (use), not CNI 
50. Interpretative Repertoires (Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) user paradigms 1984 
No, derives from 
CNI 
51. Invisible Colleges (Crane, 1972) Diffusion of 
scientific information 1972 No. Use, not CNI 
52. Knowledge Gaps (lacuna) (Krikelas, 1983): 
avoiding unknown intermediaries while filling 
the gaps 
1983 5.3.4, Fear of the unknown 
53. Knowledge Gap Theory (Chatman & 
Pendleton, 1995) 1995 4, Threshold lack 
54. Library Anxiety (Mellon, 1986; Bostick, 1992) 





4, Threshold lack 
5.3, Negative 
affect 
5.3.4, Fear of the 
unknown 
55. Life in the Round-Normative behavior & self-
imposed Information Poverty (Chatman, 1996, 
1999): 1 ambiguity, 2 imprecision, 3 private 
becomes public, 4 taken for granted, 5 no 
outside information unless critical & small world 






56. Managerial Support (Wolek, 1986): 
encouragement leads to use of information. 1986 
3, Explicit 
approval 
57. Market Value of Information Commodities 
(Mowshowitz, 1992): information = the ability of 
a goal-seeking system to decide or control in 
the marketplace 
1992 No, only in its absence 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
58. Mooers' Law (Mooers, 1960) 1960 6.1, Cost-benefit 
59. Motivational Factors (Weiner, 1974) for 
Interface Design (Shneiderman, 1986) 1986 
No, how to avoid 
CNI 
60. Network Gatekeeping Theory (Lewin, 1947; 
White, 1950; Metoyer-Duran, 1991; Barzilai-
Nahon, 2004) 
1947 3, Censorship / selection 
61. Nonlinear Information Seeking (Foster, 2004) 2004 No. Use, not nonuse 
62. Normative Behavior (Chatman & Pendleton, 
1998; Chatman, 1999) 1 Social Norms 
(rightness & wrongness in a social world), 2 
World View, 3 Social types (of persons) & 
typology, 4 Concept of information behavior. 
Sometimes equated with Small World Theory. 
1998 6.2, Avoidance of the irrelevant 
63. Open vs. closed mind (Rokeach, 1960) = 
Avoidance & Vigilance (Hoffman, 1970) = 
Monitoring & Blunting (S. M. Miller, 1980; Pifalo 




5.3.4, Fear of bad 
news 
64. Opinion Leadership Theory (Chatman, 1987b) 1987 3, Authoritarian control 
65. Optimal Foraging (Sandstrom, 1994) 1994 6.1, Cost-benefit 
66. PAIN Hypothesis (Bruce et al., 2004 
submission; Bruce, 2005): personal anticipated 
information need. 
2004 No. Storage, not use or nonuse. 
67. Perceived Accessibility (Culnan, 1983, 1985) 1983 6.1, Cost-benefit 
68. Perspectives on the Tasks in which 
Information Behaviors are Embedded (B. L. 
Allen, 1996): a person (or group)-in-situation 
approach. 
1996 No, derived from CNI. 
69. Phenomenography (Marton, 1981): finding 
and systematizing of forms of thought in terms 
of which people interpret significant aspects of 
reality. (Limberg, 1997): goals affect outcomes 
~ (Todd, 1997) 
1997 No. It employs CNI. 
70. Poverty, leading to information poverty 
(Buschman, 1998): libraries, in fact, do not like 
or help the poor, but they should, for a better 
civic life for all. 
1998 2, Societal barriers 
71. Practice of Everyday Life (Certeau, 1984): 
retaining the autonomy of ingeniously defended 
private meanings from commerce, politics, & 
culture 
1984 






TITLE Date CNI? 
72. Principle of Least Effort (Zipf, 1949) 1949 6.1, Least effort 
73. Principle of Uncertainty for Info Seeking 
(Kuhlthau, 1993a): uncertainty increases in a 
search & must be overcome 
1993 5.3, Affect 
74. Process of Asking Questions (R. S. Taylor, 
1962): visceral, conscious, formalized, and 
compromised 
1962 
4, Inability to 
locate (Stage 4) 
4, Inability to 
verbalize 
(Stage 2)  
75. Professions & Occupational Identities (P. 
Wilson, 1983) 1983 
No, except in its 
absence 
76. Problematic Integration Theory & Uncertainty 
Management Theory (Babrow, 1992)  1992 
5.3.4, Fear of bad 
news  
6.1, Desire for 
disengagement 
77. Question-Negotiation in Libraries (R. S. 
Taylor, 1967, 1968). Visceral, conscious, 
formalized, compromised levels of the question. 
Librarian hope to revert compromised to 
formalized. 
1967 
4, Inability to 
locate (Stage 4) 
4, Inability to 
verbalize 
(Stage 2)  




79. Reader Response Theory (Rosenblatt, 1938): 
efferent-aesthetic reading continuum. (Fish, 
1967): privatization of meaning. 
1938 6.1, Avoidance of real information 
80. Reference Group Theory (Dawson & 
Chatman, 2001) Behavior of group (family, 
class, party) influences behavior of members. 
Perception of others = basis of self-perception 
2001 No, leads to CNI 
81. Reification of Information (Buckland, 1991) 1991 Not apparently. 
82. Sense-Making in Individuals (Dervin, 1979) 1979 4, Threshold knowledge lack 
83. Sensemaking in Organizations (Gilmore & 
Murphy, 1991; Weick, 1995): organizational 
people attend to the environment that they 
construct 
1991 No. Use, not CNI 
84. Serious Leisure (Stebbins, 1982) 1982 No. 
85. Small-World Network Exploration: in persons 
(Milgram, 1967): in network nodes (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998) 
1967 No. Use, not nonuse 
Small-World Theory: See Gratification Theory 
and Normative Behavior  -- -- 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
86. Social Capital (Jacobs, 1961; Bourdieu, 1986; 
Lin, 2001) 1961 
2, Societal 
barriers 
87. Social Constructionist Viewpoint on 
Information Practices (Tuominen & Savolainen, 
1997): impact of culture on self-supervised 
information behavior 
1997 No, leads to filtering. 
88. Social Learning Theory = Theory of Planned 
Behavior (Bandura, 1977); Social Cognition 
(Bandura, 1986): social experience determines 
behavior. 
1986 No, except in its absence. 
Social Network Theory (Outsiders): See 
Impoverished Life-World of Outsiders -- -- 
89. Social Positioning: by gender (Hollway, 1984); 
individual social history & goals, & group norms 
(van Langenhove & Harré, 1999); by physical, 
digital, & social space (Given, 2002) 
1984 No, leads to CNI. 
90. Spatial Location of Information (George A. 
Miller, 1968): some humans locate information 
[sources] spatially 
1968 1, Mismatched intelligences 
91. Speech Act Therapy (Austin, 1962) speech IS 
act 1962 Not apparently. 
92. Strength of Weak Ties (Liu & Duff, 1972; 
Granovetter, 1973): weak ties allow information 
to enter an otherwise closed social system. 
Human Networks (Gosser, 1991) Strength of 
weak ties in orgs. > tech. 
1972 




93. Symbolic Violence (Foucault, 1977; Bourdieu, 
1991): the power of words and thoughts 1977 




94. Transtheoretical Model of Health Behavior 
Change (Prochaska, 1979; Prochaska & 
DiClemente, 1983): stages of behavior change, 
drawn from several theories 
1979 No, except in its absence 
95. Undiscovered Public Knowledge (Farradane et 




4, Inability to 
locate 
5.4, Priming 
96. User-Driven Model (R. S. Taylor, 1986a) 1986 No. CNI might be one factor. 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
97. Value Sensitive Design (Friedman, 1997): 
computers should & do have human values 1997 
No, derives from 
CNI. 
98. Value-Added Approach (R. S. Taylor, 1982, 
1986b). See also Information Use 
Environments. 
1982 No, except in its absence 
99. Willingness to Return (Durrance, 1989): 
indicator of search success 1989 6.1, Cost-benefit 






101. World Wide Web Information Seeking 
(Choo et al., 1998): motivations (the strategies 
and modes of viewing and searching) and 
moves (the tactics used to find and use 
information) 
1998 No. IR motivations 
102. Zone of Intervention (Kuhlthau, 1996): 
proximal information professionals can help a 
seeker to overcome the principle of uncertainty 
1996 
6.2, Deference to 
cognitive 
authority 
103. Zone of Proximal Development (Vygotsky, 
1978): the child learns by imitating proximal 
adults 
1978 





APPENDIX 3: SELECTED INFORMATION BEHAVIORS 
TITLE Date CNI? 
1. Browsing (Chang & Rice, 1993) Info use, then 
info use in context. 1993 
No, CNI underlies 
browsing. 
2. Elicitation as Micro Level Information Seeking 
(Wu, 1993) question-asking and IR system 
design do not inform each other.
1993 No. Use, not CNI 
3. False Positives (Applegate, 1993) satisfied 
with inadequate information via material 








6.2, Avoidance of 
irrelevant 
information 
4. Fear Appeals (Janis & Feshback, 1953) 1953 
5.3.4, Fear of bad 
news  
6.1, Desire for 
disengagement
5. Information Activities in Work Tasks of Varying 
Complexity (Culnan, 1983; Byström & Järvelin, 
1995) complexity increases use of less 
accessible sources. 
1995 6.1, Cost-benefit 
6. Information Gathering Patterns and Creativity 
(Maizell, 1960) 1960 No. Use, not CNI 
7. Keeping Found Things Found (W. Jones et al., 
2001) knowledge management 2001 
No, Storage, not 
CNI 
8. Multitasking (Miwa, 2001; Spink et al., 2006) 2001 No, IR 
9. Rounding: ambiguity, imprecision, public, 
taken for granted, only critical outside 
information (Chatman, 1999), & Dissonant 
Grounds: rounding by organizations (Solomon, 
2005) 
2005 No, derived from CNI 
10. Scholarly Migration (McCain, 1984): active 
refocusing v passive re-evaluation 1984 
No, except in its 
absence 
11. Selection & Censorship (Asheim, 1953, 1983) 1953 3, Authoritarian controls 
12. Specialization (Bar-Hillel, 1963) 1963 6.1, Avoidance of overload 
13. Stopping Behavior (Zach, 2005) 2005 6.1, Satisficing
14. Web Information Behaviors of Organizational 
Workers (Detlor, 2000): organizational, user, 
and interface factors in Web use
2000 No, derives from CNI 
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TITLE Date CNI? 
15. Work Task Information Seeking & Retrieval 
Processes. Information systems should be 
designed to meet human IR needs (Hansen, 
1997).  
1997 No, derives from CNI. 
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APPENDIX 4: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SUBJECT HEADINGS 
 To compile this list of Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH), I 
searched for the term "information" on the Library of Congress Web site 
"Classification Web" (Library of Congress, 2006). The search revealed several 
hundred subject headings containing the word "information," and I chose those 
headings that I concluded to be pertinent to use of information or nonuse of 
information. I based my conclusions on my familiarity with the literatures about 
the use and nonuse of information. 
 The terms appear here in alphabetical order. The primary term appears 
first, followed by other terms (in parentheses) for which the primary term is the 
preferred term. Any Library of Congress annotation then follows a colon. Column 
1 (Use/CNI) denotes whether the subject heading refers to information use, and if 
the subject heading does not refer to use, which element of the taxonomy of 
Figure 1.1 appears to be associated with the nonuse (CNI #). Column 2 contains 
the LCSH. I assigned the Use or CNI # of Column 1 to each LCSH based on my 
familiarity with the literatures about the use and nonuse of information. Eleven 
subject headings reflected CNI (CNI #), and 15 reflected use (Use).  
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Use/CNI Library of Congress Subject Heading 
Use 1. Business information services--Use studies (Business 
information services--Utilization [Former Heading]) 
CNI 4 2. Common fallacies (Blunders; Errors, Popular [Former Heading]; 
Fallacies, Common; Information, Misattributed; Misattributed 
information; Misconceptions, Popular; Misinformation; Mistakes, 
Popular; Popular errors; Popular misconceptions) 
Use 3. Cross-language information retrieval (CLIR (Cross-language 
information retrieval); Multilingual information retrieval; Polyglot 
information retrieval) 
CNI 2 4. Cyberterrorism: Here are entered works on attacks or threats of 
attack against any portion of an information infrastructure.  
CNI 2 5. Digital divide (Divide, Digital; GDD (Global digital divide)): Here 
are entered works on the perceived gap between those who 
have access to the latest information technologies and those 
who do not.  
CNI 3 6. Disinformation: Here are entered works on false, misleading, or 
trivial information deliberately planted by an intelligence 
organization to confuse another nation's intelligence operations. 
CNI 5.2 7. Distraction (Psychology)   (Divided attention) 
CNI 3 8. Executive privilege (Government secrecy; Secrecy in 
government) 
CNI 3 9. Foreign news--Censorship  
CNI 3 10. Freedom of information in the church (Secrecy in the church) 
Use 11. Human information processing (Information processing, 
Human) 
Use 12. Human information processing--Age factors (Age factors in 
human information processing) 
Use 13. Human information processing--Effect of drugs on 
Use 14. Information behavior (Information-seeking behavior): Here are 
entered works on the ways human beings interact with various 
sources and channels of information, including both active and 
passive information-seeking, and information use. 
Use 15. Information literacy (Literacy, Information): Here are entered 
works on the ability to recognize when information is needed 
and to locate, evaluate, and use the required information 
effectively.  
Use 16. Information retrieval (Data retrieval; Data storage; Information 
storage and retrieval; Retrieval of information) 
Use 17. Information services--Use studies (Use studies about 
information services) 
Use 18. Information visualization   (Visualization of information) 
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Use/CNI Library of Congress Subject Heading 
Use 19. Intellectual freedom   (Access to ideas; Freedom of thought; 
Freedom to read) 
Use 20. Leaks (Disclosure of information) 
Use 21. Library information networks--Use studies 
Use 22. Personal information management (Information management, 
Personal; PIM (Personal information management)) 
CNI 3 23. Selective dissemination of information (Dissemination of 
information, Selective; Information dissemination, Selective; 
SDI (Information services)) 
CNI 5 
CNI 6 
24. Selectivity (Psychology)   (Attention, Selective; Selective 
attention; Selective perception) 
CNI 4 25. Uncertainty (Information theory) (Measure of uncertainty 
(Information theory); Shannon's measure of uncertainty; 
System uncertainty) 
Use 26. Use studies: Use as a topical subdivision under types of 
information resources, information services, libraries, library 
resources, and publications for works about use studies about 
those resources or services.  
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APPENDIX 5: A DIFFERENT TAXONOMY OF CNI, one based on the 
transmission model of communication 
 A taxonomy of compelled  
nonuse of information, based on  
the transmission model of  
communication (Figure A5), might  
work as well as the taxonomy  
based on cognitive involvement  
(Figure 1.1). Documentation of this  
transmission model originated with  
Aristotle (1954, original 350 B.C.E.) 
as "speaker-speech-audience" and found modern expression in the book The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Shannon 
and Weaver's model, a telecommunications engineering model, expressed the 
elements of the model as "source-transmitter-message-channel-receiver-
destination." Somewhat concurrently, Lasswell (1948) developed a parallel 
sociological model based on his earlier work (1927) about propaganda. The 
Lasswell model used the formula: "Who says what in what channel to whom with 
what effect" (1948). Schramm (1954) modified the Shannon-Weaver "source-
transmitter" to "sender-encoder" and the Shannon-Weaver "receiver-destination" 
to "decoder-receiver" to produce the system depicted in Figure A5. 
 Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication and the 
transmission model of communication inspired much discussion and met with 
Figure A5: Schramm's communication 
model of information transfer. 
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criticism from several sources. For example, some have criticized the model for 
its unidirectional linearity, a shortcoming that Shannon and Weaver later 
addressed with the addition of a feedback loop. Some criticized it for its lack of 
consideration of noise in the channel, a shortcoming also corrected later by 
Shannon and Weaver.  
 Further criticisms emerged. Reddy (1993, pp. 176-182) noted that: 
The logic of the [conduit metaphor] framework runs like threads in 
many directions through the syntactic and semantic fabric of our 
speech habits.… [O]f the entire metalingual apparatus of the English 
language, at least seventy percent is directly, visibly, and graphically 
based on the conduit metaphor. (pp. 176-177) 
Therefore, implies Reddy, Shannon and Weaver reacted to a pervasive, 
irresistible schema, and others, reading Shannon/Weaver, interpreted the 
Shannon/Weaver model in light of this schema. Reddy continues: 
As soon as people ventured away from the original, well-defined area 
of the mathematics, and were forced to rely more on ordinary 
language, the essential insight of information theory was muddled 
beyond repair [by the distorting influence of the conduit model on 
ordinary language]. (p. 182) 
Reddy also noted the confusion generated by Shannon/Weaver's use of 
"message" (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 7) versus their use of "signal" (p. 7) and 
"meaning" (p. 4). MacKay (1969) objected to the Shannon/Weaver definition of 
information independent of meaning, but readers of Shannon remember that 
Shannon specifically avoided the concept of meaning in his model (Weaver 
expressed ambivalence about meaning). Cherry (1966, pp. 214-219), referring to 
the misuse of the concept of entropy, objected to the application of this model, 
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designed for engineering applications, to human communication. Shera (1983, p. 
385), decrying the subordination of purpose to process, stated: "Librarians would 
do well to remember occasionally [Michelangelo's] Moses or a Pietà and think 
somewhat less frequently of Shannon and Weaver." 
 In spite of its alleged shortcomings, this model has gained some 
acceptance in Library and Information Science (LIS) and in cognate disciplines. 
For example, the model is "widely accepted as one of the main seeds out of 
which Communication Studies has grown" (Fiske, 1982, p. 6). Further, this study 
did not rely on the concepts suggested by Reddy, MacKay, Cherry, and Shera, 
concepts such as "meaning," "message," "noise," "feedback," "destination," and 
"process." In other words, had this study employed the transmission model 
depicted in Figure A5, it would have required only the five components of the 
model depicted in Figure A5, and that model would have provided an adequate 
and extremely useful graphical conceptualization of CNI. 
 To develop the taxonomy below, I placed 22 conditions leading to CNI in 
locations in Figure A5, based on my familiarity with CNI. For example, 
authoritarian control (1) appears to emanate primarily from the sender and to 
depend upon the encoding employed by sender. Environmental and social 
barriers (2 and 3) narrow the channel of communication. Conditions 4 through 22 
appear to me to be barriers against the accurate decoding of a communication, 
with conditions 4-10 lying closer to the sender/encoder, and conditions 11-22 
lying a bit closer to the receiver. This taxonomy would require much further 
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thought before being useful to this study, but it does illustrate the possibility of 
other taxonomies for conditions leading to CNI. 
Sender/Encoder (elements 3.1 to 3.5 and 3/6 to 3.8 of Figure 1.1) 
1 Authoritarian control: Censorship/selection, misinformation, or 
disinformation by an authority; Tacit approval or disapproval by an 
authority; Explicit approval or disapproval by an authority; Enforcement by 
an authority: reward & punishment 
Channel (element 2 of Figure 1.1) 
2 Environmental barriers unrelated to abilities, for example, geographical 
isolation, bad systems 
3 Societal barriers: lack of economic, cultural, or social capital, for example, 
race, physical appearance, advanced age, gender prejudice 
Decoder (elements 1.3, 5.3, 5.4, and 6.2 of Figure 1.1) 
4 Affect/emotion/mood  
5 Mismatched intelligences, for example, Eidetic v symbolic imagery  
6 Fear of the unknown  
7 Avoidance of cognitive dissonance  
8 Attribution theory  
9 Selective memory 
10 Priming (selective acceptance of expected information)  
Receiver (elements 1.1, 1.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1 of Figure 1.1) 
11 Homeostasis, habituation  
12 Neuro-chemical mandates (e.g., drugs, alcohol, neuro-chemical 
pathology) 
13 Somatic pathology, for example, traumatic amnesia  
14 Somatic barriers related to abilities, for example, disposition based on 
personality or gender, physical impairment, advanced age 
15 Creativity/originality promoting nonuse via engrossment & dissociation, or 
association 
16 Threshold knowledge shortfall, such as inability to locate information, 
naïve conceptions  
17 Psychological engrossment, attention, and distraction 
18 Principle of Least Effort  
19 Desire for disengagement  
20 Resignation  
21 Avoidance of overload 
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